AJPAM Guide to Contributors

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AJPAM is a bi-annual publication published in January and July each year. Manuscripts discussing a range of issues of public administration, leadership, management, development and related matters across the continent and from other parts of the world are welcome.

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Contents

Message from the Editor 5

Managing International Migration in the African Context:  
The South African Experience 7  
Mataywa Busieka

Assessing Areas of Application of the Demand-Driven Capacity Building Grant of the  
District Development Facility Functional Organizational Assessment Tool by Local  
Governments in Ghana 20  
Abdulai Darimani, Abdul-Mumin Abdulai and Frederick Agyarko Oduro

Electronic Governance and Service Delivery in Nigeria: Challenges and Solution 33  
Anieti Nseowo Udofo and Johnson Ijale Echor

The Nexus Between Africa’s National Resources and Socioeconomic Development:  
The Mediating Role of Learning Transformational Leadership 43  
Robert Kemepade Moruku

Effects of Work-related Stress on Employees’ Performance in the Nigerian  
Banking Industry: A Study of Selected Banks in the Federal Capital Territory,  
Abuja 67  
Nana Usman Bature

Ethics and Integrity in Public Service Leadership: A Case for Promoting Meritocratic,  
Professional and Neutral Service 82  
Sylvester O. Obong’o

The Rationale for Local Governments’ Decentralisation Implementation Role  
Examined: An International Reflection 99  
Stephen Gunura Bwengye

Cultural Impact on Public Administration and Governance in Africa:  
The Nigerian Case 109  
Dhikru Adewale Yagboyaju
Editor’s Foreword

The African Journal for Public Administration and Management (AJPAM) is glad to bring to you its new edition. AJPAM brings together a wide variety of articles which have considerable relevance to African public services. The journal covers wide ranging topical current issues vital in the transformation of public administration for the development of Africa.

Mataywa Busieka’s article assesses policy, legal and institutional measures South Africa has put in place to address the emerging issue of international migration. In his analysis, migration in South Africa has a deep historical and socio-economic background dating as far back as 1913 where the colonial government sought immigrants of “white” descent to build the economy. The 1994 democratic government sought to remedy the situation by reversing racially-based and exploitative laws and integrate SA into the Southern African Development Community region, the African continent and the world as a whole as envisioned in the 1994 Abuja treaty. This article provides a policy framework for migration and integration policies.

Abdulai Darimani discusses the District Development Facility (DDF) introduced in 2008 by the Government of Ghana to support local governments through discretionary funding. He discusses how capacities are evaluated using the Functional Organisational Assessment Tool (FOAT) by which local governments with high scores receive more funding than low scoring authorities. The study adopts the responsiveness theory which implies that putting financial authority and resources in the hands of local governments enhances their capacity for discretionary spending, creates incentives for performance and increases their accountability to beneficiaries of services they deliver.

Anieti Nseowo Udofo and Johnson Ijale Echor address the strategic position Information and Communication Technologies occupies in governance in Africa’s largest economy, Nigeria. The emergence of such technologies has led to the need for electronic governance to monitor the process of information dissemination, construction and citizen participation. Electronic governance has the potential to ensure proper functioning of Information Communication Technologies and result to accountability, speed, responsiveness, effectiveness as well as efficient service delivery despite challenges.

Robert Moruku draws a nexus between Africa’s national resources and socio-economic development while examining the role of transformational leadership. In his discourse he presents Africa as a continent blessed with natural resources, yet the plight of African citizens remains deplorable, which he attributes to pervasively weak leadership capacity. The transformational leader, he posits, offers a transcendental purpose for addressing the higher-order needs of their followers. By employing the “logical-scientific or paradigmatic mode” the author concludes that leadership has a big role to play in orchestrating socioeconomic development of Africa.
Nana Usman Bature addresses the effects of work stress on employees’ performance in the banking industry in Nigeria. Stress is a psychosocial factor which hampers the wellbeing of workers thereby reducing performance and productivity. Many parallels can be drawn between the banking sector and public services as the stress triggers cut across all fields. The author recommends the enhancement of stress management such as regular training, openness and understanding among employees and administrative support.

Sylvester O. Obong'o’s article on ethics and integrity in public service leadership focuses on the Kenyan public service. The author notes that the Government of Kenya has put in place several approaches aimed at instilling ethical behaviour in the public servants including legislation, development of a code of conduct and training. The author recommends further research to determine if non-compliance to the stipulated code of conduct is due to weak implementation or public servants are taking advantage of loop-holes.

Stephen Gunura Bwengye analyzes local government decentralization in Uganda. In his analysis, a decentralized authority in comparison to central government can be more accessible and responsive to local needs thereby enhancing accountability in service delivery and community participation. Community participation is also seen to encourage innovative solutions for local problems in the decision-making process.

Dhikru Adewale Yagboyaju analyzes cultural impact on public administration and governance in Africa. Using Nigeria as a case study, he argues that the endemic culture of corruption acts as a deterrent to development. He concludes that Nigeria’s weak governance system, part of which is the country’s public administrative system, nurtures a culture of impunity and under-development that can only be addressed through a cultural reorientation.

I conclude by thanking all the authors who submitted their work for assessment, heeded the advice of the editors and produced well thought-out articles. The journal needs more submissions of articles by members of the Association and other stakeholders. We therefore urge you to develop and submit articles for publication in the AJPAM. Through knowledge sharing, the journal plays a critical role in capacity development. We especially encourage young professionals to submit their articles for consideration. We look forward to seeing more submissions of articles from this quarter.

Finally, I would like to thank my colleagues on the editorial board for their excellent work in reviewing the submissions. We also appreciate the AAPAM secretariat for their supporting role in ensuring the publication of AJPAM.

Prof. Malcolm Wallis
Chief Editor
Managing International Migration in the African Context: The South African Experience

Mataywa Busieka

Abstract

The subject of international migration and the concomitant narrative about policy and institutional capacity to manage it has in the recent past gained notoriety following the flood of migrants from Asia to Europe. In contributing to this fascinating discourse, this paper assesses policy, legal and institutional measures South Africa has taken and proposes to develop towards an Africa oriented as opposed to the current Euro-centric International Migration dispensation. The paper explains the tenets informing this fundamental change towards a policy regime that is in line with the African development agenda. In view of the foregoing imperative, this paper will commence with an overview of a broad context within which international migration is unfolding in South Africa. The paper will then examine the policy options South Africa has proposed and is considering for implementation to manage international migration in the African context guided as it were by regional policy instruments. The paper will outline the various policy instruments that have been developed by the African Union (AU) and the South African development Community (SADC) to guide and facilitate the free movement of persons, goods and capital amongst the member states. A reflective conclusion will round off the discussion on this contribution.

Key Words: Economic migrant, Diaspora, foreign nationals, national security, International migration, regional

Introduction

“It is without a doubt a fascinating world we reside in: an increasingly interdependent world; one in which international trade, overseas investment, global communications, worldwide travel, large-scale migration, transferred technology and cross-border crime are commonplace. It is a world in which we all need partners abroad to help us boost business, create jobs, promote trade, manage migration, protect the environment, tackle terrorism, preserve peace and defend our interests” (Hain, 2017).

True to this pithy quote, in the course of the 21st century, globalisation and increased synthesis between the fields of trade, migration and investment has more than ever challenged the capacity of states to autonomously manage such flows, thus giving rise to regionalism and multilateral solutions. Although international migration flows are becoming increasingly intercontinental, most international migrants move within major regions, in particular, migration seems to be influenced by regional processes so says the National Centres of Competence in Research (NCCR, 2017).

This is why, for South Africa (SA), and being an integral part of the continent, managing...
international migration within the context of Africa becomes a critical policy instrument. It is important to first set the context within which South Africa grapples with the increasingly dicey international migration question before looking at the current and proposed policy option to better manage this complex phenomenon.

The Genesis of International Migration in South Africa

Migration patterns in any country are better understood through the prism of historical, economic and geographical contexts (Johnson 2011:10). Much of South Africa’s economy was built by migrant workers, a postulation that suggests that SA, as a nation, is a product of migration (Seda, 2016:35). For South Africa what this means is that any migration policy should and must be informed by this historical evolution which if wished away can lead to kneejerk responses that can worsen the migration crises and create more avenues for corruption and illegal migration to flourish (Gordon 2010:12), see also (Peberdy, 1997, Crush, 1998, Williams 1999 and Maharaj, 2004).

SA’s international migration policy is based on the post-1994 Constitution (Act 108 of 1996) and it should be understood in the context of its history and geographical location. It is important to point out that migration in southern Africa has long been shaped by many factors, most of which will persist after any resolution of the current challenges informed as it were by the time honoured flow of migrants from relatively poor to relatively rich societies and more crucially is the fact that arbitrary colonial borders divided communities that remain closely linked to one another by culture, shared history and kinship (McDonald et al (1999:13), see also Solomon (1996:3). In the light of the growing economic integration, and the stated intention of countries in the region to ease cross-border movements, migration flows may well increase in coming decades (Johnson 2011:7). It is no wonder then that SA has been and continue attract migrant labour on the continent since the 19th century (Gordon 2010:8).

Much of the international migration policy paradigm in SA in the late 19th and the 20th centuries was dominated by the discourse of recruiting “desirable” whites and excluding migrants from Asia and India in particular and in terms of acquiring citizenship, formal immigration under colonial and apartheid rule was essentially conceived of as being for whites only see Immigrants Regulation Act of 1913, (McDonald 2000:814, Simelane 1999:11, IOM 2005:1). With regard to African migrants, domestic and foreign, the primary concern of apartheid and pre-1948 South African governments was to ensure colonial domination and an abundant supply of cheap migrant labour from across SA and the region which enabled SA to become the most advanced economy in Africa (Mattes et al 2000:7).

The major aim of the first nationwide immigration legislation passed in SA, the Immigrants Regulation Act of 1913, was to exclude Indian immigrants who had followed Indians who had entered after 1860 as indentured labourers to work in the sugar cane plantations and their growing population was considered a major threat to the ideology of white supremacy. The Aliens Control Act of 1991 was based on the 1913 Act that excluded blacks and was amended in 1930 and 1937 to exclude Jews, who were among categories of European migrants considered undesirable.
on racial, religious or political grounds (Peberdy et al 2000). The racist orientation of SA’s international migration policy became very evident when the government welcomed whites from neighbouring states in Southern Africa who felt ‘threatened’ by black majority rule (Gordon 2010:9).

Under apartheid, immigration control manifested chiefly in tight border security and restrictions on Africans considered politically undesirable and others entering the country, and on Africans travelling abroad (Johnson 2011:17). Ports of entry were under the control of police directed by an intelligence unit until 1992 when immigration officers were introduced in which construct the fragmented departments of “Home Affairs” (variously named) were responsible respectively for general control via the pass laws while delivering modern services largely to whites (DHA Guidelines: 2016:8).

From 1994, the vision of SA’s first democratic governments was to reverse racially-based and exploitative laws, and integrate SA into the SADC region, the African continent and the world (Preamble to the SA Constitution Act 108 of 1996). The transition to democracy has enabled SA to play a full and active role in the family of nations this being one of the fruits of a struggle in which the mobilisation of international support played a critical role, based on the principles of internationalism and universal human rights (Gordon 2010:3), see also (Maharaj 2004:2, Crush et al 2005(a):25). With these lofty constitutional foundations, the main focus for SA is to construct an international migration regime that accelerates development and this to be achieved through inter-state cooperation fast in the Southern Africa region and ultimately the rest of Africa.

SA has undergone a protracted process of developing policy and legislation on international migration and refugees since 1994 a process that involved the drafting of a WHITE Paper (WP) on International Migration in 1997, a White Paper on International Migration accompanied by a Draft Immigration Bill, and the adoption of the first comprehensive Immigration Act in 2002, which has subsequently been amended. The Refugees Act that legislated in 1998 is currently undergoing amendments (DHA 2016).

The African Union Agenda 2063 (AU Agenda, 2063) has highlighted the importance of free movement by Africans in Africa for meaningful integration, and increased trade this being one of the seven (7) overarching aspirations outlined in Agenda 2063 namely: “an integrated continent, politically united, based on the ideals of Pan-Africanism and the vision of Africa’s Renaissance” (AU Agenda 2063: Aspiration 2:9). The clauses that unpack this aspiration (23 and 24) mention free movement twice thereby locating it at the heart of political and economic regional integration.

The AU Agenda 2063 goes on to call for action to introduce an African Passport, issued by member states, capitalising on the global migration towards e-passports, and with the abolishment of visa requirements for all African citizens in all African countries by 2018 (AU Agenda 2063: 33). Contrary to this vision, the reality is that on average Africans require visas to travel to 55% of other African countries whilst visas are issued on arrival in only 25% of other countries and in yet another scenario Africans do not need a visa to travel to just 20% of other countries on the continent (DHA WP:2016:16).
In the context of the vision espoused in Agenda 2063 and more importantly placing a premium on the benefits of regional integration, the current SA scenario on free movement of persons is untenable. Even though SA is fully supportive of the Agenda 2063 vision of an Africa where its citizens can move more freely across national borders, where intra-Africa trade is encouraged and there is greater integration and development of the African continent (Johnson 2011:4), implementation of these measures remains a key challenge (Gordon 2010:9). The following chapter will demonstrate that there is sufficient documented will among African nations to open up borders but there is a massive bay between intention and practice.

**International Migration Instruments in Southern Africa**

The first major blueprint for Africa’s development – the Lagos Plan of Action and the Final Act of Lagos – was adopted almost three decades ago, and set out a vision of an integrated African market by the year 2000, subsequently given further impetus by the Abuja Treaty which was approved in 1991 and came into force in 1994, proposing an African Economic Community (AEC) to be in place by 2028 (Qobo, 2007:1). The aim of the AEC is to promote economic, social and cultural development as well as African economic integration in order to increase self-sufficiency and endogenous development and to create a framework for development, mobilisation of human resources and material (Abuja Treaty, 1991:2).

The African Union has recognised eight Regional Economic Communities (RECs) which are the building blocks of the African Economic Community (AEC) established in the 1991 Abuja Treaty that provides the overarching framework for continental economic integration: these include the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU); the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the East African Community (EAC), the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA); the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS); and the Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CENSAD11) (Hartzenberg, 2011:13).

These regional approaches are usually based on the conclusion of free trade instruments between countries in a specific region with a view to enabling economic development and these may range from extensive free movement regimes applicable to all categories of persons to more limited provisions focusing on the movement of qualified individuals (Sakyi et al, 2014:7-8). Africa as a continent is also experiencing an increase in intraregional migration and research has shown that, to a larger extent, these movements occur essentially within the Continent (Melo et al: 2014:9-10). This development does not, however, detract from the reality that these migratory flows are occurring in an African context still marked by the inadequacy of institutional capacities of some African countries to address migration challenges individually and collectively and hence the need for any policy position on the management of international migration needs to take these migration flows and institutional capacity factors into consideration (AU, 2006).

Free movement of persons within regional integration construct encompasses three types of movements: visa-free entry for short visits and/or granting of visa on arrival; the right
of residence (temporary and permanent), and the right of establishment (income generating activities such as work and starting a business) and to this extent regional policy instruments are generally used to guide member states to develop their national policies on international migration (DHA WP:2016:52), see also (Khumalo: 2007:8-9). SA has developed a new White Paper on International Migration which is Africa oriented as opposed to the current one that is based on historical ties with Europe (DHA: 2016). The main objective of the WP on International Migration is to develop a South African policy position for managing international migration in line with the African development agenda.

Freer movement of people across the continent is cited as a key long-term objective of the AU (AU Agenda 2063:32). Since the early 2000, the relationship between migration and development has become increasingly important to the AU and in this respect, in 2006 the AU adopted the African Common Position on Migration and Development which covers a number of areas including migration and development, human resources and the brain drain, remittances, trade, migration and peace, security and stability, migration and human rights (AU, 2006).

Agenda 2063 proposes to take the Abuja Treaty further by calling for action to all segments of African society to work together to build a prosperous and united Africa based on shared values and a common destiny (Agenda 2063: 102). The AU at its 25th Ordinary Session gave the clearest commitment on regional integration which in itself set clear parameters for the international migration policy by, among others, proposing the establishment of the Continental Free Trade Area (CFTA), and the implementation of continent-wide visa free regimes including issuance of visas on arrival at ports of entry for African citizens (AU 2016). For the purpose of this contribution the focus will shift and narrow to the SADC experience which has a far greater impact on and informs South Africa’s international migration policy.

SADC Regional Migration Policy Framework

The goal of achieving the free movement of people, goods and capital in the region has long been a priority for SADC, and is seen as integral to promoting development, poverty alleviation, and prospects of greater integration (Landau et al 2015:4). To this end, a number of protocols have been adopted by the SADC member states to address the free movement of SADC nationals. The various protocols are briefly reviewed in the following sub-sections.

SADC Member States have developed a protocol on the facilitation of persons whose overall objective of the Protocol is to facilitate the movement of persons (SADC, 2005), but more specifically, it aims to facilitate the entry of citizens from SADC into other member states without the need for a visa, for a maximum period of ninety (90) days and develop national policies aimed at the progressive elimination of obstacles to the movement of persons of the region generally into and within the territories of State Parties (Khumalo, 2007: 26). The Protocol makes reference to the provisions pertaining to residence and establishment (See articles 14, 17, 18 and 21).

To date though (2017) only nine (9) Member States have signed while only four (4) (including SA) have ratified the Protocol. Failure to develop compatible immigration policies laws and systems, lack of accurate population registers, individual states clinging to national
sovereignty; the perception of migration as a security and not a developmental issue; protectionist immigration laws and policies; the criminalisation of foreign migrants and the all-pervasive xenophobia in most countries are among the reasons for this inordinate delay to ratify the Protocol (Matlosa 2006).

Whilst the SADC Protocol on the facilitation of movement of persons covers the rights to residency and establishment (Article 16 and 18), it however leaves the granting of such rights to the discretion of Member States. This is a major drawback of the Protocol especially when compared with the ECOWAS (Khumalo, 2007: 14) and EAC (EAC, 2010) disciplines which are more permissive in this regard. There is therefore no regional policy framework that guides SADC Member States in granting residence and establishment rights a yawning gap that gives individual countries unlimited leeway to adopt both unilateral and bilateral approaches when dealing with the residency and establishment rights for SADC nationals (Khumalo: 2007:15)

Other free moment protocols acceded to by SADC Member States are; the Protocol on Education and Training of 1997, the Protocol on Tourism of 1998, the Protocol on Free Trade of 1996 and the SADC initiative for Refugee Commissioners, of which SA is part, which aims to create a common regional approach on the management of asylum seekers and refugees (SADC, 1996). All these Protocols are geared towards facilitating free moment of persons in those specific sectors within the SADC region.

From the foregoing analysis, it is clear there is unambiguous intention on the part of SADC Member States to open up borders for free moment of people but the bay between this statement of intention and the implementation itself is on a massive scale. This is in contrast to the ECOWAS and EAC where there is far deeper integration and more permissive disciplines on free movement of persons. The ECOWAS Protocol (ECOWAS, 1979) for example makes general provisions for the right of the Community citizens to enter, reside and establish in the territory of Member States which rights would be progressively established in the course of a maximum transitional period of fifteen (15) years from the definitive entry into force of the Protocol and to achieve this objective the Protocol concomitantly obligates Member States to abolish all obstacles to free movement of persons and to the right of residence and establishment (Article 2).

Article 2 of the ECOWAS Protocol further states that the Community citizens have the right to enter, reside and establish in the territory of Member States and that a citizen of the Community visiting any Member State for a period not exceeding ninety (90) days can enter free of visa requirements save that such a citizen is required to obtain permission for an extension of stay (Article 3). Member states are however given the right to refuse admission to citizens of the Community that fall in the category of inadmissible immigrants under its laws (Article 4).

EAC Member States have on the other hand adopted measures to achieve the free movement of persons, labour and services, and the right of establishment and residence of their citizens in the EAC region under article 104 of the Treaty Establishing EAC (1999). Provisions on free movement of persons entails the abolition of any discrimination based on nationality and includes the right to enter the territory of a Partner State without a visa; the right to move freely within the territory of a Partner State; the right to stay in the territory
of a Partner State; the right to exit without restrictions; and the right to full protection by the laws of a Partner State (EAC Article 104).

Even though SADC as a region lags behind ECOWAS and EAC on the imperative of free movement of persons and whilst most SADC Member States have not amended their policies in line with the SADC Protocol on free movement of persons, SA has adopted both unilateral and bilateral approaches in removing visa conditions for SADC and other nationals outside of SADC. For instance, SA has implemented visa waivers which are in line with the spirit of the Abuja Treaty with nationals of 11 of the 14 SADC countries (DHA, 2016). SA has also implemented the Zimbabwe Special Permit (ZSP) and Lesotho Special Permit (LSP) to regularise the large numbers of Zimbabwean and Basotho national residing in SA irregularly (DHA, 2016)

This section has outlined the context within which the SADC regional measures on free movement of person has evolved and it was clear that the region lags behind its erstwhile counterparts of ECOWAS and EAC in the implementation of progressive instruments and adherence to stipulation on free movement of persons. Consequently, SADC remains a slow work in progress towards the ideals of the Abuja Treaty. The next section will assess the proposed SA policy option for managing International Migration within the region.

**Policy Options for South Africa to Manage International Migrations Within the African Context**

It is a fact of life that the movement of persons across national borders carry with it benefits and also creates risks that have to be mitigated by each country and multilaterally. To manage its burgeoning international migration regime, SA has adopted a risk-based approach which advocates for an incremental removal of migration formalities for frequent and trusted travellers including diplomats, officials, academics, business persons, students etc, (DHA WP:56). Additionally in order to ease movement into SA for Africans from further afield, SA has begun offering a ten year multiple-entry visas to Africans from countries requiring visas to visit SA, who are frequent travellers, business people and academics (DHA:2016) (10)

South Africa is also grappling with the reality that a significant population of Zimbabwean and Basotho citizens are living as irregular migrants or asylum seekers in SA, some have acquired fraudulent documents and may live under false identities and many of them work, study or run businesses in SA (DHA, 2016). In response to these hard realities, South Africa has developed special dispensations visas for economic migrants from certain SADC countries which provides an opportunity for Zimbabwean (DHA, 2014) and Basotho nationals (DHA, 2016) to regularise their stay in SA see also (Papademetriou et. al 2004). These dispensations make provision for amnesty to those who declare fraudulently acquired documents and who do not have criminal records. Such dispensations often assume a variety of forms in different countries but in general they save both security and developmental objectives.

The White Paper (WP) sketches three (3) scenarios for consideration when developing policy of managing international migration in the African context. In what is termed as Option 1, the WP proposes a status quo; that is, no legal avenue would be provided
for SADC economic migrants with relatively low-level skills (DHA WP:62). The option supports the review of existing labour agreements with some neighbouring countries in line with the new vision of international migration. This will include stepping up of enforcement capacity, especially with regard to penalising employers who contravene labour and migration legislation. In support of this view, it is argued that SA is confronted with serious economic challenges of high levels of unemployment, inequality and poverty. This concern is captured in the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) report which avers that further opening of borders for low skilled international migrants has brought this group into direct competition for jobs and resources with South Africa’s poor who have migrated to the same urban settlements from rural areas (APRM 2012;109).

On the other hand, Option 2 advocates for free labour mobility by SADC nationals in support of regional economic development and integration whilst adopting a regional approach to resolving migration issues as is the case with ECOWAS and EAC since development accelerates as capital will have greater access to a large pool of labour (DHA WP:62). Option 3 takes the extreme view that the status quo is not viable, and free labour mobility within the region is not yet a reality and hence the need for SA to consider introducing a permitting regime for economic migrants from neighbouring SADC countries and in doing so, there must be due regard for the short and long term socio-economic impact (DHA WP: 62). This option, it is argued, will allow managed legal migration by economic migrants from Southern African Customs Union (SACU) countries, including Zimbabwe, Mozambique and Malawi. This option is supported by a compelling argument which avers that while SA is confronted with her own economic challenges, economic migration from the neighbouring countries is historical and will persist as long as pull and push factors remain hence the need to better manage this phenomenon (Johnson 2011:11).

The WP proffers an incremental implementation of at least three types of visas supported by measures such as the robust enforcement of labour and migration laws to ensure that citizens are not disadvantaged by employers paying economic migrants lower wages (DHA WP:62). The WP also supports what is called a SADC special work visa, one that will allow the holder to work in SA for a prescribed period of time but not qualify to progress to Permanent Residence on the basis of years spent in the country and that this be a quota-based regime implemented through bilateral agreements that specify responsibilities for the signatory and contracting States whilst partly leaving to political discretion the number of visas to be issued but one which should be informed by a fact-based analysis of the labour market demand (DHA WP:62).

For trade facilitation within the scope of regional integration, a SADC Traders’ visa is proposed which would be a long-term, multiple-entry visa for cross border traders who enter/exit the Republic frequently (DHA WP: 63). To promote and grow the Small and Medium Enterprise (SME) sector, a SADC SME visa is proposed which will be essentially for self-employed people, such as micro and small business owners. The overriding motivation for this option is that as long as these immigrants pay taxes and follow SA business regulations, they should be welcomed since this category of traders add value to the economy. It will be noted that most of these trade facilitation and free movement of labour visas are already
permissible within the ECOWAS and EAC regional integration disciplines. Additionally though, the WP adds the rider that these new visa regimes should be tied to a programme to regularize existing undocumented SADC migrants currently residing in SA, along the same lines as the special dispensation permits and other amnesties SA has conducted over the years (DHA WP:63). It is hoped that this hybrid permit dispensation will go a long way to minimise and developmentally manage the perennial challenge of illegal migration in SA.

Asylum seekers and refugees have arguably presented SA with the biggest headache in terms of managing international migration in the African context. Whilst SA is under international obligation to admit asylum seekers in the refugee regime in a humane and secure manner, for this objective to be achieved in a more efficient and sustainable manner, the WP recommends that Asylum Seeker processing centres be established closer to the borderline for ease of accommodation during the status determination process (DHA WP:63). Once properly cleared under the Immigration Act, efficient processing of asylum seekers under the Refugees Act will take place in the processing centres. This intervention will enable risks to be managed for both SA and the asylum seekers who often fall victim to corrupt networks of human traffickers. This is international best practice in countries such as Canada, Australia, Switzerland and Brazil see for example Papadopoulou, A. (2006).

As a major step towards resolving the compounding illegal migration challenge, the WP nudges SA to take robust steps to be able to refuse asylum to asylum seekers who have transited through one or more safe countries (DHA WP:2016:67). This significant is unlikely to be achieved without first building appropriate relationships and signing agreements with neighbouring countries as is the case in Europe through the Dublin agreement (Dublin Regulation, 2013).

The WP is alive to the necessity that once admitted into the country, it is of utmost importance that migrants are integrated into communities where they settle. Studies have shown that social cohesion can be maintained if migrants are successfully integrated into the society, that is, they receive equal treatment in terms of social protection (Narada, 2010:11). The integration policy will apply to holders of long term visas, permanent residents, naturalised citizens and refugees since these are the people who are in the country for extended periods and who will need to settle and interact with different institutions such as financial institutions (see also Taran, 2008).

Without an effective integration policy, the presence of communities and individuals who are not known to the local people but for whom the state has to provide, puts pressure on resources and increases the risk of social conflicts. Conversely, effective communication and building relationships between foreign and local communities improves stability, reduces tension for resources and improves conditions for co-existence between migrants and local communities (Reitz et al, 2006).

Finally the WP stresses the need for a ‘whole of government and society’ approach for the management of international migration considering more importantly the fact that international migration policy is cross-cutting and requires an inter-sectoral governance approach for it to succeed (DHA WP:2016:73). Countries like Canada have a well-managed migration program that requires participation of all stakeholders such
as employers, employees, and the authorities in origin and destination countries (Wong 2007). It follows that the DHA, being at the coal-face of coordinating international migration, has to be capacitated to more strategically and professionally manage and administer immigration legislation. It is to be noted that policy options may be constrained by the level of development in that lack of resources and organizational capacity in less developed countries may prevent them from implementing some of the best practices found in more developed nations (Narada, 2010:44).

Conclusion

Admittedly, international migration is a complex and compounding affair given the underpinning human rights issues. It is instructive that, no developed country has succeeded in stemming the flow of international migration patterns and so SA should, in acknowledging this global reality, put in place progressive policy measures to, within the African context, effectively manage the growing incidents of economic migrants, some illegal and others disguised in forms like asylum seekers.

There is, therefore, a pressing need to pay sufficient attention to developing a comprehensive policy framework that will render an effective coordination capacity across society to find a comfortable balance between optimising the economic benefits of migration whilst protecting human rights, including the right to safety and security of all who live in SA and hence the timely intervention of the WP.

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Assessing Areas of Application of the Demand-Driven Capacity Building Grant of the District Development Facility Functional Organizational Assessment Tool by Local Governments in Ghana

Abdulai Darimani¹, Abdul-Mumin Abdulai and Frederick Agyarko Oduro²

Abstract

The Government of Ghana and its development partners introduced the District Development Facility (DDF) in 2008 with the main aim of improving the capacities of Metropolitan, Municipal and District Assemblies (MMDAs) or local authorities for effective and efficient service delivery through access to discretionary funding. The Assemblies were assessed yearly on agreed indicators using the Functional Organisational Assessment Tool (FOAT). Local Authorities that performed well in the assessment are given financial grants for investment in infrastructure and capacity building but those that fail are given only the capacity building grant to build their capacities in the areas where capacity gaps have been identified. The study examined the areas of application of the demand-driven capacity building grant and the extent to which Assemblies independently prepare towards the annual FOAT assessment. This study used a qualitative approach with some basic descriptive statistics to show responses and analyse the data. The results showed training was the area with the highest application of the demand-driven capacity building grant and the extent to which Assemblies independently prepare towards the annual FOAT assessment. This study used a qualitative approach with some basic descriptive statistics to show responses and analyse the data. The results showed training was the area with the highest application of the demand-driven capacity building grant. Also, the use of external support for preparation towards the annual assessment was widespread among the sampled local authorities. The study recommended development of a policy and a clear formula for the proportional distribution of the demand driven capacity building grant among the identified capacity gaps.

Keywords: Demand-Driven, Capacity Building, Functional Organizational Assessment Tool, District Development Facility, Local governments in Ghana

Background

The Government of Ghana and its development partners introduced the District Development Facility (DDF) in 2008 as part of decentralization. The aim of the facility was to improve the capacities of Metropolitan, Municipal and District Assemblies (MMDAs) for effective and efficient service delivery through improved systems and access to discretionary funding. Under the facility, MMDAs were assessed yearly on agreed indicators using the Functional Organisational Assessment Tool (FOAT).

The local authorities that performed well in the annual FOAT assessment were given financial grants from the Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development for investment in infrastructure and capacity building. The grant comprised of two main components namely; the district development facility, which was...
available for all local authorities in Ghana and the Urban Development Grant, which was available only to the 46 local authorities established before 2012. The focus of this study was the district development facility.

The DDF grant comprises investment grant and capacity building grant. The MMDAs that fail the FOAT assessment do not qualify for the investment grant but are given the capacity building grant to build their capacities in the areas where capacity gaps have been identified. MMDAs face a number of capacity constraints that affect their ability for effective and efficient service delivery to their localities. The constraints include: difficulties in data and information management, limited tax revenues, inadequate logistics and skills. The capacity building grant is provided (12% of the annual DDF pool) to address these capacity constraints of all the MMDAs.

The capacity building grant 12 percent of the annual DDF pool—consists of two components: 40 per cent generic for the national level and 60 per cent demand-driven for the district level. The DDF Secretariat of the Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development manages the generic 40 per cent capacity building grant. The Local Government Service and the Institute of Local Government Studies provide support for the Ministry in the implementation of the 40 per cent generic capacity building grant in the area of training and monitoring.

The 60 per cent demand-driven portion of the capacity building grant is used by the MMDAs for their demand-driven capacity-building needs which cover training, logistics, and organizational strengthening including the establishment of database, accounting system development, and revenue generation and mobilization system (Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development 2012).

The DDF/FOAT had been implemented for a period of eight (8) years as at 2016. According to the Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development (2016) the MMDAs continue to have capacity gaps even though the assessment has been carried out for eight years. The capacity gaps are found in all the thematic areas, which is quite inconsistent with the increasing high level of scores recorded over the years. A review of the capacity building assessment reports showed that each annual assessment of the FOAT identified a horde of capacity constraints of all the MMDAs and in the thematic areas for both the minimum conditions and the performance measures. In addition, MMDAs continued to complain about the non-availability of simple logistics such as computers, writing desks, file trays, etc.

However, MMDAs continue to register very high scores in the national annual FOAT assessment. From a modest 47.3% in 2006 the national average score of the assessment rose to 61.39% in 2008 and further to 92.2% in 2013 (Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development 2012) a clear indication of a consistent increase in the performance of MMDAs in the annual FOAT assessment. Yet there were reported complaints that MMDAs continued to seek external assistance in their preparation towards the annual DDF/FOAT assessment.

The key research question is why MMDAs continue to seek external assistance in their preparation for the annual DDF/FOAT assessment despite the consistently high scores over the years? The objective of this study is to find out the areas in which MMDAs apply their share of the demand-driven capacity building grant. Secondly, the study seeks to determine the extent to which MMDAs
independently prepare towards the annual DDF/FOAT assessment.

This study adopts the responsiveness theory of Wetterberg & Brinkerhoff (2012). The responsiveness theory is a strand of the larger fiscal decentralization theory, which states that putting financial authority and resources in the hands of local governments enhances their capacity for discretionary spending, creates incentives for performance and increases their accountability to beneficiaries of services they deliver. This theory is consistent with the objective of the study, which seeks to investigate the areas of the application (discretionary spending) of the demand driven capacity grant that MMDAs received from the DDF.

Relevance of the Study

Findings of the study would contribute to the continuous improvement of the capacity of MMDAs for effective and efficient service delivery. In particular, the findings on the demand driven capacity building would be important for stakeholders in their approaches and techniques towards enhancing capacity building. Also, the lessons gathered from the study will provide valuable input into the ongoing discussion on the sector wide approaches to decentralization, the sustainability of the DDF and the search for an effective and coordinated framework for capacity building in the decentralization sector.

Despite the plethora of work, none of them focuses specifically on the application of the demand driven aspect of the performance based grant in Ghana. This study contributes to knowledge by investigating into and documenting evidence of areas of application of the demand-driven component of the capacity building grant and the extent to which the demand-driven grant contributes towards enhancing the capacity of beneficiary local governments in Ghana. In this study the concept of capacity as noted by Silverman (1992) transcends the conventional narrow sense of the “technical ability to perform a specific function”, rather it encompasses the ability to anticipate and allocate resources in support of efficient service delivery.

Literature Review

Decentralization and local government have been acknowledged as the preferred means for democratic development and efficient service delivery (Alhassan 2016). In 1988, Ghana embarked on ambitious decentralization and local government reforms. With the transition to multi-party democracy in 1992, Ghana continued decentralization and the district assembly system of local government had been introduced in 1988. Article 35 (6) (d) of the Constitution of Ghana provides that: “the state shall take appropriate measures to make democracy a reality by decentralizing the administrative and financial machinery of government to the regions and districts” Finding the resources for local governments to play their mandatory role has remained a major challenge.

After many years of reforms many local governments in Ghana continue to suffer from inadequate capacity for discretionary spending due to the poor health of their finances. The lack of capacity contributes to the failure of decentralization goals and/or programmes at the local government level (Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development 2006). Silverman (1992) argues that there is internationally the high tendency for central governments or sector ministries internationally to centralize (or not fully decentralize or only de-concentrate) many of the “managerial, administrative, and technical duties or roles because of the perceived inadequate capacities at the sub-national levels.”
Several theories inform decentralized decision making and strong local governments (Ghartey, Ghartey & Mensah, 2015). The theory of devolution postulated by scholars such as Rondinelli (1981) point out that for decentralization to be effective and meaningful central governments should devolve power, authority, resources and responsibilities to local governments. There is also the theory of jurisdictional control held by scholars such as Oates (1972) and Frey & Eichenberger (1999), which argued that each public service should be provided by the jurisdiction having control over the minimum geographic area that would internalise benefits and costs of such provision.

Frey and Eichenberger (1999) extended this idea by arguing that jurisdictions could be organized along functional lines while overlapping geographically, and that individuals and communities could be free to choose among competing jurisdictions through initiatives and referenda. Alhassan (2016) argues that, irrespective of the form of decentralization, it rests on four key pillars, which are political, administrative, fiscal, and decentralized development planning. According to Gonschorek et al (2014:2) fiscal decentralization “can be defined as the devolution of fiscal authority to lower levels of government. The degree of decentralization can be determined by the division of spending responsibilities between different levels of government, the amount of discretion given to local governments, and their ability to determine expenditure and revenue.”

Steffensen J., Fredborg H. L. and White R., (2005) reported that performance-based grant systems have been introduced as incentives to enhance capacity and performance of local governments. Smoke (2015) corroborated this report by indicating that many countries in the developing world are adopting and using a systematic general performance based grant system in service delivery. As noted earlier and also postulated by Steffensen et al (2005) the DDF grant, which was introduced in 2008 by the Government of Ghana in collaboration with its development partners, comprised an investment grant and a capacity building grant. According to Steffensen (2010) “the capacity building support aspect of the grant should enable local governments to address the functional gaps, identified during annual assessments, in an efficient and targeted manner”.

There is empirical evidence of the positive effects of performance-based grants on the capacity and performance of local governments. In a review of experiences from a number of countries, UNCDF (2007) concludes that despite significant variation across performance-based grant schemes in areas such as the size of the grants, the number of minimum conditions/performance measures and processes of performance assessment, they share common principles and have the potential to impact positively on the overall reform agenda in many countries. Gonschorek G., Hornbacher-Schönleber S., and Mareike Well M., (2014) used the performance based grant system to analyse the potential of two specific pathways of fiscal and political decentralization, performance-based transfers and participatory governance, to improve the current state of Indonesia’s health service delivery in Indonesia. Ghartey et al. (2015) examined how the Functional Organizational Assessment Tool (FOAT) can be made an effective tool for assessing the performance of LGs in the Central Region of Ghana.
Methodology

The study was designed in a logical step-by-step sequence involving 7 distinct stages (Figure 1).

Figure 1: Flow Chart of Research Activities.

Conduct feasibility or Recognisance study of the research areas.

Extensive Review of Literature

Design of research Question

Design of research Question

Primary Data collection

Data analysis

Draft Report & Presentation of findings

Final report

The study population the 216 MMDAs in Ghana that participate in the annual FOAT assessment. As shown in Table 1, the population comes with predetermined strata. These are 6 Metropolitan, 56 Municipal and 154 District Assemblies distributed in the 10 administrative regions of Ghana. Out of the 216 MMDAs, 42, representing 19.4% of the total number of MMDAs in Ghana were selected for the study (Table 2). The 42 MMDAs were selected using the stratified purposeful sampling procedure. As earlier indicated the study population was already in various strata. The sampling frame was purposively stratified according to metropolitans, municipalities and districts in order to ensure representation of each of the three strata. Purposive sampling enables researchers to intentionally select “particular settings, persons, or events [which can provide] important information” (Maxwell, 1997 cited in Teddlie & Fen, 2007). The number of Assemblies for each stratum was selected as a fraction of the total sample. Based on the stratification, individual MMDAs were randomly selected from each of the strata.

Source: Authors’ Construct, 2016
Table 1: Population of the Study

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regions</th>
<th>Metropolitan Assemblies</th>
<th>Municipal Assemblies</th>
<th>Districts Assemblies</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Upper East</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upper West</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brong Ahafo</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ashanti</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volta</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greater Accra</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>6</strong></td>
<td><strong>55</strong></td>
<td><strong>155</strong></td>
<td><strong>216</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Field Work, 2016

The sample size of 42 was further purposively divided into two clusters with 32 MMDAs on Above National Average (ANA) and 10 MMDAs on Below National Average (BNA) using the 2013/2014 national FOAT average score of 92.3%. The majority of 32 MMDAs on the ANA were selected because most of them scored high percentages in their 2012 and 2013 FOAT assessments; all the MMDAs fulfilled the minimum conditions, and almost 100% scores were obtained in performance measures.

The study used both primary and secondary data. The secondary data was collected through the review of relevant literature to gain deeper understanding of the FOAT assessment and the capacity building component of the facility. The relevant documents that were reviewed included the performance scores from 2006 to 2013 FOAT assessments, the DDF Operational Manual, reports of the Sector-Wide Approach to Decentralization and various reports, academic journals and papers prepared on the DDF/FOAT. Other relevant documents, reports and publications relevant to performance-based grants were also reviewed. The primary data were obtained from staff of the DDF Secretariat and core staff of the selected MMDAs, which comprised Coordinating Directors, Finance Officers, Planning Officers, Budget Officers and Engineers who were interviewed using structured questionnaires. The draft report was discussed with key experts on decentralization to solicit further views and also validate some pieces of data collected from the field.
Table 2: Sample Size

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regions</th>
<th>Metropolitan Assemblies</th>
<th>Municipal Assemblies</th>
<th>Districts Assemblies</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Upper East</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upper West</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brong Ahafo</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ashanti</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volta</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greater Accra</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sample Size</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Authors’ Construct, 2016.

The study used three instruments to gather data. These were: (i) structured questionnaires, and field observations. The questionnaires were directly administered to the respondents and followed on phone calls were made. The administration of the questionnaires began in August through to October 2016. Out of the 42 questionnaires administered, 35 were answered and returned giving a response rate of 83.3%. Of the 35, 28 were from the ANA-MMDAs and 7 from the BNA-Assemblies.

The data was analyzed qualitatively using some basic descriptive statistics to show similarities and differences in the responses of the participants. Merriam (2002) argues that a qualitative inquiry should be richly descriptive. Aspects of the descriptive statistics were quantitatively analyzed while an inductive strategy was adopted for others, which focused on people’s perceptions and ideas. Methodologically, however, The inductive approach requires social researchers to understand that “knowledge of the social world” or phenomena, for that matter, should be based largely on the perceptions and ideas of people (Miller & Brewer, 2003, 155). In other words, data itself (i.e., people’s perceptions, ideas, and social meanings), must be allowed to speak broadly on its own. The inductive strategy was thus adopted to allow the research team to gain knowledge on the subject matter through “the cognitive process” of the respondents.

Results and Discussion

Profile of respondents

The respondents were staff of the selected MMDAs namely Coordinating Directors, Deputy Directors, Assistant Directors, Planning Officers, Budget Officers, Finance Officers and Engineers (Table 3). Coordinating Directors constituted the majority of the respondents. These were the officers best placed to provide responses on the DDF/FOAT assessment and the utilization of the demand-driven capacity
building grant. The response rate was high 83.3% (35 MMDAs of which 3 were Metropolitan, 11 Municipal and 21 District Assemblies).

Table 3 Designations of Respondents.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Designation</th>
<th>No.</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>No.</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ANA</td>
<td>92.3%</td>
<td>BNA</td>
<td>92.3%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coordinating Director</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>42.9</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Planning Officer</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>28.6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finance Officer</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Budget Officer</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deputy Director</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assistant Director¹</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>10.7</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-Total</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Authors’ Construct, 2016.

The years of experience of the 35 MMDAs ranged from 3 years being the least to a maximum of 8 years. A majority of the MMDAs 12 (representing 34.3%) had 8 years experience in the FOAT assessment, 2 each had 3 and 4 years experience respectively, 4 had 3 years of experience, 7 had 6 years experience and 8 had 7 years experience in the annual FOAT assessment. There were more male respondents (33) representing 94.3% than female respondents (2) representing just 5.7%. The low representation of female respondents in the sample was due to the fact that the study focused on designated positions, which happened to be dominated by males as at the time of the study. With respect to level of education respondents with Master’s degree formed the majority (25) representing 71.4% of the total sample.

Assessing areas of application of the Demand-driven Capacity Building Grant

The first objective of the study was to assess areas of application of the demand-driven capacity building grant of the DDF/FOAT. The result of the assessment showed that MMDAs applied their share of the grant on three main areas notably training, acquisition of logistics and “others”, which covered school infrastructure; street naming; sanitation; construction and rehabilitation; provision of water sources, economic and social infrastructure and energy. Others in the DDF context refers to expenditure which is eligible but not explicit in the list of the eligible expenditure and may include new and emerging issues such as disaster risk reduction and management, climate change adaptation, sanitation, environmental management and conflict management.

The areas on which the demand-driven capacity building grant were applied were found to be consistent with the DDF/FOAT allowable expenditure. The areas were also found to be consistent with the capacity building gaps identified and recommended by consultants of the previous FOAT assessments. For instance, FOAT VIII capacity building analysis identified the following capacity building gaps to be addressed by MMDAs under new ones or climate and others). They
are climate change and disaster management, social accountability, disability act and planning, community-led total sanitation, managing environmental impact assessments, preparation of staff ledger, conflict management, pro-poor and pro-vulnerable planning, and office management.

However, some of the areas on which the demand-driven capacity building grants were applied under others were not entirely consistent with the allowable disbursement of the grants neither were they part of the identified and recommended capacity building gaps. This was a result of two main factors. First, MMDAs did not fully appreciate the requirements of the demand-driven capacity building grant. Secondly, the capacity building gaps identified under the new ones did not necessarily reflect the priority capacity needs of individual MMDAs. Among the three broad areas (training, logistics and other) training received the highest application of the grant (Table 4).

Table 4: Areas of Application of capacity building grant.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area of Application</th>
<th>No. ANA</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>No. BNA</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Total No.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Training</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Logistics</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Authors’ Construct, 2016

More than half of the responding MMDAs (28 of the 35 MMDAs representing 80% of the sample) applied their capacity building grant on training during the last five years. The areas of training that were reported included planning and budgeting, information management, and revenue generation. Among the reported areas of training, revenue mobilization was found to be the highest area of concentration for the application of the demand-driven capacity building grant by the sampled MMDAs.

Responding MMDAs were put into two groups according to performance in the annual FOAT exercise with one group placed under above national average (ANA) and the other below national average (BNA). The purpose of classifying the MMDAs according to ANA and BNA was to ascertain differences in their responses. The study found that there were no significant differences between MMDAs with ANA and those with BNA regarding the type of capacity gaps and challenges they faced.

Determining the extent to which MMDAs independently prepare for FOAT Assessment

The second aim was to examine the extent to which MMDAs independently prepare for the annual FOAT assessment. The starting point in determining the extent to which MMDAs independently prepare towards the annual FOAT assessment was to find out the steps that MMDAs employ in their preparation for the annual assessment. Based on information from the field, MMDAs employed four main steps in their preparation for the assessment. These were: (i) formation of
internal FOAT committees (ii) pre-assessment meetings (iii) conduct of Mock FOAT, (iv) external support (if need be).

The MMDAs established in-house FOAT Committees as the first step in their preparation towards the annual FOAT assessment. The in-house Committee comprised senior staff of the MMDA. A respondent reported that: “An in-house steering committee was formed within the management team to oversee and coordinate activities of departments and units in line with required FOAT indicators through which all identified gaps were filled.” The key task of the In-house FOAT committees or teams that were reported consisted of (i) assembling all relevant files and documents, (ii) going through all the relevant files that have been assembled and analyzing the data to peruse and rectify any anomaly before the actual FOAT exercise begins; and (iii) coordinating and making available all the documents and data needed for the exercise.

The second step taken by MMDAs was the organization of Pre-assessment meetings. The pre-assessment meetings are convened and involved all the heads of department and unit to create platform for discussions on a range of issues including: (i) the requirements and detailed review and interpretation of the FOAT indicators; (ii) the filing and records for the assessment; and (iii) the review of the Assembly’s readiness for the FOAT assessment. The frequency of these meetings is not pre-determined; it depended on the magnitude of the challenges to be addressed by any particular MMDA and the period of notification required for the assessment. The Pre-assessment meetings often provide the basis for the Mock FOAT.

The third step was the Mock FOAT exercises. The mock FOAT exercises were conducted by the MMDAs as the final internal preparation leading to the actual assessment. The study found that 19 MMDAs representing 54.2% of the sample conducted Mock exercises each year as part of their preparation for the annual FOAT assessment. Out of the 19 MMDAs, 17 representing 89.4% belonged to the ANA MMDAs and 2 representing 10.6% belonged to the BNA MMDAs. This meant that more ANA MMDAs conducted mock FOAT exercises than the BNA MMDAs. The high percentage score showed a strong association. The mock exercises attracted external support for the MMDAs. MMDAs would or wouldn’t seek external support depending on their level of confidence in their preparation for the annual assessment.

External support was the fifth and final step, which came in the form of technical advice, data and or training and was sourced from either the state (in particular the Regional Coordinating Councils (RCCs) or the private sector. The study found that 12 MMDAs representing 34.2% of the sample used private consultants to assist in their preparation for the annual FOAT assessment.

The study noted that information on the use of private consultants by MMDAs was sensitive one because while there appeared not to be a total prohibition on the use of private consultants their use was an indictment on the capacity objective of the DDF, particularly the demand-driven capacity building grant after nearly a decade of implementation of the DDF/FOAT. Therefore, the article set a minimum limit beyond which a conclusion would be drawn that the use of private consultants was widespread. This priori limit was 20% before going into the field. Based on the minimum
limit of 34.2% showed wide spread use of private consultants by the sampled MMDAs.

Eleven MMDAs (Majority) representing 91.7% of the 12 MMDAs that used private consultants had their scores above the national average. This suggested that the high performance by these MMDAs was influenced by external capacity rather than internally acquired and applied capacity. The frequency of the use of private consultants varied among the MMDAs with the majority (5) representing 46% using private consultants every year and 2 representing 18% use private consultants once in the last three years.

The desire to qualify for the DDF and acquire skills were the two main motivations for the use of external private consultants by the MMDAs. All the 12 MMDAs reported that despite the high cost of using private consultants, it was found to be valuable because it enabled excellent preparation and the acquisition of skills by staff. Information management and storage was the most common area of skills that MMDAs reported to have acquired from the use of private consultants. Other areas of skills reported by the MMDAs were planning and coordination, critical analysis of indicators, and writing of minutes and reports.

Other challenges that compelled MMDAs to seek external support in their preparation for the annual FOAT assessment were; inadequate clarity of the indicators, frequent postings and transfer of staff, inadequate coordination among departments of the Assembly, information management and storage, and late release of the FOAT guidelines. Again, a majority of the MMDAs reported weak capacity in information management and storage as the most critical challenge affecting their preparation for the annual FOAT assessment. A respondent said: “Sometimes it is difficult getting information from other decentralized departments.” Another respondent added: “We always have difficulty retrieving records due to lack of proper storage facilities at the Assembly”.

Conclusions and Recommendations

Based on the findings, the study concludes that the demand-driven capacity building grant served a valuable purpose towards improving the capacity of MMDAs. It was a signal for exploring further the financial autonomy of MMDAs as anticipated by the policy and legal framework for decentralization. The demand-driven capacity building grant was a key factor for the sustainability of the concept and lessons from the implementation of the DDF/FOAT.

On the basis of the findings and conclusion the study recommends provision of guidelines on the use of the demand-driven capacity building grant to minimize the concentration of use on training while ensuring equitable distribution among identified capacity building gaps. The study also recommends a clear policy and its effective dissemination on the use of private consultants by the MMDAs in their preparation for the annual FOAT assessment. In support of the drive towards sustainability of best practices of the DDF/FOAT in general, the paper recommends a shift beyond the measurement of MMDAs’ compliance towards the measurement of the Quality of Service Delivery. This measurement would not only support value-for-money but also deepens the involvement of citizens at the local level in service delivery by MMDAs.
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Electronic Governance and Service Delivery in Nigeria: Challenges and Solution

Anieti Nseowo Udofia and Johnson Ijale Echor

Abstract

The strategic position Information and Communication Technologies occupies in governance has no doubt affected positively the way and manner administrative functions of government are carried out. Information and Communication Technology has changed the process of governance in the world. It offers tremendous benefits to the government and the governed resulting in the social development of the society. Despite these benefits, there are serious challenges confronting its proper implementation and or utilization in Nigeria for sustainable development. The objective of this article is to examine the impact of Electronic Governance in socio-economic development of Nigeria as well as bring to the fore the challenges militating against the effective implementation of Electronic Governance in Nigeria. The article is descriptive in nature and relies solely on secondary sources of data for its analysis. It is concluded that in order for Electronic Governance to be effectively implemented, the institutions of government that are responsible for its proper functioning must be well armed with both human and material resources. The findings of the study revealed electronic governance has the potential to enhance the development of Nigeria if it is effectively administered. It recommends that there should be proactive steps aimed at ensuring the adequate supply of electricity and the development of human resource capabilities in order to man the electronic technologies to achieve the much needed results.

Key Words: Electronic Governance, Government, Service Delivery, Development,

Introduction

The emergence of Electronic Governance in the world is an epoch similar to the emergence of steam engine, cars, train, electricity, telephone and computers. Just like the previous inventions that changed the world, the introduction of Information Communication Technologies have changed the way and manner in which individuals and government institutions carry out activities and relate with each other in a more prompt and cordial means. The introduction of Electronic Governance has become a viable instrument in the process of information dissemination, construction, citizen participation as well as monitoring and evaluation. The proper functioning of Information Communication Technologies in the process of governance has led to accountability, speed, responsiveness, effectiveness as well as efficient service delivery thereby moving from a traditionalist bureaucratic method of administration to modern participatory administration.
Adeyemo (2011) refers to the use of internet technology as a platform for exchanging information with other arms of government. The prime objective of this model is to improve public service delivery and democratic processes. This paradigm shift no doubt will improve the poor service delivery system and undemocratic processes in developing countries.

Electronic Governance is therefore a device adopted to ensure that good governance is enshrined in our public sector. To achieve development in the society, electronic governance is the mechanism that government applies in institutions of government that will drive the desires and aspirations of the people in the society. However, despite the emergence and applicability of Electronic Governance in countries of the world, Nigeria is still below average in implementation and this is affecting effective service delivery in the public sector Ministries, Departments and Agencies (MDA's) in the country. So many factors accounts for these. Such include digital divide, human resource problem, power problem, corruption etc.

Arising from the above stated points, the major objective here is to investigate the impact of electronic governance in the socio-economic development of Nigeria. In doing this, we will also pay attention to some of the challenges militating against the effective application of Electronic Governance in Nigeria.

**Electronic Governance**

Electronic Governance is an emerging trend in the administration of both private and public activities. It is a means through which tasks are done faster, more accurately and more conveniently. Electronic Governance as it is viewed here is the means through which government as an institution performs its functions – representation and regulation of societal actors, delivery of public services and policy making (Coleman, 2008). It is worth noting that government administrative process is increasingly being supported by Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) with new methods of governance emerging in recent times. It is the strategic use of electronic means of doing things to support governance process including ICT-enabled transformation in the relationship between government and citizens, business and other arms of government.

According to UNESCO (2003), Electronic Governance is the public sector’s use of Information and Communication Technologies with the aim of improving information and service delivery, encouraging citizen participation in the decision-making process and making government more accountable, transparent and effective. The Pacific Institute of Management in India considers it to be the application of ICTs to the process of government functioning to achieve simple, moral, accountable, responsive and transparent governance (Misuraca, 2007).

Electronic Governance has claimed numerous definitions in the literature. For instance, Organization for Economic Corporation and Development, (2003) introduced four definitions of Electronic Governance as follows: (1) internet service delivery and other internet-based activities by government (2) all uses of ICT, (3) transforming public administration through the use of ICT and (4) the use of ICT particularly the internet as a tool to achieve a better government. However, Electronic Governance is defined as the ultimate aim or end product that is geared towards achieving a more efficient and faster service delivery in government. It is a move away from the
analogue method of doing things to a digital method that guarantees development of all the sectors of government where this method is applied.

According to Adeyemo (2013), Electronic Governance is aimed at promoting good governance which is characterized by equality, partaking in the democratic process, transparency and accountability in the various sectors of the nation’s economy. This is in line with the assertion that Electronic Governance is a more acceptable and reliable means of operating government businesses through the utilization of ICT in improving service delivery.

Benefits of Electronic Governance in Administration

The application of Electronic Governance in the administration of government activities is beneficial and important in numerous ways. In this article, the benefits will be discussed in two major perspectives viz: administrative development and effective service delivery. Administratively, Electronic Governance assists in the following ways:

i. Automation of Administrative Processes: when there is minimal human intervention and everything is system driven, the result will be effective, efficient as well as timely service delivery. So many departments carrying out government policies and programmes as well as agencies that renders services to the public are now computerized and connected through networks and software which are built and designed around the agencies and sometimes depending on the services they render, their inter-connectivity goes beyond the boundaries of the organization. So many departments have launched their own individual websites carrying information of their respective departments enabling online carrying of operation and file movement like budgeting, accounting, data flow, meetings etc.

ii. Reduction of Paper-Work: the introduction of Electronic Governance has significantly cut down on the paperwork involved in an organization’s administration. With this, communication is done electronically through storage and retrieval of information. Instead of physical movement of files which delays actions, information is transmitted over wires to computers at each employee’s desk for action.

iii. Elimination of Hierarchy: in a typical bureaucratic civil service setting, hierarchy is rigorously practiced hence delaying the administrative process. On the other hand, the introduction of ICT into governance process like Intranet and LAN has reduced procedural delays caused by hierarchical processes in organization as it is now possible to send and receive information and data across various levels of the organization without stress.

iv. Enhancement of Quality Services: people across all segments of the society get quicker and efficient services from government with greater accountability, responsiveness and sensitivity. Also, people’s grievances are redressed. Electronic Governance has also facilitated video tele-conferencing, monitoring, supervision and reporting and face to face communication leading to better quality services.
v. **Change in the Administrative Culture:**
   Electronic Governance creates public awareness bringing with it norms and values of accountability, openness, integrity, fairness, equity, responsibility and justice in the administrative culture freeing it from bureaucratic-pathology and becoming efficient and responsive.

(B) **Effective Service Delivery**

i. **Transparency:** through information dissemination and publication of public information on the web, it is open to public accessibility and scrutiny. This makes more people to have equal chances of having access to information. For instance, advertisement for employment is done online and all interested candidates have equal chance of applying.

ii. **Economic Development:** online transaction gives citizens the opportunity to check what is available for sale and possibly buys it without necessarily travelling to where it is sold. For instance, those living in the hinterland can order goods online and same delivered to them with little or no extra charge. If a rural area suffers from lack of information regarding markets, products, health, agriculture, education, weather, and policies etc development will be retarded but when ICT is made available, it leads to better and more opportunities and prosperity in such environments.

**Electronic Governance and Development in Nigeria**

Development is a concept with multifarious connotations meaning different thing to different people based on the perspective within which it is used. However, the commonly understood and most sought for type of development especially the one that bothers on the wellbeing of the citizenry is “socio-economic development”. It involves development in which the citizens have access to basic needs of life like food, shelter, cloth, healthcare, power, education, water and sanitation. It is important to note clearly that in most developing countries Nigeria inclusive despite the vast natural and human resources available, the availability and accessibility of these basic needs is still on a very minimal level hence underdevelopment.

It is worth pointing out that in some instances these basic needs are available in government organizations but accessing them becomes a challenge. This situation is mostly caused by lack of power, illiteracy, government policies etc and development cannot occur when these are not put in place. But this is not so in advanced industrialized countries as most government programmes are carried out electronically thereby easing the problem of movement and enhancing faster service delivery. This is why the National Information Technology Development Agency (NITDA) contends that the public sector can harvest enough dividends from Electronic Governance as it could lead to better employee productivity, job and wealth creation and improve the citizens understanding of the workings of government by virtue of better information it avails them. With Electronic Governance, people can transact businesses, government and government can facilitate business that will bring about the development without travelling for meetings. This is done through electronic conferencing or electronic meeting.

Electronic Governance covers several areas of government activities. Three distinct areas have been identified as having this
connection like: Government to Government (G to G); Government to Citizens (G to C) and Government to Business (G to B) (Hassan, 2013). When Electronic Governance is properly implemented, the resultant effect is development. As noted earlier, Electronic Governance is a viable instrument that can effectively reduce if possible curb corruption in the country because it helps to check financial malpractices and other forms of waste going on in our public sector life. This is in line with the assertion of (Minstry and Jalal, 2012). Electronic Governance provides ample opportunity to the citizens to be participants in development and not only recipients of finished goods and services. This is important because the ultimate goal of every government is to deliver effective services hence the recipients of the services (citizens) must play active role in the process as an instrument for the implementation of government policies.

Another connection between Electronic Governance and development is that it is a means through which government is brought closer to the door-steps of the citizens. People can now access information about government activities not necessarily through television or radio news broadcasts but through their mobile phones whereby 24 hours update is given. This is made possible through the creation and development of private news websites for example ‘Nairaland’. This is so convenient that even before government owned television or radio stations airs their news at their stipulated time, the citizens would have heard or read them on private news sites.

The achievement of development by any government or people in the world will never be possible without the repositioning of government Ministries, Departments and Agencies (MDAs). This is important because these three bodies are responsible for the formulation and implementation of government policies and programmes that are geared towards developing the important sectors of national life. The effective introduction and implementation of Electronic Governance is the sure way of promoting and making government services more accessible and faster. It will involve abandonment of the primitive analogue and paper ways of carrying out government functions to more dynamic, easier and faster methods.

It is important to note that if Electronic Governance is properly and effectively implemented, citizen’s contact with government institutions will be reduced. A visit to government ministries and department reveals that so many government activities are still being carried out in the analogue way thereby causing queues, delay, inaccurate information capturing and inefficiency on the part of the personnel.

We can agree that the number of hours spent in government organization to fill forms and queue up when one has dealings with government ministries would have been used in other fruitful exercise that will yield positive fruits. Therefore, the full digitalization of all government’s MDAs will reposition them to drive the much needed development the country seriously desires.

**Necessary Ingredients of E-Governance for Development**

As earlier expressed, Electronic Governance has numerous benefits for which the ultimate aim is the enhancement of development in the society. It is instructive to point out that for Electronic Governance to enhance and aid in the development of the society, there are a
A number of components which must function optimally. According to Ojo (2014), the following should be examined as having direct influence on development.

i. Electronic Participation: participation in decisionmakingandpolicyimplementation is paramount in democratic sustenance. Electronic Governance promotes citizens participation while the elected representative becomes more accessible through the provision of Information Communication Technology. This kind of medium encourages the citizens to participate in decision making. In the words of Hina (1997), successful Electronic Governance mechanisms can only operate through strong private and public participation.

ii. Electronic Service Delivery: the achievement of efficient services in government ministries requires total and absolute overhauling of the analogue operative methods to digital methods. Electronic Governance promote to a reasonable extent effective and efficient service delivery to the citizenry. This is done through the availability of automated electronic platform where citizens can log in to access services and goods at their convenience.

iii. Electronic Mobilization: electronic mobilization enhances citizen’s participation in the decision making process. Through the social media so many groups are informed about political meetings and gathering where venue, date and time are made available for members of such groups. With this, members of such groups are easily reached and the most commonly used platform in Nigeria includes amongst others: Facebook, Instagram, Whatsapp applications etc.

iv. Electronic Transaction: this implies business engagements between the citizen and the government or private institutions and the government through online platform. This can facilitate effectiveness and efficiency in the day to day government business.

v. Electronic Planning: planning is an essential element for development. The survival or failure of any business depends on proper planning strategies. Electronic planning involves informing the general citizens of the policies and programmes of government before the final implementation. The citizens therefore may provide advice and share their views towards government initiatives to enhance better outcomes.

vi. Electronic Taxation: in Nigeria the collection of tax has gone electronic where the citizens and corporate bodies pay their taxes such as property tax, tenement rates, income tax and so on through the online means. It is a more convenient and secured method that curbs irregularities and corruption in the process.

vii. Electronic Registration: this may involve a number of registrations which this article may not cover ranging from registration of birth, motor vehicle, drivers license, local government identification, employment opportunities, trade permits, registration for examination and screening exercises. All these can be done on the website without being physically present at the institution or parastatal carrying out such service.
E-Governance Implementation: The Nigerian Situation

E-governance as we understand is a tool for the enhancement of government services. As a country that wants to attain all round development and becomes one of the dynamic economies in the year 2020, it becomes pertinent for the country to key into the Electronic Governance platform in order to be in line with current global trend in service delivery. With this in mind, to foster economic growth which is the primary concern of the national government, Electronic Governance is imperative and very strategic in achieving this.

To have a successful Electronic Governance implementation in Nigeria therefore, the people must be well vested with the applicability of ICT. According to Rogers (2003), the nature and manner of the information exchange, relationship in individuals determines the condition under which an individual exchanges or does not exchange information and the impact of such transfers. To this extent therefore, the success of Electronic Governance in the public sector will greatly be determined by individual’s (employees) ability to use the ICT platform to carry out work.

In Nigeria, there have been various Electronic Governance initiatives put in place to fast track the rapid development of the nation. Such initiatives and policies include National Rural Telephony Projects, Public Service Network Initiative, State and Local Government ICT Facility Loan Scheme and Work Nigeria Initiatives, (Fatile 2012).

Currently, the government of Nigeria through the National Information Technology Development Agency (NITDA) is responsible for the ICT policy in Nigeria and has programmes aimed at providing ICT education to top government functionaries as well as upgrading the skills of ICT professionals in Nigeria. Interestingly, in a quest to create awareness of ICT amongst Nigerians, which would ginger the growth and development of Electronic Governance in Nigeria, NITDA commissioned several mobile buses called Mobile Internet Units (MIU), these are locally manufactured busses that goes round town disseminating Electronic Governance initiatives to Nigerians.

Despite the laudable programmes of the Nigerian government and its agencies, the applicability of Electronic Governance in Nigeria is still in a slow stage. According to UN rating of 2005, Nigeria was number 139 out of 291 countries in terms of e-governance compliance; the country is 141st in the world e-governance ranking in 2018. In Africa, out of 43 countries, we are number 24. We have countries like Rwanda that was rated higher than Nigeria, Kenya amongst others (Ojo, 2014). This therefore means that despite the huge potentials at the disposal of the country, the country is still below the UN Electronic Governance index which is 1.62. Conversely, the Electronic Governance index of Nigeria stands at 1.02 more than 5 points adrift of the required.

Despite this rating however, the Electronic Governance practice in the country has greatly improved over the years as such government institutions like Joint Admissions and Matriculation Board (JAMB) now conducts their examinations online. National Youth Service Corps now conducts electronic registration and issues potential corps member with posting letters online. National Examination Council (NECO), West Africa
Examination Council (WAEC) and many other institutions have since gone online. These developments are commendable and should be sustained in a bid to enhance and fast track the Electronic Governance process that will aid development in Nigeria.

Challenges to E-Governance Implementation in Nigeria

Even though it has been generally accepted that Electronic Governance promotes sustainable development, there are numerous obstacles in the wheel of successful Electronic Governance implementation in Nigeria. Studies have repeatedly shown that the diffusion of Electronic Governance has been slower than expected and the governments are not making full use of the available technology for reforming governance (Adeyemo, 2013). Wherever adopted, the impact of Electronic Governance has been only incremental rather than transformative. Though there are huge benefits, Nigeria is facing a number of challenges in the proper implementation of Electronic Governance. In this regard, we shall itemize some of the challenges facing Electronic Governance in Nigeria to include:

i. **The Digital Divide**: one of the major obstacles to the success of Electronic Governance in the country is the ICT knowledge gap. Digital divide according to Keniston is a problem of multiple dimensions that manifest into (1) a technical aspect referring to availability of the infrastructure, the hardware and the software of ICTs, and (2) the social aspect referring to the skills required to manipulate technical resources. Nigeria as a developing country has lots of limitations. However, the gap between those who have technological access and those who don’t is still widening. The existing evidence suggests that income, education and age are important social determinants of internet access, and that older people and those with low incomes are much less likely to use the internet.

ii. **ICT Infrastructure Deficit**: the ICT infrastructure required for the proper take-off is still in a very slow stage. Nigeria had less than 500,000 fixed lines before 1999. Although the telecommunication landscape is steadily changing with the introduction of GSM services, which has increase accessibility and provided less demanding interfaces for people to connect. Much is still left to be achieved in this direction. The cost of internet usage in Nigeria remains too high for majority of the people hence it is seen as the exclusive reserve of the well-to-do people in the society.

iii. **Inadequate/Lack of Legal Framework**: for every policy of government to succeed and be sustained, there must be strong regulatory framework. The IT regulatory framework in Nigeria has not yet been restructured to fully accommodate Electronic Governance. There are no regulatory and monitoring mechanisms to check ICT compliance in government institutions and there are no laws on Electronic Governance. Before seeking ICT solutions to problems of governance, appropriate policy design must be developed and set in place, in order to facilitate seamless information exchanges within government and between government, citizens and businesses.

iv. **Lack of Qualified Manpower**: yet another problem is that of lack of qualified personnel to handle the task
of ICT management. This problem is anchored on the availability of human capacities that have technical skills, for installation, maintenance, designing and implementation of ICT infrastructure across the country. The government of the country should therefore show more commitment in the training and retraining of personnel who will be capable to effectively handle Electronic Governance tasks.

v. **Shortage of Power:** over the years, the power sector in the country has continued to witness outages. The current power generation in the country is put at about 4000MW but it has drastically reduced to less than 1500MW showing a great decrease in the power generation capacity and this has enormous consequences on the socio-economic development of the country likewise Electronic Governance compliance. Very few parts of the country can boast of 5 hour power supply in a day and this has greatly influence the usage of ICT device and ICT cannot be functional without electricity.

vi. **Bureaucratic Constraints:** the Nigerian public sector is still ICT-resistant because some of the staff who are not ICT compliance. They still prefer to handle office issues the analogue way. There seem to be deep rooted resistance to change among Nigerian civil servants regarding computerization. Many civil servants are afraid of computerization because they speciously think computerization of government activities will render some of them redundant. Even among the few who have embraced computerization incessant transfers within the service most times hampers Electronic Governance activities. Electronic Governance cannot be achieved unless public servants who man government bureaucracy are hard-pressed to change.

vii. **Corruption/Embezzlement:** the public service in Nigeria is bedevilled with corruption and embezzlement of public funds meant for the execution of government projects for which initial intention is for the betterment of the larger society. Corruption has over the years had negative implications on laudable government projects and Electronic Governance project is not an exception. Diversion and embezzlement of funds meant for project is the order of the day in government ministries and agencies and this goes on and on without checks and is having negative impact of the Electronic Governance project in the country.

**Conclusion/Recommendations**

Electronic Governance portends a lot of potential for fast tracking development in all facet of human dealings. ICT has the platform to eventually resolve the problem of development in Nigeria if it is effectively applied. As observed in our discussion, Electronic Governance holds a lot of promises especially in bringing services to the citizenry in an easier manner and also helping to facilitate the easy interaction between government and government, citizen and government and business and government. It is worthy to remark that all these lofty potentials that Electronic Governance holds can only be achieved when the enabling platform is created for its operations. Notwithstanding these great features, Nigeria is yet to fully integrate and reap the benefits thereof owing to some factors militating against it.
In view of the above, it is pertinent for the Nigerian Government to fully implement ICT policies in its MDAs in order for them to drive the much needed development through effective policy implementation. We recommend that more effort be devoted in improving the power supply which currently is in a sorry state (epileptic). Electronic Governance performance will also depend greatly on the human resource personnel hence the government should devote more resources into the training and retraining of ICT personnel to solve the problem of internal digital divide in government MDAs. Above all, the process of doing business, registering property, obtaining construction and business permits, trading, paying taxes and registering business at the Corporate Affairs Commission, renewal of drivers licenses, online examination and many others have since commenced but it should be extended to all the relevant MDAs of government as a means of bringing services more faster, efficient and also curbing corruption.

References


UNESCO, 2003
The Nexus Between Africa’s National Resources and Socioeconomic Development: The Mediating Role of Learning Transformational Leadership

Robert Kemepade Moruku

Abstract

Drawing on the leader-member exchange theory, the learning theory, (LMX), and social capital theory, the article sets out to examine the role of the learning transformational leadership approach in mediating the nexus between Africa’s national resources and its socioeconomic development in the context of the international environment. It was found that two factors accounted for the socioeconomic performance of Africa. These were (i) a pervasively weak leadership capability in mediating the nexus between superabundant national resources and Africa’s socioeconomic development in the immediate African context and (ii) a remote but strong nexus between the international development context and Africa’s human condition. Both contributed to the worsening poverty situation in Africa. The main contribution in the article comes from linking the two factors needed for orchestrating socioeconomic development of Africa, which is that, unless the international context is addressed, the learning transformational leader may fare only a little better than the transactional leader s/he replaces. Consequently, it was recommended that Africa adopts a learning transformational leadership to effectively mediate the link between its superabundant national resources and its human condition. It was also suggested that Africa addresses the international context to be able to secure the benefits of the exploitation of its national resources. Specific measures for nurturing learning transformational leaders are suggested and of addressing the international context. Future studies should take national case studies and longitudinal studies to assess the efficacy of the policy measures suggested in the present study.

Keywords: National resources; Resource curse; Socioeconomic development of Africa; Institutional leadership; Transformational leadership; Learning Transformational leadership; Transactional leadership.

“No society can surely be flourishing and happy, of which by far the greater part of the numbers are poor and miserable” (Adam Smith, quoted in Heilbroner, 1999: 60).

“Without India...England would cease to be a nation” (Rudolph Churchill, as quoted in Herman, 2009: 178).

1An earlier version of this paper was presented at the 38th Round Table Conference of the African Association of Public Administration and Management (AAPAM) held at Mazagan Beach and Resort, El Jadida, Kingdom of Morocco from 6th to 10th November, 2017. The author is grateful to participants for useful comments that served to enrich the paper. The author is immensely grateful to the anonymous peer-reviewers for their useful observations and comments, which served to improve the quality of the article. However, he is responsible for any residual errors.

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Introduction

Africa is caught in a developmental paradox. The paradox is conceptualized as the increasing and yawning gap between the actual and expected socioeconomic development performance of African states (leaders) in the face of the endowment of superabundant national resources. That is, there is a superabundant stock of resources in Africa, which over the years, have been and are continuously being exploited but the reality of socioeconomic development is very disappointing.

This is different from just the increasing rate of poverty, a phenomenon observed even in the developed or advanced industrialized countries. A new poverty has emerged since the World Bank incorporated poverty reduction as an official policy and in the advance of globalization, which leaves the poor behind, harms the environment, and cares more about profits than people (Hart, 2001; Moruku and Obeleagu-Nzelibe, 2006; World Bank, 2012, as cited in Banerjee and Jackson, 2016). The reality is that Europe has achieved development from tapping these same resources by importing them in their raw form at depressed prices and processing them, which spurs a reversed industrialization in favour of Europe (Toffler, 1980: 96-127).

Africa’s development problem can be seen in terms of (i) a pervasively weak leadership capability in mediating the nexus between superabundant national resources and Africa’s socioeconomic development in the immediate African context and (ii) a remote but largely strong nexus between the international development context and Africa’s dilute and unenviable socioeconomic development. By these perspectives, the author intends to make contributions in two domains, which are (i) the failure to achieve improvement in the human condition or suboptimal performance in Africa because of what the present researcher perceives as an unwilling, incapable, or closed-minded leadership, or an inappropriate leadership style and (ii) the failure to achieve improvement in the human condition in Africa because of the constricting or impeding international development context.

The author employs the established “logical-scientific or paradigmatic mode” (Naiburg, 2003) of reasoning from effect to cause in investigating the world. This is the “if/then” logic which states, in effect, that if cause leads to effect, then altering cause will lead to altering effect. In this article, the author suggests that leadership (cause) has a big role to play in orchestrating socioeconomic development of Africa (effect). Thus, we need to change the leadership type (change cause) to move Africa out of stagnation and move to improve the human condition (change effect).

The author argues that no one else other than Africans themselves who will honestly, without pretext, do this for Africa. The overall point and contribution to the development debate in this article comes simply to this effect: That, unless the international development context is addressed, the learning transformational leader upon whom we anchor our hopes of orchestrating socioeconomic development for Africa is likely to fare only a little better than the transactional leader s/he will replace.

Consequently, after this introduction, the logic of the article is set out to achieve the aforementioned contributions as follows. The conceptual framework is laid out in section two. Section three is used to list Africa’s wealth of national resources. This is followed
up, in section four, with the worrying issue of
the rising poverty level in Africa. The present
researcher takes a sample of founding fathers
of modern Africa as examples of great leaders
and poses the question whether they may or
may not be described as transformational
leaders that Africa now seeks to enthrone,
doing so to stimulate and drive the thinking
process. The researcher then turns to establish
the nexus between national resources and
socioeconomic development of Africa, arguing
that the transformational leader plays a
mediating role in the linkage between national
resources and socioeconomic development of
Africa. The argument is developed in section
seven that, the international development
context takes a major part of the blame
for the suboptimal performance of African
leaders because it has a debilitating effect on
the economies of African countries. This is
followed up, in section eight, on the previous
argument by suggesting that the international
polito-economic order must be restructured
to enable Africa to benefit from the exploitation
of its national resources. Considering its
importance for orchestrating socioeconomic
development, how to develop, or encourage
the development of, learning transformational
leaders for Africa is discussed in section nine.
Section ten concludes the article.

In this context, “Africa” is used to represent
itself and to serve as a proxy for “developing
countries”, which provides international
comparability. In a similar vein, “Europe” is
used to refer to itself and as a proxy for “the
developed industrial countries”, such as the
United States of America, Canada, the United
Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand.
“African states” and “African countries” are
used interchangeably. The leader of a country
is its political head with executive capacity. In
case, depending on the political system,
he/she is either the president (in a presidential
system) or prime minister (in a cabinet system).
Leadership is considered in a collective and
distributed sense.

**Conceptual Framework: Leader-
Member Exchange Theory**

Two complementary theoretical explanations
for the preferred type of leadership are given
in this article. These are the Leader-Member
Exchange (LMX) Theory and the Learning
Theory. These are discussed in the following
two subsections.

i. **The Leader-Member Exchange Theory**

In its essence, the LMX Theory suggests that
an exchange transaction takes place between
leaders and followers (members). Effective
leadership is achieved when followers grant
or concede legitimacy and power to leaders in
exchange for receiving allocations of valued
resources such as privileges and development
assets.

Applied in general, the effective leader,
according the LMX Theory, would offer
*improvements in the human condition* through
the provision of valued resources such as
guaranteed and well-paying jobs, unblinking
electricity supply, clean running pipe-borne
water, roads, well-equipped and staffed
hospitals, world-class educational institutions,
adequate resources (tools) to do one’s job, and
so on - all in exchange for legitimacy, power,
authority, and status of the leader. But for now,
this is a far cry from the status quo in Africa,
as highlighted in section three.

The LMX Theory is a higher level theory
embodying the transactional leadership theory
and transformational leadership theory. Conger
(2004) credited James MacGregor...
Burns (1978) with identifying these two main types of leadership.

**The Transformational Leadership Theory:** The content in the exchange transaction of transformational leaders is the offer of a **transcendental purpose** for addressing the **higher-order needs of their followers** and the leaders themselves; achieving the transcendental condition as the mission of leaders. When these needs are satisfied, both the leaders and followers are transformed; hence the term, **transformational.** It is the transformation into something transcendental (beyond self), possibly, for example, spiritual state, moral purity, *such as a mission to save the world.* According to Burns (1978: 4, as quoted in Conger, 2004), “The result of transforming leadership is a relationship of mutual stimulation and elevation that convert the led into leaders and may convert the leaders into moral agents”. The effective transformational leader can impact on the lives, beliefs, and thoughts of present or immediate followers as well as those of future generations of followers. This is the case, for example, with the great religious leaders.

The behavioural components of transformational leadership consist of: cultivation or display of charisma for the arousal of strong emotions, individualized consideration, provision of intellectual stimulation, and performance. It can be suggested that the transformational leader has two main qualities. These are the capacity of the transformational leader to aspire to great heights and the capacity to inspire his followers. Aspiration is an internal dynamic issuing from within the leader although it may draw sustenance from some external source. But inspiration is an external dynamic issuing from the leader to the followers.

But it may help to take into account what transformational leaders can and cannot do. Otherwise, we may end up persecuting otherwise effective, well-meaning, and hard-working transformational leaders. For example, global issues such as climate change and its deleterious effects require global action to address them, not just the effort of one transformational leader in one African country. As Küng (2005) argues, the age of globalization requires a global ethic.

**The Transactional Leadership Theory:** For clarity in contrast, transactional leaders nurture more mundane and instrumental relationships with their followers, such as cash for votes in politics or offer and acceptance of gifts for rendering services such as kickbacks for award of contracts. The transactional leaders live in an immanent, terrestrial, or pedestal existential plane, so to speak. This is the more pervasive of the two types of leadership in many parts of the world.

**ii. Learning Theory**

The justification for this framework derives from the observed continuous, dynamic complexity characterizing the total global cultural environment. This environment, bordering on the edge of complexity and chaos (Buckley and Monks, 2008), creates the imperative for acquiring a continuous learning capability for creatively and iteratively adapting to its continuous changes. It necessarily involves enrolling in a *life-long learning course* at the level of individual countries, regions, and continents, which constitutes multi-level learning experience. It is useful for creating dynamic capability, *dynamic efficiency,* and skills for appropriate responses to environmental cues. Besides, a *static efficiency* can result from a static transformational leadership style, leading to
stagnation in the absence of learning. Thus, a static leadership may lead to the blind, rigid, or fanatical deployment of formerly successful, but now irrelevant, strategies to the very perdition of the country, region, or continent.

A learning continent led by leaders who are characterized by, and conscious of, the need to continuously learn will necessarily be more aware of the inevitability of learning from previous errors and failures and thus will be in a position to develop adaptive moves. For leaders to flexibly and advantageously adapt to changing environmental circumstances, they need to re-conceptualize or re-examine successful schemas irrespective of their previous or current suitability to their cultural environment. This is what Drucker (1994, in Carmeli & Sheaffer, 2008) described as rethinking, challenging, and constantly doubting the theory of the firm. Africa needs learning-capable leaders, who are willing and open to learn from failures by re-examining past failures and re-strategizing to achieve development (see Carmeli & Sheaffer, 2008).

Africa’s Wealth of National Resources

In this section, the national resources which constitute the subject matter for this conversation are listed. Reference to Social Capital Theory is made to demonstrate the superabundance of Africa’s national resources.

According to Couto (2004), the Social Capital Theory, examines (i) moral resources and (ii) moral and collective goods that people invest in one another as members of a family, community, country, or society generally. Moral goods include truth, trust (a faith in other people), empathy, fellowship, goodwill, reciprocity, and mutual support. Thick networks increase the likelihood of collaboration and cooperation. Moral and collective goods relate to assets commonly owned and enjoyed by all members of a society. An example is good environmental quality; it is clean, fresh air.

Social capital resources relate to three other forms of capital resources, which are (i) financial capital resources, (ii) physical capital resources, and (iii) human capital resources. All corporations and countries have these three forms of capital resources to varying degrees. Applying this template, Africa’s national resources are listed as follows.

**Social Capital Resources**

These are moral goods which include truth, trust, empathy, fellowship, goodwill, reciprocity, and mutual support.

**Financial Capital Resources**

They are constituted by money. Africa obtains its financial capital resources mainly from taxes, levies, fines, duties, excise, licenses, concessions, and proceeds from exports. The major source of financial capital resources for Africa is constituted by the proceeds from export of natural resources to developed, industrial countries.

**Physical Capital Resources (Natural and Technological Resources)**

These are constituted by both (i) natural (God-created) capital resources and (ii) non-natural (human-created) capital resources. I take natural (God-created) capital resources first.

a. **Natural (God-created) Capital Resources**

are mineral natural and agricultural natural capital resources which are
endowments from God. Mineral natural resources are rock-or soil-based.

i. **Mineral Natural Resources**: The Delta State Ministry of Commerce and Industry (2014) lists the known deposits of mineral natural resources in the Delta State of Nigeria as follows: Kaolin, Silica, Phosphate, Tar Sand, Clay, Gypsum, Feldspar, Mica, Quartz, Quartzite, Granite, Gabbro Syenite, Petroleum, Natural Gas, Silica sand, Clay, Ball clay, Lateritic clay, Gravel, and Lignite. These are the resources of just one state out of 36 states in Nigeria. At the continental level, there are Uranium, Tin, Columbine, Bitumen, Iron ore, Coal, Limestone, Gold, Silver, Copper, and so on.

ii. **Non-Mineral Natural (God-created) Resources** include humans, as the superordinate capital resource; fish in swamps, rivers, lakes, seas, and oceans; animals in the forest, seas, and oceans; herbs and trees.

iii. **Natural (human-cultivated or Agricultural) Capital Resources**: These are crops of all sorts, animals raised through husbandry activities; fish raised in ponds and elsewhere. The Delta State Ministry of Commerce and Industry (2014) also listed the resources in this area, namely, Cassava, Maize, Oil Palm, Banana, Plantain, Cocoa, Cow Pea, Rubber, Mango, Pineapple, Pear, Coconut, Sugarcane, Kola nut, Rice, Water Yam, Bamboo, Potatoes, Vegetables, Groundnut, and so on; Poultry, Cattle, Pig, and Fish.

b. **Non-natural (Human-Created) Capital Resources** consist of tools, buildings, equipment, machines, and other artefacts.

These are subsumed under technology as they are products of human ideas. So, they are technological capital resources. They are “the complex of physical structures and networks within which economic activities are carried out” (Castree, 2006; Kristiansen, 2001; African Development Bank, 2007: 158-161). Thus, their absence creates a missing link in resources for socioeconomic development.

**Human Capital Resources**

Human capital resources are qualities residing in the person. They are the skills, experiences, expertise, attitudes, and motivations that Africans embody in their persons, which impact on productivity. These resources are acquired through education, training, interactions with other knowledgeable people, and intuition or inner knowing. They contrast with social (network) capital resources which are relational capital resources that reside in the network of relationships among people in the network; the relationships are inter-actor ties. Li (2007: 231) defined social capital “as an informal access to others’ resources due to social ties.” It is actually a privileged access to favours as a result of being connected to people who have various resources.

**The Rising or Worsening Poverty Level in Africa**

A rising level of poor and impoverished Africans are suffering unprecedented adversity through loss of jobs, low-paid work, health hazards (e.g., Ebola, cerebrospinal meningitis, malaria, tuberculosis), rising food and energy prices (many countries), environmental degradation, armed conflict (South Sudan; Central African Republic, Libya), political turmoil (e.g., Ethiopia, Democratic Republic
of Congo, Libya, Somalia); natural disasters such as droughts, desertification (e.g., Niger Republic, Somalia), landslide (e.g., Sierra Leone); poor economic performance such as recession (e.g., Nigeria and South Africa; they, along with Brazil, have just come out of it), resource depletion, insecurity due to incessant terrorist attacks (Egypt, over the Sinai Peninsula; Nigeria, in the North-East; Kenya, Mali, Somalia), bad leadership and official corruption (almost all African countries), and so on. As it stands now, Africa cannot adequately feed, clothe, educate, and house the vast majority of its population. Thus, the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) which were developed to secure a more prosperous future for the most disadvantaged people on earth only a few years ago (2000) are unlikely to be met across the board (Correll, 2008 in Lena, 2000) in Africa (see African Development Bank, 2007; Okaba, 2005).

These misfortunes have driven a pernicious and embarrassing second wave Slave Trade in Africa. Whereas in the first wave of the Slave Trade, the enslaved were unwilling victims of slave raiders, in the current wave, people are giving themselves up to slavery. They go the extra mile to seek out, and pay heavily in Euros or Dollars to, the human traffickers to ferry them in “Desperate Journeys,” in overloaded and rickety boats, across the Mediterranean Sea, mainly through war-ravaged, chaotic, and dangerous Libya, to Europe in hopes of finding and experiencing a better and comfortable life (see Mafu, 2019).

Failed crossings by sea, which are daily occurrences, result in capsizing of ferry boats occasioned by the drowning and death of thousands each year for many years now. The Mediterranean Sea has, thus, become a virtual watery grave for (African) migrants. According to Yousef (2017, as quoted in Mafu, 2019) between 700,000 and one million African migrants died in the Mediterranean Sea in 2017. Others suffer denials of visa application, rejection, mistreatment, embarrassment, and shock at the embassies of the US and European countries in Africa. Europe and the US may be afflicted with “amnesia”, which is a medical condition of forgetfulness. The US forgets that it migrated from Europe and Europe forgets that it migrated from Africa. They are Africans in the Diaspora. Despite the hazards in migration, from Africa, the flow of Europe-bound human traffic seems unstoppable as the lure of an envisioned better life and the desperation to escape the clutches of war, poverty, and hunger feed a desire to take a chance.

Even for successful crossings into Europe, the reality for those who succeed is a different one from the envisioned life: shock, enslavement, slave labour, forced prostitution, humiliation, rejection, detention, abandonment in makeshift refugee camps or shelters (see also Pennington et al., 2009).

**Africa and Transformational Leadership**

In this section, an attempt is made to answer the implied question, “Has Africa ever had transformational leaders?” A suggestion is made of some African leaders as candidates for consideration as transformational leaders and leave readers to judge whether they are transformational leaders or not. In doing so, Dunayevskaya (1973, as cited in Gibson, 2004) is drawn upon to list Gamel Abdel Nasser of Egypt and Dr. Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana as radical African leaders. For the reason of space constraint, the leadership
qualities of just three leaders are highlighted, who are Gamel Abdel Nasser of Egypt, Nelson Mandela of South Africa, and Barack Obama of African extraction.

Gamel Abdel Nasser of Egypt was an extraordinary or a great leader, at least in the sense of Hayward (2005). He moved enthusiastic crowds in Egypt. To gain insight into his leadership style and effectiveness, Bishop (2004) suggested that we consider the crowds that attended three major events in his life. These were his “audience crowd” that came to hear his moving speech precedent to the nationalization of the Suez Canal in 1956; the “panic crowd” that attended his resignation from the presidency of Egypt following his country’s defeat at the hands of Israel in the 1967 war; and the “expressive crowd” that mourned his sudden death in 1971. He summoned uncommon courage to nationalize the Suez Canal Company. Consequently, Britain, France, and Israel launched a tripartite military invasion of Egypt. Egyptians gave him the mandate of nation-building in 1956. In 1967, they called him back into office after his sudden resignation from the presidency but protested against his emphasis on military modernization and industrialization based on heavy industries at the expense of producing consumer goods, a model provided by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR).

Nelson Mandela (the Madiba) of South Africa resisted the Apartheid system and endured a politically-motivated life term in jail, kept incommunicado, in the Robben Island, under inhuman conditions. He suffered a bout of tuberculosis. He was released under pressure from the international community and the war for the de-Apartheidization of South Africa. On his release, he contested for the presidency and won election under the African National Congress (ANC). Under his watch, he reconciled White, Black, and Colored South Africans through the Truth and Reconciliation Commission. The economy of the country was buoyant. At his death, almost like no other leader, world leaders gathered to pay him their last respects. He earned the respect of the world as a great leader. Streets, roads, parks and other public places have been named after him in many countries as a tribute to his contribution to humanity, in fact, world civilization and immortalization of his name. Mandela’s mission for the world is transformational in effect.

Barack Obama (African American; his father was a Kenyan) was a consecutive, two-time president of the US. He was as good as being a president of the world because of the dominant position of the US on the world scene. He managed to re-establish diplomatic relations with Cuba, America’s decades-long arch-enemy, which ten of his predecessors were loath to, unwilling, or incapable of doing. He contained North Korea without precipitating war rhetoric as against what is currently precipitated by Donald Trump. He got Iran to sign a nuclear deal; he also signed the Paris Climate deal and committed the US to reduce climate-threatening carbon emissions. He made Africa, in particular, and the Blackman, in general, proud. On his farewell, thank you, trip to friendly countries and allies of the US around the world, in Greece, he stirred a rousing applause and standing ovation for a well-delivered speech. In it, he once spoke Greek to the delight of members of the Greece parliament; he touched on political philosophy, in particular, that democracy started from Greece (perhaps on the basis of recorded practice but Athens had its political instabilities; coups, democracy interspersed with oligarchic and autocratic
rules [Howenstein, 2009; Wren, 2005: 19]) and, suggested that, although, it (democracy) is not the best form of government, it provides space for disagreement and debate. His uncommon achievements in international diplomacy won international acclaim, which was rewarded with the highly coveted Nobel Prize for international diplomacy.

On the occasion of his famous speech in Cairo, Egypt, on June 4, 2009, President Barack Obama stated impressively that:

> It is easier to start wars than to end them. It is easier to blame others than to look inward; to see what is different about someone than to find the things we share. But we should choose the right path, not just the easy path. There is also one rule that lies at the heart of every religion – that we do unto others as we would have them do unto us. This truth transcends nations and peoples – a belief that isn't new; that isn't black or white or brown; that isn't Christian, or Muslim or Jew. It's a belief that pulsed in the cradle of civilization, and that still beats in the heart of billions. It's a faith in other people, and it's what brought me here today. We have the power to make the world we seek, but only if we have the courage to make a new beginning . . .

(as Quoted in King, 2005).

Some White Americans depicted him with uncharitable caricatures. Some even suggested that they wanted their country back from his leadership. They were overwhelmed with his extraordinary performance and immense administrative capabilities because he exceeded their myopic and ethnocentric imaginations. But he was restrained; he did not use his enormous national military power to fight back for his Black people against the White aggressors, supremacists, and terrorists. Obama was more often than not seen in a long-sleeved shirt with the sleeves folded back, which might appear casual to some people. In other words, he was not flamboyant and given to displays. He was always collected and stable; never pounded a table top, as angry or destructive leaders would do as described in Gibson and Callister (2010) and Krasikova et al. (2013).

Others are Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana who fought and secured independence for Ghana, which was the first on the African continent; and Martin Luther King (Jr), an African American, who spear-headed the civil rights movement in the US in the 1960s and inspired people with his famous, “I have a dream...” speech.

Let me stoke or provoke a debate by suggesting that the founding fathers of modern Africa were transformational leaders. I have my reasons for making this suggestion. For one, they were able to inspire and mobilize ordinary, bare-handed Africans to demand independence from the imperial, colonial powers of Europe, and where they were not favourably heard, fought them and won independence. I can recall Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia (formerly Northern Rhodesia); Jomo Kenyatta (c. 1897-22 August, 1978), an African nationalist who led the Kenya African National Union or KANU from 1961 until his death and transformed Kenya from colony to independent republican state; and Jaramogi Ajuma Oginga Odinga (October, 1911- 20 January, 1994) also of Kenya fame; Julius Nyerere of Tanzania; Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia (the Rastafarians were inspired by him to the point that they paid worshipful homage to him); Joshua Nkomo and Robert Mugabe.
of Zimbabwe (formerly Southern Rhodesia) who employed guerrilla warfare and ended Ian Smith’s white minority rule in 1980; Ndabanigi Sithole of Zimbabwe (founded the ZANU in July, 1963), Bishop Desmond Mpilo Tutu, and Bantu Steve Biko both of South Africa who, among others, spearheaded the struggle for the de-Apartheidization of the country. Steve Biko paid with his dear life in the Soweto uprising against R. F. ‘Pik’ Botha’s and P. W. Botha’s Apartheid South Africa. The present author is surprised that the International Criminal Court (ICC) did not arraign Vorster, Botha, and others for crimes against humanity. Where is the conscience and justice in this world? Africa has, however, forgiven them. That is part of Africa’s contribution to world culture and civilization. *Africa is a transformational leader.*

Others were Dr. J. K. Aggrey, who inspired Black Africans to take pride in their black skin colour; Chief Obafemi Awolowo, Herbert Macaulay, and Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe of Nigeria (who was, in fact, known as “Zik of Africa”); Samuel Daniel ‘Shafishuna’ Nujoma of Namibia, a revolutionary who led South West African Peoples Organization (SWAPO) to gain independence, and anti-Apartheid activist; Jonas Malheiró Savimbi of Angola who founded and led the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola, assassinated in February 22, 2002; Augustinho Neto of Angola who led the Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) and gained independence for the country; Samora Moises Machel of Mozambique, military commander, politician, and a revolutionary, who won independence for his country; Patrice Emery Lumumba, Moise Tshombe, and Joseph Kasa-Vubu of Congo; Aimé Césaire of Martinique in the Caribbean and Léopold Seder Senghor of Senegal both of whom pioneered the Négritude movement in the 1930s to re-ignite an African cultural rebirth (see also Babou, 2010; Wikipedia.org). This is an incomplete list.

So, what is new about transformational leadership that we have not seen in Africa before and why is Africa still the way it is despite the transformational leaders we have engaged in the past?

Observing the disappointments, Babou (2010) suggested that,

The dismal record of the post-colonial African leadership, whether revolutionary or accommodationist, has dimmed the enthusiasm of progressive historians, who worked hard in the 1960s and 1970s to establish African nationalism’s role in ending European colonial rule in Africa. Now corruption, genocide, refugees, civil wars, military coups, and ethnic conflicts have become the favored topics of historians and social scientists studying Africa.

This observation is consistent with my concept of static efficiency and the reason why the present researcher advocates the concept of the learning transformational leader, who is iteratively adaptive, creative; has dynamic capability and efficiency.

**Mediating Between National Resources and Development**

In this sub-section, the researcher attempts to establish the nexus between leadership and a national resources-based socioeconomic development. The relationship is not direct but mediatory with the leader standing between the national resources and socioeconomic development. The nexus is demonstrated...
using a business model or template by which the entrepreneur converts financial capital resources into the other three capital resources.

Applying this template, the author suggests that the learning transformational leader can impressively deliver socioeconomic development by harnessing and investing the proceeds of natural resource exploitation in the development of infrastructures as explained below.

**The Learning Transformational Leader Generates Financial Capital Resources**

Financial capital resources are constituted by money. The money is generated from extracting natural resources and collecting sundry taxes. Africa derives its financial capital resources mainly from taxes, levies, fines, duties, excise, licenses, concessions, and exports. The major source of money is the export of natural and agricultural resources to developed, industrial countries. These are constituted by both (i) natural (God given) resources and (ii) Agricultural (Man-developed/cultivated) Resources. They were listed in section 3 above and would not be repeated here.

**The Learning Transformational Leader Converts Money into Physical Capital Resources**

The conversion takes place by acquiring the physical assets. These are Non-natural (Human Created) Resources, which consist of tools, buildings, equipment, machines including computers, and other artefacts. The researcher subsumes them under technology as they are products of ideas. So, they are technological resources.

**The Learning Transformational Leader Converts Money into Human Capital Resources**

Human capital resources are constituted by the skills, knowledge, experiences, expertise, attitudes, and motivations that contribute to the productivity of the workers. These assets reside in the persons, which impact on his/her productivity. The resources are acquired through education, training, development, interactions with other knowledgeable people, and intuition which is inner knowing or tacit knowing (all knowledge is first of all personal and local). To achieve this feat, the leader must invest in educational infrastructure (schools, colleges, polytechnics, universities).

**The Learning Transformational Leader Converts Money into Social Capital Resources**

Li (2007: 231) defined social capital “as an informal access to others’ resources due to social ties.” Social capital resources are broad and diverse relational (network) resources. Thick networks tend to fetch benefits of collaboration and cooperation.

In theory, this is the nexus. But in practice, it has a weak link. The author feels a duty to explain why this connection has not satisfactorily worked out in reality, in Africa.

**Weak Management of Social Capital Resources**

Social capital resources are relational resources that encourage collaborations and cooperation. The more a country has these resources, the more the social wealth of the country, including its unity. There is poverty in social capital resources and their management in many African countries leading to the
proliferation of ethnic enclaves, separatist, and irredentist movements.

The Central African Republic (CAR) is divided on religious lines and waging a fratricidal war arising from it. Libya has three governments (states or countries?): a United Nations-recognized government in Tripoli, a legitimate government in Tobruk, and an ISIL caliphate ‘government’ in Sirte. Cameroun is neatly divided into Anglophone Cameroun and Francophone Cameroun. Why is Africa fighting over the languages of invaders? Nigeria has many fault lines, dichotomies, schisms, or dualisms. Two of them are the North/South and Muslims/Non-Muslims schisms with Shiites/Sunnis sub-divide.

A learning transformational leader would start from building harmony by tapping and managing the country’s social capital resources through the identification and addressing of the festering and lingering injustices infecting the polity.

Weak and Stagnated Technological Development

Africa’s technology is underdeveloped in comparison with that of Europe and long-stagnated since after the engineering feats of Egypt were accomplished, for example. This is a multidimensional problem, which includes the dimensions of self-defeating psychological and epicurean orientations, poor attitude to research and development, and funding deficit. For space constraints, only the first item is explained.

The psychological and attitudinal dimensions: To be sure, psychological and attitudinal or motivational factors have held up Africa’s technological development. Africa’s unpatriotic and transactional leaders frustrate Africa’s scholars by weakening their motivation to do enough fundamental and applied researches, mainly by sidelining, humiliating, and subjugating them to infra dig European ‘experts’. We are tethered to our colonial past when we see the European as a superior human species (see Rodney, 1972). So, our leaders prefer to employ Europeans with an Ordinary Diploma in engineering to supervise African PhDs in engineering. The result of the influences of all the factors is that patent filings from Africa’s universities are rare. Too few Nobel Prizes have been won in Africa. Africa’s engineers are not doing enough designing and fabricating of machines, equipment, and tools. Abstract, conceptual or counterfactual thinking is not sufficiently encouraged, as emphasis is placed on mundane or earth-bound practicality and professionalism. Notable theories are not forthcoming from Africa’s universities. Its universities are not listed among the best 500 universities in the world. The one exception is
the University of Cape Town in South Africa, which was ranked 103 in the 2011 Times Higher Education World University Rankings. Four of its alumni have bagged the coveted Nobel Prize in various academic fields (Wikipedia.org, 2012). These are listed to challenge Africa to do more than what it is currently doing.

To be sure, Africa has the people with the intelligence and capacity to make breakthrough research and development. Many of its intellectuals have been lured away to Europe, particularly the US (brain drain), and making their mark there. Thus, in making the above observations, the real issue is underperformance in the underdeveloped world as suggested in Wren (2005: 30), not about lack of innate ability or intelligence which is contrary to the sterile, jaundiced, ridiculous, and pseudoscientific Inate Theory which Murray propounded for derogating the Black Man (Murray, 2003 as cited in Roberts, 2004). This theory is a close cousin of the Intelligence Quotient (IQ), which has since been roundly discredited and dumped in the trash can of discarded theories. The superficiality of Murray’s theory comes out clearly from his ignorance of the historical fact that Africa was the cradle of world civilization, which was a product of human intelligence. Murray’s Inate Theory properly belongs to the dumpsite of pseudoscientific theories listed in Samuelson (764-766). He also fails to know that intelligence is normally distributed in the population.

**Unsatisfactory Development of Human Capital Resources**

This item is closely related to technology development discussed just above. It only needs to be added that the quality of human capital is on the decline (Odimegwu, 2005). As mentioned before, Africa cannot adequately feed, clothe, educate, and house the vast majority of its population. This is disturbing because, as Peters and Besley (2008) suggest, human capital is a necessary input in the knowledge-based or knowledge-driven economy (KBE or KDE). The explosion in the number of public and private universities, in Nigeria, for example, is not matched by an explosion in funding. Overcrowded classrooms, high lecturer-student ratio, poor facilities, poor working environment, lack of motivation, lack of tools to work with and so on are telling hard on the quality of output. The emphasis or objective is to achieve mass, rather than high quality, education.

Based on the foregoing observations, it may be suggested that a research university should be established to be owned and funded by all African countries. Let it be called African Continental University (ACU). A University of Africa (UOA) exists in Toru-Orua in Bayelsa State in the South-South Geopolitical Zone of Nigeria. It should be a graduate university with faculty drawn from Africa and elsewhere. It should collaborate with world-class universities around the world. Faculty should have a very light teaching load with a view to having ample time for researching and thinking. Funding should surpass the most highly funded university in the world to enable Africa accelerate its socioeconomic development. This is particularly emphasized in view of the fact that all development emanates from ideas which are created in the human mind. As such, development is the concretization by transformation of the ideas held in the human brain or mind into physical goods, services and processes. The university is society’s engine room for churning out ideas in a disciplined manner.
In the next section, the global capitalist economic system is examined for insight on the impasse in the national resources-based development for the continent.

National Resources and Development: Impact of the International Context

Immanuel Wallerstein has convincingly argued that, “Africa is today part of a single world-system, the capitalist world-system, and its present structures and processes cannot be understood unless they are situated within the social framework that is governing them” (as quoted in McGowan, 2008: 248; word in italics unstressed in original). In brief, (i) structural barriers (e.g., frozen international division of labour, and peripheralization of Africa), and (ii) ‘resource curse’ are preventing Africa from achieving socioeconomic development (Humphreys, 2005, in Basedau and Lay, 2009; McGowan, 2008; Moruku, 2010; Pfeifer 2009). I discuss them separately.

i. Structural Barriers to Africa’s Socioeconomic Development

The discussion in this subsection is based on the periodization approach of Wren (2004) using major events which define turning points in history as basis. It draws heavily on Simon (2010).

From about 1945, the Fordist era, after the Second World War, the global capitalist economy was constructed by the United States of America (USA or US), as the hegemonic power, in conjunction with other major capitalist states, especially, the UK. It was constructed in line with broadly Keynesian and Fordist principles against the backdrop of an economic boom and high employment. But towards the late 1960s, this boom was coming to an end as the US became more and more bogged down in the Vietnam War. It eventually lost the war.

In the period 1973–1974, the post-Fordist era, an international oil crisis ensued when the oil-rich Arab states slapped an oil embargo on the West for its support for Israel in the Arab-Israeli conflict of the period. This led to the quadrupling of oil prices, which upset the postwar global economic structure. In order to recover from this crisis and begin a new cycle of capital accumulation, a neoliberal economic model was adopted by the US ruling class in the mid- to late-1970s. These developments meant the end of the Keynesian model and promoted a capitalist regime of accumulation on the basis, among others, of renewed exploitation of the periphery, the natural resources-rich developing countries. The global institutional framework was also radically altered, which involved the transformation of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (WB) into instruments of global neoliberalism overseeing the application of structural adjustment programmes in indebted developing countries, whereby they took over the treasuries of these countries (Harvey, 2006: 23, in Simon, 2010).

By the mid-1990s, the neoliberal era, the extraterrestrial powers consisting of the hegemonic bloc, engineered the financialisation of the global economy and developing countries of the world were both coerced and persuaded to follow the neoliberal path to development. The global diffusion of the new (Hayekian) monetarist economic orthodoxy took on neoliberal ideological turn (Kus, 2006). These developments coalesced to produce the “Washington Consensus” with
the World Trade Organization (WTO) serving as its institutional expression.

This global capitalist economic system is backed up with a coercive military machine that rolls on peripheral nations attempting to escape it. It is a social order that is completely lacking in compassion and justification (Banerjee, 2003, 2008; George, 2014; Kohl and Farthing, 2009; Lazzarato, 2009; Sumner, 2008). It is intolerant of challenge, opposition, or alternative socioeconomic and political structures and systems. To ensure its hegemonic grip on other states, the US and members of its hegemonic bloc keep invading peripheral states and blocking their development. These include the invasion of Iraq over an alleged possession of weapons of mass destruction (WMD); the tripartite invasion of Egypt over the nationalization of the Suez Canal; the Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba over its adoption of communism; the invasion of Salvadore Allende Gossens’ Chile in 1973 for its alleged communist-leanings (Bird, 2002); and the invasion of the poor countries generally for a renewed exploitation (see Moruku, 2016; Simon, 2010).

Economic globalization is encircling developing countries into a neoliberal, neo-imperialist capitalist system. But it is currently exclusionary, creating losers (e.g., Africa) and winners (e.g., developed countries), arising from distorted market structures such as the persistence of agricultural subsidies in developed liberal economies while opposing subsidy regimes in Africa and continuing the intensification of its peripheralization (see also McGowan, 2008; Helmut and Eberhard, 2004).

ii. Resource Curse on Africa’s Socioeconomic Development

Sure enough, the abundance of natural resources in Africa has failed to bring about a commensurate level of development of the continent. The academic debate has been dominated by the notion of an adverse effect of natural resources on peace and ultimately, socioeconomic development. Humphreys (2005, in Basedau and Lay, 2009) compiled six causal mechanisms on the adverse effect of natural resources on peace and development. The one that interests me most is the greedy outsider’s mechanism which suggests that outsiders (mainly Western powers) might be ready to intervene militarily either directly or through support for internal warring factions in order to gain or maintain control over lucrative resources. In the case of the Tuareg Uprising orchestrated by Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), in Mali, French military authorities merely chased away the rebels (Independent, 2016, in Mutanda, 2017) in order to retain their goodwill for exploitation of uranium in that region.

Thus, the debate on the failure of African leaders to realize Africa’s determination to achieve socio-economic development of the continent through the exploitation of natural resources must take the geopolitical intricacies in the international context into account. Africa is of immense and abiding geostrategic interest to the extraterritorial powers of Europe and the US. Thus, the roles these powers play in the wars fought in Africa and elsewhere in the resource-rich developing world, the battlegrounds of the Cold War, are meant to protect resource flows to these imperial powers. Africa will never rest because of its resources. This is my concept or definition of the resource curse on Africa.
Imperatives for Restructuring the World Economic Order

For too long, Africa has been docile and accepted a subaltern position as if it was an unalterable law of nature. Africa must now assert itself to reach its destiny of favour by tapping its natural resources for the benefit of its people. Sure, Africa is going in that direction and the author wishes to show it from developments starting from the stage of colonial dependency and “resource curse” to the stage of assertiveness in global geopolitics. Laudably, the Africa Union is taking the lead in this direction (African Union Commission, 2015) to generate the momentum to drive the rise of Africa after its decline from pioneering human civilization. The rise of the West coincided with the fall and stagnation of Africa, which decline enabled the West to colonize it. The rise of China is on course, which serves notice to Africa to rise to its feet.

Stage of Colonial Dependency and “Resource Curse”: The extraterritorial powers of Europe rose from the Berlin Conference, in 1885, to partition Africa into spheres of influence, market penetration, and resource exploitation. It exported its state system and muddled up the configuration of Africa, which created boundary problems that continue to fuel wars. For example, Eritrea and Ethiopia went to war over a boundary dispute. Europe profited by selling arms to both sides. Nigeria and Cameroun just managed to avert a war over the oil-rich Bakassi Peninsular because they showed unusual, uncommon, and extraordinary maturity by appealing to the International Court in The Hague and chose to abide by its decision (Ekoko, 2004). The success story of Nigeria and Cameroun serves to debunk the theorization of oil as fueling wars, which is alleged to translate to the resource curse of Africa. It is a classic case of the falsification of a theory of white Swans when one Swan is black.

The colonial powers exploited Africa’s human resources by conscripting its people to fight in the two devastating World Wars from 1914 to 1918 and 1935 to 1945. The French noticed that the Moroccan and Algerian soldiers were especially courageous fighters. So, they were deployed to the very front lines and took the hit while French troops took the back lines, far behind, cringing in deep trenches. As a result, Moroccan and Algerian troops suffered more troop losses than the French troops. French authorities also executed, by firing squad, about 100 Moroccan and Algerian troops who refused orders to fight against their Muslim brothers and fellow Arabs on the side of Germany and its European allies (Al Jazeera documentary Program: The World War through Arab Eyes, 5/01/2017). Thus, Africa’s bravery became another resource curse. The conscription of Africans in the world wars is another dimension of human resource exploitation of Africa. But let it be known that in the event of a nuclear war in the Korean Peninsula, Africa will not fight for the either side in the conflict. Africa believes in its non-aligned stance. In fact, Africa will mediate peaceful resolution of the conflict and host the peace talks. Africa has been doing it by contributing its troops on peace-keeping operations in the world, such as its contributions to the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL).

Stage of Neutrality in World Geopolitics: After World War II in which 60 to 80 million people were killed, the West (US and its NATO allies) waged an attritional and smoldering Cold War with the East (USSR and its Warsaw
Pact allies). The rival political ideologies and economic systems brought the world to the brink of a nuclear holocaust. The climax was the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962. The developing countries wisely chose to stay out of this madness by the formation of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) in the Belgrade Conference, Serbia in 1961 and led by Josip Broz Tito of Socialist Yugoslavia. The founding fathers were Shri Jawaharlal Nehru of India, (1889-1964), Achmad Sukarno of Indonesia (1901-1970), Josip Broz Tito of Yugoslavia (1892-1980), Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt (1918-1970), and Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana (1909-1972), whose action was known as the Initiative of Five (http://en.wikipedia.org). An Afro-Asian conference had been held in Bandung, Indonesia in 1955 which was attended by newly independent Asian and African countries; a necessary step to the founding of NAM. That conference enunciated the collective opposition of the participants to colonialism and imperialism.

Unfortunately, the metropolitan powers undermined or ruptured the NAM and rendered it inefficacious by forging bilateral cooperation between member-states and the metropolitan powers and playing out their geopolitical and ideological struggles (proxy Cold War), using these countries as the battleground. The Congo, whose war was waged from 1961 to 1965 was Samuelson, 1976: 762; Wikipedia.org, 2018). Africa then sought a new international economic order, as explained in the following sub-section.

Stage of Demanding New International Economic Order: The capitalist liberal world order into which most of NAM members were drawn was suffocating and frustrating the development efforts of the developing countries. Consequently, these countries went, cap in hand, to demand a restructuring of the international economic order into the New International Economic Order.

Specifically, developing countries sought changes in the international trading system along the lines of the Charter drawn up at a Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly, in May 1974, for the NIEO. Seven of the eight key proposals in the charter related to trade namely:

1. **Increased prices for primary products.** Prices should increase immediately and be tied directly to the prices of exports of manufactured goods. A new fund should be set up to finance commodity agreements.

2. **Tariff and other barriers to trade.** Industrialized countries should remove tariffs and other trade barriers imposed against the manufactured goods of developing countries.

3. **Technology.** Arrangements should be made for technology to be transferred from Western to developing countries by other channels than transnational corporations.

4. **International monetary arrangements.** The developing countries should have a larger role in the International Monetary Fund and in other arrangements which affect trade and development.

5. **Foreign debt.** Debt should be cancelled for the very poorest counties, rescheduled for others.

6. **Countries have the right to national sovereignty over their resources.** They can nationalize foreign interests with fair compensation.
7. Developing countries’ share of world industrial output should rise to at least 25 per cent by the year 2000.

Following the rise in oil prices between late 1973 and early 1974, which jolted the Western world, their governments became convinced that they had to agree to a better deal for the developing world if they were to enjoy a guaranteed supply of raw materials. But when it gradually became clear, that the developing world was not in a strong bargaining position, the Western world lost interest in the NIEO. It can be suggested that Africa’s lack of sustained confidence weakened its bargaining position.

Stage of Assertiveness in Global Geopolitics: After a thoughtful consideration of the facts, Madeley (1996: 15-16), suggested that a better option for the resource-rich developing countries would be for them to harness the potentials of their own resources. Egyptian economist, Samir Amin, argued that the South would be better off ‘delinking’ from the ‘logic of the global system’. Today, more than ever before, with the orchestration of a hierarchical liberal world order (Sørensen, 2006), there is need to restructure (remake) the world to secure the benefits that are possible with exploitation of national resources.

Africa should and can formulate strategies for constructive engagement with the imperial powers. A raft of initiatives can be suggested, including (i) revitalizing the aspiration and pursuit for a medium term power status, which Nigeria, Brazil, and Egypt sought in the past; (ii) canvassing for permanent membership of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) with veto power, doing so in cooperation with China and India; (iii) acquiring negotiating power; (iv) seeking power parity with the big powers; (v) seeking the restructuring of the world on lines of a polycentric world order. For space constraints, I expatiate on just the last initiative.

Seek a Restructuring of the World on Lines of a Polycentric Order: The post-World War II global geopolitical system was structured by the powerful Metropolitan countries. They did so to suit their exclusionary geopolitical interests. Africa did not participate in the structuring exercise. Africa must participate in the ongoing restructuring exercise. The BRICS initiative is an exemplary case. It should involve the creation of multipolar (Wade, 2011) or polycentric (de La Barra, 2006) world order. Multipolarity or polycentrism is a variant of Jacques Derrida’s conception, rooted in post-structuralism, of a decentered universe (Barry, 2002: 65-68). More clearly, “(It) means a fall in the concentration of economic activity in (the core of) the international system and, within this, the rise of concentrations outside the previous core” (Wade, 2011: 351).

Five indicators define the contours of the emerging new world, which are suggested in Wade (2011), namely:

1. Share of G7 (12 percent of world population) in global GDP: In 2000, the G7’s share was 72 percent; by 2011 it will have fallen to 53 percent, according to the IMF (measured at market exchange rates).

2. China’s rise: Chinese output per head compared to that of the United States rose from about 6 percent to 22 percent between 1980 and 2008 (the proportion in 2008 was roughly similar to Japan’s in the late 1940s).

3. Whose monetary policy matters to the rest of the world? Ten years ago, the
world paid attention to U.S. and EU monetary policy, and nobody outside China paid attention to China’s monetary policy. Today China’s monetary policy is closely watched, especially in New York; Washington, D.C.; and London.

4. Share of developing and transitional countries (DTCs) in world output: Between 2000 and 2009, the share of DTCs in world output rose by 10 percentage points, from 23 percent to 33 percent (measured at market exchange rates) and from 40 percent to 50 percent measured in purchasing power parity dollars.

5. South-South trade: In 1997, the ten biggest Asian exporters (excluding Japan) sent 46 percent of their exports to the United States, the EU, and Japan; in 2009, only 36 percent, the difference going to developing countries and oil exporters. China is now Brazil’s biggest trading partner, displacing the United States from its long-held top spot.

Developing Africa’s Learning Transformational Leadership

As it stands now, the supply of learning, visionary, transformational leaders is far short of the demand for them. So, leaning on Brandl and Bullinger (2009) and on Archer (in Bergendorff, 2008), there is an imperative to deliberatively develop or source for them. This makes it an issue of both agency (i.e. nurture) and structure (i.e. nature). In fact, nurture can be employed to copy nature.

It should be pointed out that transformational leadership was discovered (MacGregor Burns, 1978 in Conger, 2004), not created, which ‘proves’ the “nature” side of the academic debate on leadership. But it can be developed or institutionalized as shown in the case of entrepreneurship (see Brandl and Bullinger, 2009) by using the tools of Institutional Theory, which are (i) ideals, (ii) discourses, and (iii) techniques of control.

i. Idealism of LTL: LTL should be highly valued and held up as an object of high desirability much like the Western cultural account did for entrepreneurship which led to the pervasiveness of entrepreneurship in Western societies (see Brandl and Bullinger, 2009). The value and desirability should stem from the useful developmental services issuing from LTL to communities, states or countries, organizations, and societies. Consequently, LTLs should enjoy the admiration and loyalty of their followers. They should be seen as moral and collective resources for the society, securing the highest possible quality of life for their subjects without thought of personal monetary gains. People should aspire to leadership position precisely because they want to serve and enjoy the satisfaction of serving and getting their names written down in gold letter in the great history books of the annals of Africa.

Africa’s electorates are yet to use their enormous powers of granting legitimacy, status, authority, and power to their leaders through the democratic election process and extracting from them, in exchange, uplifting vision, being exemplary moral agents, public service, high quality life, high standard of living, and so on. Thus, African electorates should demand from their aspiring leaders the values convergent on LTLs.
ii. **Discourse**: As stated before, discourse gives more precise specifications of the behavioural dimensions of LTL. Discourse is normally conducted through discursive regimes constituted by lectures, books, speeches, reports, news, talk shows, jingles, journal papers, and other communication channels. What this requires is that the value of LTLs should be built into school syllabuses and universities’ academic programmes and be taught as such. They should be subjects of public speeches, official reports, and any other avenues for disseminating and entrenching the need and value of LTLs.

iii. **Control Techniques**: Techniques of control develop and assess the specifications made in discourse processes. In other words, it tries to ensure whether the discourse processes have been successful. This may be performed by the Africa Union in its peer review process. It should determine whether the leader of an African country is leading according to the tenets of LTLs.

### Conclusion

Drawing on the leader-member exchange theory, the learning theory, and social capital theory, the present paper set out to examine the role of the learning transformational leadership in mediating the nexus between Africa’s national resources and its socioeconomic development in the development context of the international environment. It was found that two factors accounted for the socioeconomic performance of Africa. These were (i) a largely and pervasively weak leadership capability in mediating the nexus (connection) between superabundant national resources and Africa’s socioeconomic development in the immediate African context and (ii) a remote but largely strong nexus between the international development context and Africa’s human condition. Both contributed to the worsening poverty situation in Africa.

Consequently, it was suggested that Africa should install a learning, visionary transformational leadership to effectively mediate the link between its superabundant national resources and its socioeconomic condition. It was also suggested that Africa addresses the international context to be able to secure the benefits of the exploitation of its national resources. Specific measures for nurturing the learning transformational leaders were suggested. These were the (i) idealization of the values and qualities of the learning transformational leadership, (ii) establishment of a discursive regime for making the values and behavioural dimensions or specifications of learning transformational leadership precise, teachable, and cultivatable, and (iii) establishment of control techniques for measuring the efficacy of the specifications.

Specific measures for addressing the international context included (i) revitalizing the aspiration and pursuit for a medium term power status, which Nigeria, Brazil, and Egypt sought in the past; (ii) canvassing for permanent membership of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) with veto power, doing so in cooperation with China and India; (iii) acquiring negotiating power; (iv) seeking power parity with the big powers; (v) seeking a restructuring of the world on lines of a polycentric world order. Future studies should take national case studies and longitudinal studies to assess the efficacy of the policy measures suggested in the present study.
References


Nana Usman Bature

Abstract

This study examines the effects of work stress on employees’ performance in the banking industry, using some selected banks in Abuja. Opinions of bankers were surveyed via the adoption of proportional random sampling that grouped bankers into managers and non-managers and two hundred and twenty (220) copies of questionnaires were distributed while 198 were completed and returned. Both descriptive and inferential statistical (univariate and multivariate analyses) were applied to analyze the data. Findings from the study revealed the existence of a significant relationship between the causes and effects of stress of the sampled bankers. Furthermore, stress was found to impact negatively on employees’ skills, efforts, working condition, ability to meet set targets, speed, accuracy and integrity. Specifically, skills, accuracy and integrity were the major performance factors most affected. The study recommends that stress management should be targeted at ensuring that bankers undergo regular training, while job schedules should be redesigned to give room for effective administrative support in the banking industry.

Keywords: Banking Industry, Employees, Performance, Stress, Stressor, Work Stress.

Introduction

Stress may be regarded as inevitable in life. It affects the performance of employees in all organizations either positively or negatively. Stress is the wear and tear of the human body caused by challenges of life. Stress is the response people may have when presented with work demands and pressure that are not matched to their knowledge and abilities and which challenge their ability to cope.

A decade ago, the banking sector in Nigeria underwent rapid and striking changes, like policy changes due to globalization and capitalization. These brought about increased competition amongst the banks in order to meet these changes which could bring down any bank that lacked merit. Another reason for stress in the banking industry was the fear that arose due to entrance of more private (corporate) sector banks, downsizing, rightsizing, and introduction of new technologies. As a result of these changes, the employees in the banking industry experienced high degree of stress. The advent of technological revolution in all works of life coupled with globalization, capitalization and privatization policies have drastically changed conventional patterns in all sectors of the economy. The banking sector is no exception.

The 1990s saw radical policy changes with regards to fiscal deficit and structural changes in Nigeria so as to prepare her to cope with the new economic world order. Globalization
and privatization-led policies compelled the banking sector to reform and adjust to have a competitive edge to cope with multinational led environment. The advent of technological changes, especially extensive use of computers in the sector has changed the work patterns of the bank employees and has made it inevitable to downsize the work force in the sector. Another thing that has affected the bank employees is the merger and acquisition that has been ongoing in the banking industry. The implications of the above transformations have affected the social, economical and psychological domains of the bank employees and their relations. An adage says that “health is wealth”. Whenever an employee’s health is affected his performance level will automatically reduce.

**Review of Literature and Hypothesis Development**

Stress is an imprecise term. It is a part of both social and concrete sciences. It is defined in terms of the internal and external conditions that create stressful situations, and the symptoms that people experience when they are stressed. Stress is a universal experience in the life of each and every employee in the organization, (Imtiaz & Ahmad, 2009). Selye (1956), probably the leading authority on the concept of stress, described stress as ‘the role of all wear and tear caused by life’. Stress is associated with impaired individual functioning in the workplace.

Robins (2000) opined that the nature of organizational jobs ensure the condition that individuals experience when they face vital opportunities or threats and are unsure about their ability to handle or deal with them efficiently and effectively. Robins and Sanghi (2006) in the same vein defines stress as “dynamic condition in which an individual is confronted with an opportunity, constraints, or demand related to what he or she desires and for which the outcome is perceived to be both uncertain and important.”

According to the Health and Safety Executive (HSE), UK (2001), stress is an undesirable response people have to tremendous pressure or other types of demands placed upon them. Some stress can be good, and some can be bad. Health and Safety Executive (HSE) distinguished between stress and pressure. Pressure is seen as positive and something that actually helps improve performance. People need a certain amount of pressure to perform well. However, the problems arise when the sources of pressure become too frequent without time to recover, or when just one source of pressure is too great for people to cope with. McGrath (1976) proposed a definition based on the conditions necessary for stress: **there is a potential for stress when an environmental situation is perceived as presenting a demand that threatens to exceed the person’s capabilities and resources for meeting it, under conditions where he expects a substantial differential in the rewards and costs from meeting the demand versus not meeting it.**

Prior research works exist in this area in developed and developing Countries (even...
though not sufficient in Management Sciences). Ahmed and Ramzan (2013) examined the relationship between job stress and job performance on bank employees in Pakistan. The study adopted the purpose model to investigate the impact of job stress on job performance using sample of 144 participants. The participants comprised senior graduate employees, customer services officers and managers of well reputed banks in Pakistan. The data were obtained through close ended questionnaire. A statistical test of regression, correlation and reliabilities were also confirmed. Findings from the study indicated a significant negative correlation between job stress and job performances and shows that job stress significantly reduces the performance of an individual.

Salami, Ojokuku and Ilesanmi (2010) empirically assessed the impact of job stress on Nigerian Managers using random sampling technique to select 135 executive management students of LAUTECH Ogbomosho who have had at least years working experience as managers in various organizations. Applying Z-score test to the data collected using structured questionnaire, the study revealed that job stress brings about subjective effects such as fear, anger and anxiety among Nigerian managers resulting in poor concentration, mental block and poor decision making skills.

Imtiaz & and Ahmed (2009) examined the relationship between stress and the performance of medical and house officers at Rawalpindil Islamabad using survey approach to collect primary data for analysis. Findings from the study revealed important stress causing factors to include personal issues such as: lack of administrator support, lack of acceptance for work done, low span over work environment, unpredictability in work environment & inadequate monetary reward. Analysis showed immense support for negative relationship between stress and job performance, with stress greatly affecting career change over, job satisfaction, errors in treatment and knowledge. The study further showed that performance is negatively influenced by such factors as: increase in personal dilemmas, decrease in financial reward, decrease in influence over work environment and decrease in supervisor support.

Kashmir (2012) examined the factors causing stress among managers and non-managers working in Jammu and Kashmir commercial banks in India, analyzing primary data collected from 300 sample of bankers. The study revealed that a significantly higher level of stress is observed among managerial staff of the selected banks compared to non-managerial staff.

Paruk and Anesh (2011) examined the overall level of stress among bankers working at the retail credit evaluation and assessment (RCEA) units in four big banks of South Africa located at KwaZulu, Gauteng and Western Cape. Survey method was used to gather information concerning demographics, length of service, and qualifications of 40 employees in the banks. Findings from the study revealed high level of stress among employees in the selected banks.

The review of the above related literature suggests that stress has a profound impact on the performance of employees. On this note, the following null assertion was made:

\[ H_0: \text{Stress has no significant impact on employees performance in the banking industry.} \]
The Concept of Performance

The concept of performance refers to the act of doing a job both effectively and efficiently. Performance can also be said to be a multidimensional phenomenon whose demand include effectiveness, efficiency, productivity and good behaviour. In this study, subjective performance measurement method is used. The measures of this method are not based on quantitative operational information, instead, they are based on personnel’s subjective assessments. Wang et al. (1999) defines subjective performance measure as an indicator used to assess individuals’ aggregated perceptions, attitudes or assessments toward an organization’s product or service. Subjective performance data is usually collected using survey questionnaire.

Job performance as defined by Kazmi, Amjad and Khan (2008) is the results of three factors working together: skill, effort and the nature of work conditions. Skill is the knowledge, abilities and competence the employee brings to the job; effort is the degree of motivation the employee puts forth towards getting the job done, while nature of work conditions is the degree of accommodations of these conditions to facilitate employee performance. Akinnusi (1995), in his findings argue that in developing countries (such as Nigeria), the incidence of stress at home, in the society and organizations is alarming owing to the harsh economic realities, poor social relations, institutional delays, and breakdowns, general and pervasive feelings of precariousness of life. He stressed further that despite the gravity of the problem the attention given to the study of stress has not matched the seriousness which the matter demands. However, empirical studies carried out on the incidence of stress among Nigerian workers by Olugbile (1982); Asika and Ade-Serrano (1985) and Akinnusi (1995), have shown that consistently high levels of stress in conjunction with other socio-political and economic factors have contributed to declining productivity. Job stress also poses serious health problems, (Cox, 1996).

Work Stress in the Banking Industry

The banking industry is one of the service industries in emerging economies which is expanding very rapidly in the recent past. The market and customer orientation in commercial banks have put considerable pressure on the employees, especially front-line employees. The front-line employees of banking sector, who are in boundary spanning positions, endeavor to meet the needs of customers while attempting to fulfill the expectations of managers. An attempt to meet conflicting demands often leads to role stress (Wetzels, 2000), which impacts customer orientation of these employees and their job performance (Flaherty, Dahlstrom, and Skinner, 1999).

Short-term stress has served a useful purpose in our survival. Long-term stress, however, involves increasingly higher levels of prolonged and uninterrupted stress. The body adapts to the stress by gradually adjusting its baseline to higher and higher levels. For example, workers in stressful jobs often show an increased “resting” heart rate. Pelletier (1977) believed that the deleterious effects of stress are created only by unrelieved long-term stress. Albrecht (1979) also believed that the effects of stress are cumulative in nature. Ulcers do not just happen overnight in a high stress situation, they are generally the result of long extended exposure to stress. The health breakdown is simply the logical conclusion of a self-induced
disease development over a period of 10 to 20 years.

It was observed that literature on studies conducted in Nigeria relating the effect of stress on workers performance is insufficient. However, excessive amounts of stress can lead to lack of productivity, a loss of confidence, inability to perform routine tasks, increase mistakes and accidents at work; it can also encourage absenteeism, lower morale and increase conflict with others. Excessive amount of stress can also cause physical and emotional problems (Pflanz and Ogle, 2006) and poor life satisfaction (Pawar and Rathod, 2007). Researchers have noted that unfavourable factors such as poor telecommunication networks, low skill levels and educational attainment of staff, hostile governmental policies and world events, all combine to create a very different business environment to comparable banking organizations in more highly industrialized countries (Mahdi and Dawson, 2007).

Researchers have noted that the Nigerian socio – physical environment is fraught with occupational stress indicators (Akingbola and Adigun, 2010). Especially exposed to high occupational stress are commercial bank workers in Nigeria who must contend with a host of precipitating factors, such as, excessive and unpredictable work schedule occasioned by an ever-increasing competition in the industry; a virtual disappearance of job security as evident in mass retrenchment of thousands of bank workers on a regular basis; low decision latitude on the job; and increasing threats to physical safety, security and well-being as banks have become the number one target of armed robbery attacks, kidnappings, and armed raids by bandits.

As observed by Agboli and Ukaegbu (2006), working in Nigerian banks carries an elevated risk for occupational stress. Apart from stress-inducing factors implicit in banking jobs generally, bank workers in most parts of Nigeria must also contend with social and environmental factors such as security concerns (such as armed robbery, Boko haram insurgency in the far North east, incidents of kidnapping in South East Nigeria with white-collar workers, such as bankers, expatriates, and other high-profile individuals often the targets), decaying infrastructures (bad roads, for instance, making it difficult getting to work or getting back home on time, thereby constituting additional stress), relatively higher cost of living without a corresponding increase in take-home pay, among other factors.

**Theoretical Framework**

Most of the studies on the relationship between stress and performance focused on the negative performance effects of stress, although not all stress is bad. In fact, Selye (1956) emphasized that stress is a necessary part of life and that it does not always involve negative consequences for the organism involved. In fact, at certain moderate levels, stress can actually improve individual performance. There is substantial research supporting the concept of “good stress”. Yerkes and Dodson (1908) were the first to “stumble” upon the inverted-U theory between stress and performance. Their work focused on the effects of stress on the learning response of rats. Using three trials with low, moderate, and high levels of stimulus, the authors found a weak but curvilinear relationship, with performance on the task improving as the stressor stimulus reached a moderate level and decreasing as stimulus strength increased beyond this point.
Since Yerkes and Dodson have supported the inverted-U theory between stress and performance, Scott (1966) found that individual performance increases with stress and resulting arousal to an optimal point and then decreases as stress and stimulation increase beyond this optimum.

Furthermore, Srivastava and Krishna (1991) found evidence that an inverted-U relationship does exist for job performance in the industrial context. Selye (1975) and McGrath (1976) also suggest an inverted-U relationship between stress and performance. Finally, research on arousal theory supports the inverted-U theory, assuming that external stressors produce a stress response that is similar physiologically to arousal. Sanders (1983) and Gaillard and Steyvers (1989) argue that performance is optimal when arousal is at moderate levels. When arousal is either too high or too low, performance declines.

There are many critics of the inverted-U theory who argue that the relationship between stress and performance does not have a U-shape. One alternative model is a negative linear relationship. For example, Jamal (1985) argues that stress at any level reduces task performance by draining an individual’s energy, concentration, and time. Vroom (1964) offers a similar explanation, suggesting that physiological response caused by stressors impair performance. Some psychologists even suggest a linear positive relationship between stress and performance. For example, Mehlino (1977) argues that at low levels of stress, challenge is absent and performance is poor. Optimal performance in his model comes at the highest level of stress. There have been some studies in support of this hypothesis, including Arsenault & Dolan (1983) and Hatton (1995).

The review of the above related literature has shown clearly that there is no general consensus on the relationship between stress and performance. This is largely due to the fact that stress has been a subject of study for various fields including Biology, Psychology, Sociology, Management Sciences etc and as such viewed from many different stand points depending on the interest.

**Methodology**

This study employed a survey design where the opinions of respondents were solicited, presented, described and analyzed. The population of the study comprised of the management and staff of United Bank for Africa (UBA) Plc, Garki, Abuja, First Bank of Nigeria (FBN) Plc, Guaranty Trust Bank (GTB) plc, Zenith Bank Plc and Diamond Bank Plc respectively. The population was grouped into non-managers and managers.

<table>
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<th>Selected Banks</th>
<th>Managers</th>
<th>Non-managers</th>
<th>Total population</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United Bank for Africa (UBA)</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First Bank of Nigeria (FBN)</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guaranty Trust Bank (GTB)</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zenith Bank</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diamond Bank</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>78</strong></td>
<td><strong>412</strong></td>
<td><strong>490</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Field Survey, 2017.*
The sampling technique used in this research work was stratified proportional sampling. The respondents were grouped into two different strata and samples were drawn from each stratum randomly in order to give every element in each stratum equal opportunity of being selected. The strata in this case were non-managers and managers. The essence of this was to reduce bias to the bearest minimum. The researcher administered a questionnaire on the above groups in order to elicit the necessary information from them. After applying Yamane (1967) approach to determine the sample size, the resultant sample stood at 220. Consequently, 220 copies of questionnaires were administered to respondents in order to gather relevant information on the subject matter.

In this study, the researcher employed simple percentage (%), Student T - test and Canonical Correlation Analysis (CCA) to measure the frequency distribution of each respondent and the dependence of one variable over the other. Canonical Correlation Analysis (CCA) is a special case of Multivariate method of analysis which also includes some features of Univariate analysis (ANOVA). Canonical correlation analysis is a useful technique for exploring the relationships among multiple variables. CCA is more preferred to ANOVA where there are multiple dependent and independent variables. Multiple dependent variables involve using linear regression techniques to examine the effect of multiple stress causal variables on employees’ performance that result to specific multiple linear regression model(s). For this reason, the Multivariate Analysis of Variance (MANOVA) in the spirit of CCA is considered suitable to optimize the estimation procedure.

**Data Presentation and Analysis**

Table 2: Administration of Questionnaires

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Questionnaire</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Returned</td>
<td>198</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-returned</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>220</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Field Survey: 2017.*

Table 2 shows the rate of return of the questionnaire administered. While 90% (198) of the questionnaire were successfully filled and returned, the remaining 10% (22) were either not returned or invalid. Hence, the 198 questionnaire form the basis for analysis and interpretation as regards the causes of stress, its effects on employees and the effects on employees’ performance in the selected banks.
Table 3: Age of Respondents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age Group</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Valid Percent</th>
<th>Cumulative Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>20-25</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>17.7</td>
<td>17.7</td>
<td>17.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26-31</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>37.4</td>
<td>37.4</td>
<td>55.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32-37</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>23.7</td>
<td>23.7</td>
<td>78.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38-43</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>12.1</td>
<td>12.1</td>
<td>90.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>44 and above</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>198</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Survey Data, 2017

The table 3 illustrate the distribution of the ages of the respondents and the age variations. It can be observed that 35 respondents representing 17.7% were between the age of 20-25 years, 24 respondents representing 37.4% were between 26-31 years, 47 respondents representing 23.7% were between 32-37 years, 24 respondents representing 12.10% were between the age of 38-43 years, while the remaining 18 respondents representing 9.1% were 44 years and above. Incidentally, over 90% of the respondents were in the active age group.

Table 4: Educational Qualification of the Respondents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Educational Qualifications</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Valid Percent</th>
<th>Cumulative Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Professional Qualification</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>6.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HND</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>14.6</td>
<td>14.6</td>
<td>20.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University Degree</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>46.5</td>
<td>46.5</td>
<td>67.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Postgraduate Diploma</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>17.7</td>
<td>17.7</td>
<td>84.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Masters degree</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>15.2</td>
<td>15.2</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>198</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Survey Data 2017

Table 4 shows the distribution of respondents based on educational qualification. It indicates that 12 respondents representing 6.1% had professional qualification, 29 respondents representing 14.6% were HND holders, 92 respondents representing 46.5% were graduates with first degree, 35 respondents representing 17.7% were Postgraduate Diploma holders, while the rest 30 respondents which represent 15.2% of the whole were sample Masters Degree holders.
Table 5: Marital Status of the Respondents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Marital Status</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Valid Percent</th>
<th>Cumulative Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Married</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>40.4</td>
<td>40.4</td>
<td>40.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Single</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>46.0</td>
<td>46.0</td>
<td>86.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Widow</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>93.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Divorced</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>198</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Survey Data 2017

Table 5 shows the distribution of respondents’ marital status. While 80 respondents representing 40.4% were married, 91 respondents representing 46.0% were single. Meanwhile, the frequencies of those respondents that fall within the divorced and Widow categories were 12 and 15 respectively, corresponding to 6.1% and 7.6% of the whole.

Table 6: Position Occupied by the Respondents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category of Respondents</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Valid Percent</th>
<th>Cumulative Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Non-managers:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower Level Managers</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>43.4</td>
<td>43.4</td>
<td>43.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supervisor</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>31.3</td>
<td>31.3</td>
<td>74.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Managers:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle level Managers</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>14.6</td>
<td>14.6</td>
<td>89.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Top Managers</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>198</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Survey Data, 2017

Table 6 show the distribution of respondents’ position in the selected banks. As presented above, 86 respondents representing 43.4% were lower level managers, 62 representing 31.3% were supervisors, 29 respondents representing 14.6% fall in the middle cadre, while the remaining 21 respondents representing 10.6% were top managers.

Data Analysis

Empirical results on the dependency of employees’ performance on stress

Table 6 shows the dependency of employees’ performance on stress causal factors. As before, five stress causal factors were utilized to conduct the above regression analysis. They include Working for Long Hours & Time Pressure (WFLHATP), Long Absence from Family (LAFF), Lack of Support from my Supervisor (LOSFMS), Difficult Customers and Co-workers (DCAC) and Job Insecurity (JI). Their individual effects on the performance variables were equally investigated. The performance variables include Feeling that I need more of numerical skills to perform well...
I do experience decrease in self-motivational ability (IDEDISMA), Working under pressure slows me down (WUPSMD), I have difficulty in meeting set targets and goals (IHDIMSTAG), I am a bit slow in performing a task (IAABSIPAT), I find it difficult to reconcile accounts (IFIDTRA) and My colleagues do not have confidence in me (MCDNHCIM).

Table 7: Univariate Regression Analysis on the Impact of Stress on Employees’ Performance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent/ dependent Vars.</th>
<th>WFLHATP</th>
<th>LAFF</th>
<th>LOSFMS</th>
<th>DCAC</th>
<th>JI</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FTINMONSTPW</td>
<td>-0.0139</td>
<td>.3101</td>
<td>.2139</td>
<td>.4022</td>
<td>.0795</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDEDISMA</td>
<td>.0807</td>
<td>.1314</td>
<td>.1116</td>
<td>.0210</td>
<td>.0040</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WUPSMD</td>
<td>.7344</td>
<td>-.0688</td>
<td>.1904</td>
<td>-.0747</td>
<td>.3693</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IHDIMSTAG</td>
<td>.5141</td>
<td>-.0680</td>
<td>.08798</td>
<td>.5008</td>
<td>-.0107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IAABSIPAT</td>
<td>.4177</td>
<td>-.2040</td>
<td>.5131</td>
<td>-.1165</td>
<td>-.1661</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IFIDTRA</td>
<td>.0144</td>
<td>.3608</td>
<td>.6303</td>
<td>.3576</td>
<td>.1613</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MCDNHCIM</td>
<td>.03822</td>
<td>.6241</td>
<td>.5019</td>
<td>.0241</td>
<td>.6800</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Extraction from SPSS (IBM) 20.

Note: a & b implies significant at 1% and 5% respectively

Analysis of the impact of work and time pressure shows that working for long hours exacted pressure on employees which slowed them down (-0.7344), increases significantly the difficulty of meeting set targets by employees (.5141), slowed down the pace at which employees execute their tasks, and increases the rate at which employees lose confidence in each other (MCDNHCIM .3822).

Long absence from family increases the rate at which employees lack required skills which is necessary for accomplishing a task (FTINMONSTPW- 0.3101), the rate at which employees would be unable to reconcile accounts (IFIDTRA- 0.3608, and loss of confidence (MCDNHCIM= 0.6241). Lack of support from supervisors (LOSFMS) was associated with lack of proper skill to perform required tasks (FTINMONSTPW= 0.2139), slow rate at which employees perform their tasks (IAABSIPAT= 0.5131), difficulty in reconciling accounts, (IFIDTRA = 0.6303) and loss of confidence (MCDNHCIM = 5019).

Increased difficulty in the relationship between an employee on the one hand and customers and co-workers on the other (DCAC) is associated with lack of zeal to acquire proper skill needed for performing required tasks (FTINMONSTPW= 0.4022), difficulty in meeting set target (IHDIMSTAG = .5008), finding it difficult to reconcile accounts (IFIDTRA = .3576). Increased feeling of job insecurity (JI) is associated with work under pressure (WUPSMD= .3693), difficulty in reconciling accounts (IFIDTRA= .1613) and loss of confidence (MCDNHCIM = .680). Hence the major effects of stress on employees’ performance as revealed by the results of regression analysis are the lack of zeal to acquire proper skill needed for performing required tasks, difficulty in reconciling accounts and loss of confidence.
The hypothesis stated earlier in the study is restated and examined as follows:

\( H_0: \text{Stress has no significant impact on employees’ performance in the banking industry.} \)

The alternative hypothesis was investigated on the basis of the univariate regression analysis results on the impact of stress on employees’ performance in the banking industry. The statistical significance level of each beta coefficient that measure the impact of a stressor on a performance criteria was evaluated on the basis of t-statistics and supported by probability value. Statistical significance was indicated using superscripts \( a, \) and \( b \) (\( a \& b \)) for 1% and 5% level of significance respectively. Evidently, three of the variables (namely: lack zeal to acquire proper skill needed for performing required tasks, difficulty in reconciling accounts and loss of confidence) exhibited maximum and significant dependence on stress causal variables in the banking sector. On the basis of this finding, we conclude that stress impacted significantly on employees’ performance in the banking sector.

**Discussion of Findings**

This study has been able to expound on the existing knowledge and also unveiled fresh understanding on stress and related factors in the banking industry with some selected banks as case studies. The hypothesis stated in the study proposed that stress has significant impact on employees’ performance. Analysis of univariate regression conducted provided useful support for accepting the said hypothesis at significant level of one percent. Stress was identified to impact negatively on employees’ skills, efforts, working condition, ability to meet set targets, speed, accuracy, integrity.

The study showed that, although not all the stress factors were responsible for the poor performance observed among bank staff, most of the stress causal factors in the study influenced significantly on employees’ performance in the form of lack of zeal to acquire proper skill needed for performing required tasks, difficulty in reconciling accounts and loss of confidence. Findings of this research corroborate the work of Dar (2011) who in their study of 143 multinational companies, universities and banks in Pakistan identified stress as a trigger of subjective effects on work performance and bringing about poor skills, poor concentration and mental block.

**Conclusion**

Stress is natural to human existence. Life cannot exist without stress. The science of stress management therefore is to ensure that stress is kept at a healthy and manageable level. One major key to constructively managing stress is to first recognize its destructive or energizing effects. The study verified the construct validity of some factors used to measure the potential stress banks’ employees face which includes excessive overtime, long absence from family, job insecurity, difficult customers and co-workers and lack of support from colleagues and co-workers. It equally confirmed the reliability of items relevant for measuring the effects of stress faced by banks’ employees which include lack of zeal to acquire relevant skills for enhancing job performance, loss of motivation due to stress, under-performance as a result of stress, difficulty in meeting set targets, general slowness in performing tasks, difficulty in reconciling an account, and, finally, loss of confidence in employees.
Recommendations

The study recommends that stress management should be enhanced in terms of regular training, openness and understanding among the employees; in addition, jobs should be redesigned to give room for effective administrative support in the banking industry; lastly, managers should make efforts to clarify roles assigned to employees in other to facilitate their skills audit that will help to place employees that feel underutilized.

References


Ethics and Integrity in Public Service Leadership: A Case for Promoting Meritocratic, Professional and Neutral Service

Sylvester O. Obong’o

Abstract

“Public office is a public trust” (Josephson 1990) is a maxim which requires; public confidence in the integrity of government, lays the foundation for the ethical demands placed on people in public service and the laws that establish standards of behaviour. Although ethics, integrity and professionalism go hand in hand and are core values in how organizations conduct their business, their flagrant absence in the public service whose activities touch on the lives of citizens is dismaying. High-profile scandals in the public service over the past few years have raised serious concerns in government. A fundamental issue facing the governments today is therefore how to ensure that public servants act ethically and with integrity.

In addressing this concern the Government of Kenya has put in place several approaches aimed at instilling ethical behaviour in the public servants. These include legislation, development of code of conduct and training among other strategies. While the contributions of these initiatives which include punitive consequences cannot be ignored, they cannot be adjudged to have been successful either. Using research evidence to draw a linkage between ethics, integrity and professionalism on the one hand and the recruitment method on the other, this paper suggests that the success of ethics and integrity initiatives can be greatly hampered by patronage based appointments of top public servants. The findings demonstrate that ‘gate keeping’ through merit based recruitment and selection process, which ensures that only the best and the most qualified are hired for the job is a critical step in entrenchment of professionalism, ethics and integrity in the public service that Kenya cannot overlook or take for granted.

Key Words: Ethics, professionalism, public sector reforms, patronage, meritocracy

Context of Public Service Ethics and Integrity Reforms in Kenya

Kenya attained her independence from the British in 1963 with a constitution which provided for a complex set of institutions intended to serve the cause of controlled government, with minimal abuse of power. The most significant such institution for ensuring check and balance was the semi-federal system which took the form of seven Regions, each with a Regional Assembly and a separate public service. Immediately after independence, numerous changes to the independence Constitution of 1963 took place, especially after 1964. The country became a one-party system with a unicameral Parliament and a much scaled-down institutional base for autonomous constitutional agencies and concentration of power in the hands of the President.
From 1964 onwards, the President in his quest to consolidate power chose to use not his political party KANU but the civil service (Ahluwalia, 1996). Under these circumstances, the civil service became a critical institution in the President’s drive towards consolidating his powerbase, political interests superseded public interests, loyalty was emphasised over merit in appointments and the need to create patronage positions partly drove the rapid expansion of the public service in those formative years (Ludeki, 2003). The presidency usurped the powers and the roles of other state organs to become the biggest bureau in terms of administration and policy-making and all other organs of government, including the judiciary and the legislature gradually began to bend to it, as all politicians stood in owe over the power of the President (Nyong’o, 1989). The emerging system was typical of a contemporary neo-patrimonial relationship of loyalty and dependence pervading a formal political and administrative system, where leaders occupy bureaucratic offices less to perform public service than to acquire personal wealth and status (Bratton & Van de Walle, 1994). Branch and Cheeseman called this Kenyan state at this historical period as a ‘bureaucratic-executive state’ due to the role of civil service in sustaining the political regime that was in power (Branch & Cheeseman, 2006).

Within a span of slightly over a half a century Kenya has made big strides in development—economically, socially and even politically. A new constitution was promulgated in 2010 as a response to calls for establishment of new structures to reinforce the agenda of good governance, popular participation and consent in the governmental process in the national governance systems. In the economic front, in 2014 the country rebased its GDP and with that, it moved to a middle-level income country. The boost in GDP also means that Government have an easier time accessing commercial loans since a higher figure for GDP helps to lower debt ratios (Copley 2014). As the Country seeks a more progressive dispensation in its governance set-up, and to consolidate the new order in a firm constitutional arrangement offered by the 2010 Constitution, public service institutions are not going to experience a quantum leap into modern era but are involved in a new learning process where the old and the new exist side by side.

Kenya’s long-term development blueprint Vision 2030 aspires to create a globally competitive and prosperous country providing a high quality of life for all its citizens and to transform the country into a newly industrializing, middle income country by 2030. The strategy accords priority to improving the performance of the public service in its dual role of providing services and facilitating the growth of the private sector (GOK, 2008). Reform of the public service which has been in focus since the early 1990s with the onset of NPM type reforms advocates for opening up the public sector to greater private sector influence and lays emphasis on improving the efficiency and effectiveness of the public sector or delivery of public services (Hood 1991, De Oliveira, Jing and Collins, 2015). The rationale for the reforms in many other developing countries, Kenya included, was the belief that Kenyan bureaucracy had become too large, monopolistic and inherently inefficient (GOK 1992). Efficiency and effectiveness of the public service to position it as a key player in socio-economic development and was therefore a key driver of the reforms.
Meritocracy in the Public Service

Since Weber’s time, the debate on method of appointment and how that impacts on staff continues to be highly contested. Weber distinguished between prebendal and bureaucratic organizations. In the former, offices were often purchased. In the latter, officials were selected through meritocratic examination (Weber, 1978). Prebendal assignment of offices had very negative impact on the bureaucracy; Weber observed that “assignments of services and usufructs in kind ... tend to loosen the bureaucratic mechanism”. The means by which bureaucrats were selected was therefore closely associated with the performance of state bureaucracies. It was as a result, not surprising that to ensure performance of the bureaucracy; early reforms targeted recruitment and selection process.

In the United Kingdom, the principle of a civil service based on merit recruitment or qualification was a major recommendation of the Northcote-Trevelyan Report on Organization of Permanent Civil Service published on November 23, 1854. Similarly, the Pendleton Civil Service Reform Act of 1883 in the United States of America was enacted mainly to address the negative effects of spoils system and introduce merit as a basis of recruitment instead of political affiliation. Both in the UK and the United States, by the turn of 19th century, patronage practises were being seen as costly to the public because it excluded qualified candidates who lacked the means to secure a post in the public service. The quest for neutral competence, a quest which has continued to today, was for the ability of the public service to deliver its mandate expertly and according to explicit, objective professional standards rather than to personal or party or other obligations and loyalties which were associated with patronage. Merit recruitment was hence seen goal to create among other things, pride in a professional public service that strengthens moral resolve and the commitment to high ethical standards.

To date in the public service, methods of appointment are aimed at producing specific type of employee. While patronage appointments focus on loyalty, merit-based systems are expected to attract and satisfy appointing authorities that the best candidate is selected for a job. The virtues of meritocracy has been extolled in many studies. The World Bank (1993) attributed the growth of the East Asian ‘Tigers’ to their high quality of governance and their strong performance of bureaucracies resulting from the extremely competitive meritocratic nature of the recruitment of officials. Rauch & Evans (2000) in an empirical analysis of a cross-section of 35 developing and middle income countries, noted merit-based recruitment to be an important determinant of bureaucratic performance and the control of corruption. It reinforces the notion of equality and competence as it rejects patronage, nepotism, corruption, and incompetence for entering the civil service. It is a system that values the principles of competition, open selection, careful evaluation of qualities and of having a set of qualification standards and established recruitment process; rather than arbitrary appointment of individuals to civil service positions (Baimenov and Everest-Phillips, 2015).

Public service professionalism associated with career public service espouses probity-ethical behaviour, neutrality and fairness, among many others as the core values which have their foundation on the merit principle.
According to Nghidinwa “qualification requirements are the first stop to ascertain that competency and professionalism (developed consciousness about organisational values) are not compromised for basic qualities such as personal traits that might have been acquired through social, political, and or economic status of a candidate” (Nghidinwa 2007: 171). In the public sector, recruitment based on merit principles among other things, is envisaged to lead to professionalism, efficiency and effectiveness of the public service delivery in addition to being the first filter towards ensuring ethical conduct in the discharge of government business. While acknowledging that leaders’ decisions to behave ethically or unethically are influenced by a myriad of both individual and situational factors (Stead, Worrel & Stead, 1990), the recruitment and selection process can play an important role in determining whether an employee in the discharge of their responsibilities will be inclined more towards striving for professional excellence or to the whims of benefactors.

Being free of political influence in the execution of mandate enables public servants to be neutral and fair- thus ethical, not only to all citizens across the political divide but also to protect the citizens against partisan political interests. There are however, arguments against neutral competence of bureaucrats associated with merit recruitment and argued by some public sector scholars as the key to performance in the public sector (Heclo, 1975). The criticism are driven primarily by arguments seeking to accommodate the need for increased political responsiveness among bureaucrats. West (2005) claims that “politics and administration are intertwined” and in order to increase outcomes produced by the public sector there is a need for combining nonpartisan objectivity (characteristic for merit based systems) with responsiveness toward political executives (typical for patronized systems). This view is supported by those who posit that political appointees bring to administration more energy, human capital and higher levels of education than careerists do (Lewis, 2007).

In addition political appointees, it is claimed contribute to better implementation of political agenda. Thus responsiveness is the outstanding advantage of patronage, as opposed to careerist bureaucrats, who, according to Dunleavy (1985) tends to make choices based on their own preferences and orientations, thus diverging from the current political agenda. Those in support of political appointees further argue that having political appointees in executive positions may help mitigate the lack of trust issue that many have in non-elected officials exercising political discretion (West, 2005).

In spite of the arguments for political appointment, proponents of the merit recruitment system in the public service see it as a critical step in ensuring professionalism often associated with ethical behaviour, because allegiance is assumed to be primarily to the organization and by extension the profession. In what Kultgen (1988) called- the principle of special or role responsibility, the general welfare of the public can be served better by assigning professional and neutral public servants the responsibility for management of public affairs. Service based on patronage may not always bounce back to the general citizenry, because patronage loyalty takes precedence over public interest. Patronage relationship can thus potentially pollute the stream of professional practice at its spring-recruitment.
It is for these reasons that merit system of appointing and promoting civil service personnel on the basis of excellence rather than political affiliation or loyalty has been encouraged and practised in the civil service as a method of ensuring professionalism. The United Nations note that:

“...one of the cornerstones of administrative professionalism is the principle of merit as a criterion for recruitment and professional advancement of public servants. Respect for rules of equity and merit in public service requires... competitive recruitment; ... recruitment based on rules of professional competence..., and taking into account past performance of the public servant for purposes of career advancement and remuneration” (UN, 2000)

Analysis of the results presented in Tables 1, 2, 3 and 4 on perceptions on top leadership in the Kenyan public service indicate that majority of top leaders have requisite qualifications-professional knowledge to be in or to perform in their positions. However, these top leaders are perceived not to model ethical and professional behaviour, in additional to being perceived as lacking ethics and professionalism in their work. Modelling or setting personal example of moral and ethical behaviour by leaders goes beyond qualifications and abiding by the codes alone, it is related to behaviour of an individual, honesty, trust in the leader and interactional fairness (Brown, Trevino & Harrison, 2004). By being perceived as not setting personal example of moral and ethical behaviour by leaders goes beyond qualifications and abiding by the codes alone, it is related to behaviour of an individual, honesty, trust in the leader and interactional fairness (Brown, Trevino & Harrison, 2004). By being perceived as not setting personal example of moral and ethical behaviour by leaders goes beyond qualifications and abiding by the codes alone, it is related to behaviour of an individual, honesty, trust in the leader and interactional fairness (Brown, Trevino & Harrison, 2004). By being perceived as not setting personal example of moral and ethical behaviour by leaders goes beyond qualifications and abiding by the codes alone, it is related to behaviour of an individual, honesty, trust in the leader and interactional fairness (Brown, Trevino & Harrison, 2004). By being perceived as not setting personal example of moral and ethical behaviour by leaders goes beyond qualifications and abiding by the codes alone, it is related to behaviour of an individual, honesty, trust in the leader and interactional fairness (Brown, Trevino & Harrison, 2004). By being perceived as not setting personal example of moral and ethical behaviour by leaders goes beyond qualifications and abiding by the codes alone, it is related to behaviour of an individual, honesty, trust in the leader and interactional fairness (Brown, Trevino & Harrison, 2004).

In this case modelling ethical behaviour connotes an aspirational approach to conduct, focusing on the prevention of illegal or immoral behaviour by encouraging and rewarding desired behaviour, while the rationale behind professionalism is that public servants should be neutral, impartial, fair, competent and serve the public interest in carrying out their duties (UN 2000). According the United Nations, therefore, initiatives to promote professionalism begin with the existence of sound recruitment systems and practices. Public servants live in the real world, and the growing ambivalence as to what is, and what is not, acceptable conduct, has made the task of ethics management both more difficult and more necessary (Pope, 2000). There are diverse frameworks and strategies for ensuring ethics and integrity in the public service especially between developed and developing countries.

Professionalism in developed countries public services is closely linked with ethical competence (Whitton, 2007) and is given a specific focus. Such specific focus and seriousness of ethical behaviour in the public service in the developed countries is demonstrated by United Kingdom for example, which has a Committee on Standards in Public Life established in October 1994. It is an advisory Non-Departmental Public Body (NDPB) sponsored by the Cabinet Office. The Chair and members are appointed by the Prime Minister. The Committee’s role is “To examine current concerns about standards of conduct of all holders of public office, including arrangements relating to financial and commercial activities, and make recommendations as to any changes in present arrangements which might be required to ensure the highest standards of propriety in public life.” (CSP 2014: 34).
In its 2014 Report, the Committee on Standards in Public Life (CSP) noted that the results of surveys conducted since 2002, had consistently indicated that the behaviours that members of the public expect of public office holders are: to be committed to public rather than private ends (selflessness and integrity); to be honest and open in decision-making; to make decisions in the light of the best evidence (objectivity); to be held accountable (particularly senior public figures); and to lead exemplary lives in public office (leadership). The desired elements consistently coming up the surveys carried out by CSP since 2002 can only be realised through a professional service that has a superior collective experience in managing changing government policy and therefore its greater effectiveness in serving the Government of the day. In an era of public sector reforms, where managerial efficiency and effectiveness are so heavily emphasised, the managerial capacities of professional public servants is an exceptional asset that often determines successful policy delivery (Mulgan, 1999).

Ethics and Integrity Reforms in the Public Servants in Kenya

According to Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission (EACC) of Kenya, the Public Officer Ethics Act 2003 was enacted to advance the ethics and performance standards of public officers because they occupy positions of trust and control enormous public resources. The Commission further notes that the Act was enacted at a time when the public sector was discredited for apathy, laxity and inertia (EACC 2003). In 2006, Public Service revised its Code of Regulation, in the preamble the code recognizes the Public Service as the engine for socio-economic growth of the nation and must, therefore, take a leading role in stimulating such growth that will propel the country to greater heights of prosperity. To this end the code envisages that public servants must be committed to serving the Public with integrity and utmost courtesy and give value to the tax payers’ money (DPM 2006).

A part from being a central focus in the Ethics Act and Code of regulations, efficient and effective public service delivery anchored on professionalism and ethics is also accorded a lot of emphasis in the 2010 Constitution of Kenya. Chapter Six of the Constitution deals with leadership and integrity. It outlines what qualities are expected of leaders who aspire to occupy or those already in public office. Under that chapter, article 73 advocates for a leadership that upholds personal integrity, objectivity and impartiality; a leadership that is selfless, promotes public integrity and supports the spirit of the Law. Further to this, Article 75 clearly affirms that whether in public places, official places, in private or in association with other persons, a state officer should behave in a manner that avoids demeaning the office he or she holds.

In Chapter 10, the Constitution highlights national values and principles. In Chapter 13- the Constitution outlines the values and principles of public service, which include high standards of professional ethics. Further under the same chapter Article 232 (I) g, says that “...fair competition and merit as the basis of appointments and promotions” The Constitution enacted in 2010, therefore, lays a firm foundation for the merit system in the Kenyan public service. To further entrench the spirit of the constitution, the Public Service Commission ensured the enactment of the Public Service Values and Principals Act in 2015. Article 234 of the Constitution
entrenches the establishment of a professional, ethical and value-and-principle based public service.

The embedding of ethics, integrity and professionalism in the Constitution, the development of the Code of Regulation, the Public officer Ethics Act and the establishment of Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission to enforce the regulations, all points towards a country and a government that is concerned about ethics, integrity and professionalism in the public service and even beyond. In spite of these efforts several reports including the annual Transparency International reports, continue to raise concern regarding the integrity and ethical conduct of Kenyan public servants. It means that the existing strategies or initiatives have failed to instil the envisioned values and principles in the conduct of public servants.

A research covering 101 senior civil servants in 35 ministries out of the total 41 conducted in Kenya in 2012 sought views among others on perception on ethics and professionalism in public service management. A specific question on leadership attributes (Please evaluate the attributes of top-leaders on a scale of 1 to 4 by marking the number that closely corresponds with your view with an X, where, 1 corresponds to totally agree, 2 = agree; 3 = disagree and 4 strongly disagree) sought to test perceptions on whether: (1) leaders have a high level of knowledge and expertise in running the organization they head; (2) top leaders set a personal example of moral and ethical principles. Thus whether top leaders are professionally qualified on the one hand and on the other hand whether they discharged their duties professionally. Professionalism has many facets; these include conducting oneself with responsibility, integrity, accountability, and excellence in discharge of responsibilities.

The analyses of the attributes of top leaders and middle-level managers have been used in this paper to determine what the recruitment and selection method yields. The top leaders are to a large extent predominantly a product of politically influenced appointments, while the middle-level managers are a product of open and competitive recruitment method. Notwithstanding, inherent systemic and institutional challenges that may have been experienced, the meritocratically recruited and promoted middle-level managers emerged as being perceived as the better of the two in this research.

The research in addition to seeking views on modelling of ethical conduct by top leaders, also sought to establish whether, the perceived unethical conduct could be attributed to lack of professional qualification, closely associated with appointments based on patronage consideration, rather than merit.
Table 1: Perception on selected leadership attributes of top-leaders

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attributes</th>
<th>% Respondents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Totally Agree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(i) Leaders have a high level of knowledge and expertise in running the</td>
<td>16.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>organizations they head</td>
<td>(ii) + (i)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(iii) Leaders set a personal example of moral and ethical principles</td>
<td>10.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(iv)</td>
<td>(iii) + (iv)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Even with a proviso that it may be difficult to determine whether the unethical conduct is arising out of pressure from the benefactors and that appointees stand to be punished if they refuse to oblige or the fact that unethical conduct emanates from the individual officials who take advantage of weak compliance systems, the outcome of the analysis points to some critical patterns worth paying attention to. The results show on the one hand that 73.8% of respondents either ‘totally agree’ or ‘agree’ that leaders have a ‘high level of knowledge and expertise in running the organizations they head’. On the other hand only 40.7 % perceived the leaders to ‘set personal example of moral and ethical principles’. Ethical behaviour is fundamental to an organisation’s reputation, trustworthiness and long-term performance. Integrity is at the heart of ethical behaviour (ICAEW, 2011). Lack of ethical principles therefore has impact on the ability of the public service to offer efficient and effective services.

The outcome reported in Table 1 on top leadership modelling moral and ethical principle is consistent with the finding presented below in Table 2: Perception on selected Professional and Ethical Conduct of Top Leaders. The attributes surveyed were; patronage and favouritism, lack of ethics and lack of professionalism among others. 76.3 % of the respondents perceived patronage and favouritism to be extremely serious, serious and fairly serious, 73.3 % perceived lack of ethics as extremely serious, serious and fairly serious and lastly 62.3 % perceived lack of professionalism to be extremely serious, serious and fairly serious among the top leaders.
Table 2: Perception on selected Professional and Ethical Conduct of Top Leaders

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>% Respondents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Extremely Serious</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(i)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patronage and favouritism</td>
<td>27.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of ethics</td>
<td>18.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of professionalism</td>
<td>16.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


What do these results mean? Whereas the results can be interpreted differently, what is emerging is that according the survey a significant majority of leaders do not demonstrate moral and ethical principles, there are significant high percentages of this cadre who are perceived as practicing patronage and favouritism, lack ethics and professionalism in their work.

The results presented in tables 1 and 2, can also be interpreted with a high degree of accuracy, that the strategies employed to instil integrity and ethics in public service in Kenya have so far not yielded desired impact on top leadership and by extension on the entire public service. This observation is reinforced by the sentiments expressed in Government Circular issued as Executive Order No. 6 on Ethics and Integrity in the Public Service in March 2015. The Circular issued under the signature of the President noted that “…the conduct of various State and Public Officers within the Ministries, State Departments, State Corporations and Agencies falling under the ambit of the National Executive and the Public Service have fallen far short of the demands of the Constitution and the expectations of Kenyans with regard to Ethics and Integrity…”

Continuing ethical and integrity challenges in the Kenyan public service is further highlighted in the survey released in 2016 by the Ethics and Anti-Corruption Authority, which shows that the corruption perception of the public service among Kenyans is at 73.9 per cent, a higher figure compared with a similar survey in 2012, which indicated the perception levels at 67.7 per cent. In the 2016 survey, the Ministry of Interior leads in corruption perception, at 40.3 per cent, followed by Health at 14.3 per cent and Land at 11 per cent. The former Ministry of Devolution and Planning is ranked at position six on the corruption index, at 5.1 per cent. The least corrupt ministry is Agriculture, at 2.4 per cent. Thus in the eyes of the public, corruption in the public service is rising.

The perception on attributes of top leadership in the public service on modelling ethical personal example of moral and ethical principles, corruption perception survey results and the issuance of the Executive Order No. 6 are closely linked. One of the largest communities in Kenya have a saying that – “A fish begins to rot from the head”. Thus looking at the head of a fish will determine whether it is rotten or not. Top public servants represent
significant others to the rest of the citizens, they run the administrative machinery that supports decision-making and implement policies and programmes of the government-of-the-day, which is an indispensable role in the sustainable development and governance of a nation (Bertucci 2000).

To test a possible relationship between the method of appointment and setting of personal example of moral and ethical principles in the public service, the same questions on the research on top leadership in the public service was also applied to the middle level. The results are discussed in the next section.

**Ethics and Integrity among Middle-Level Managers in Kenya**

Middle level public servants in Kenya are career officers, who have risen through the ranks after competitive recruitment process and promoted or appointed to position through a largely meritocratic process. A significant majority of middle-level managers in Kenya are therefore a product of a merit based appointment and promotion process as opposed to top level managers who are politically appointed. In the research, a similar question to that posed to the respondents on top leaders was also tested on middle –level managers “Please evaluate the attributes of middle-level managers on a scale of 1 to 4 by marking the number that closely corresponds with your view with an X, where, 1 corresponds to totally agree, 2 = agree; 3 = disagree and 4 strongly disagree. Analyses of the results are presented in Table 3 below:

Table 3: Perception on selected leadership attributes on middle-level managers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>% Respondents</th>
<th>Totally Agree</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
<th>No Response</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Leaders have a high level of knowledge and expertise in running the organizations they head</td>
<td>34.7</td>
<td>53.5</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leaders set a personal example of moral and ethical principles</td>
<td>14.9</td>
<td>46.5</td>
<td>27.7</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 3 shows that 88.2% of respondents either ‘totally agree’ or ‘agree’ that middle-level managers have a ‘high level of knowledge and expertise in running the organizations they head’ and 61.2% perceive middle level managers to be setting personal example of moral and ethical principles. The approval rating for middle-level managers is higher by significant margins (about 20% higher) on the same attributes compared to top leaders. Those who ‘totally agree’ or ‘agree’ that top leaders have a high level or knowledge and expertise in running organizations they headed was 73.2 %
compared to 88.2% for middle managers. Thus approval rating for middle-level managers on ability to run institutions is higher by a margin of 15% compared to top leaders. On setting moral example, only 40.7% ‘totally agreed’ or ‘agreed’ that top managers set personal example of moral and ethical principles compared to 61.2% for middle managers. This is another difference of over 20% in approval rating in favour of middle-level managers.

In addition as with the question posed on top leadership, the respondents were also asked, “Please answer on a scale of 1 to 5 by marking the box with an X; where 1 corresponds to not a problem and 5 to a very major problem, your perception on the following aspects of middle-level managers in the public sector. The analyses of the results are presented in Table 4 below:

Table 4: Perception on selected professional and ethical conduct of middle-level leaders

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>respondents</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Extremely</td>
<td>Serious</td>
<td>Fairly</td>
<td>Minor</td>
<td>Not a</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(i)</td>
<td>(ii)</td>
<td>(iii)</td>
<td>(iv)</td>
<td>(v)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of ethics</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>25.5</td>
<td>27.5</td>
<td>21.6</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>69.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patronage and favouritism</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>25.5</td>
<td>22.5</td>
<td>25.5</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>64.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of professionalism</td>
<td>11.8</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>20.6</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>19.6</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>45.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Within the middle-level managers 69.7% of the respondents perceived lack of ethics to be ‘extremely serious’ ‘serious’ and ‘fairly serious’, while 64.7% perceived patronage and favouritism to be ‘extremely serious’, ‘serious’ and ‘fairly serious’ and only 45% of the respondents felt that ‘lack of professionalism’ is an ‘extremely serious’, ‘serious’ and ‘fairly serious’ problem. In comparison, even though some of the percentages on the middle level managers are on the higher side such as lack of ethics, analysis of the results shows that the problems are more serious among the top leadership and less among the middle-level managers. Those who perceived lack of professionalism as ‘extremely serious’, ‘serious’ or ‘fairly serious’ among the top leadership add up to a total of 62.3%, compared to 45.1% for the middle level. Patronage and favouritism for top leaders is 76.3% and 67.4% for middle level. Middle-level managers are perceived as being better than top-level leaders.

Modelling ethical behaviour is a powerful leadership strategy that public service leaders at all levels can use to show employees through their own behaviour how they should relate with others, hence, leaders should be a key source of ethical guidance for employees (Brown, Trevino & Harrison, 2004). In a survey conducted by the Ethics Resource Centre in 2000 published as the National Business Ethics Survey (cited in Brown, 2003) the principal finding was that modelling of
ethical behaviour by organizational leaders, managers, supervisors and co-workers sets a good example of desired organizational behaviour. When employees perceive formal and informal leaders as ethical, they:

- Feel less pressure to compromise ethical standards;
- Observe less misconduct on the job;
- Are more satisfied with their organization overall; and
- Feel more valued as employees.

To gain support and confidence of the citizens they serve, public servants must thus exhibit professional neutrality and discharge their responsibilities ethically without fear or favour. To be perceived as an ethical leader, the individual must be seen as a moral person who is honest, trustworthy, caring about people, open to input, respectful, and able to make principled decisions (Brown and Trevino 2013). Traits which could be missing among top Kenyan public servants, hence adjudged not to be modelling ethical behaviour. Ethical behaviour of top public servants has significant influence on the ethical behaviour of both public servants under them and the rest of the population they interact with. As a result, this cadre of public servants must demonstrate and let their subordinates know that they maintain ethical standards. Instilling professionalism in the public service must therefore begin at the top.

The increases in corruption perception rating in spite of existence of legislation and evident concern of the top political leadership, is probably the clearest indication that the strategies in place for dealing with ethics and integrity are ineffective and therefore need to be relooked. The approach the country is pursuing since 2003 belongs in the traditional public administration paradigm heavily focused on development of codes of conduct, enactment of legislation, implemented within a hierarchical and rigid environment associated with the traditional public service notion of 3E—economy, efficiency and effectiveness (Whitton, 2007. In contrast most developed economies have transformed from the traditional public paradigm of 3Es into 4Es adding the ethical aspect of public servants activities (Whitton, 2007) grounded on appointments based on merit criteria as a cornerstone of strategy to fight against corruption (Tanku, 2014).

The results pointing towards the persistent serious ethics and integrity challenges in spite of values, ethics and integrity codes being developed, clear public service values and ethics being enshrined in the Constitution and the establishment of well-funded body charged with fighting corruption- the Ethics and Anti-Corruption Authority (EACC), calls for a re-examination of the effectiveness of the approach used. The result of the survey presented above demonstrates that, there is a relationship between top leaders and higher incidences of lack of professionalism, ethics and integrity compared to the middle-level cadre. It is for these reasons that this paper takes a closer look at the appointment system— which is the only other significant factor likely to influence behaviour of the two categories of public servants. Top public servants up to the promulgation of the new Constitution of Kenya 2010 were not appointed on merit but on patronage basis. In patronage dominated public service systems such as what had been operating since independence, politicians do not pay much, if any, attention to appointees’ qualifications and knowledge (Golden, 2000; Grindle, 2012). Even when qualification and knowledge is taken into consideration, the promise of patronage provides a continuing
allure and attraction for activists and partisans, with an enduring capacity to alter behaviour and tempt the fates of individuals and governments (Mitchell 2009).

**Prospects for Instilling Ethics and Integrity**

The focus on bureaucratic meritocracy as a primary reference point in this paper is not without reason, Woodrow Wilson in 1887 noted:

> “Judging by the constitutional histories of the chief nations of the modern world, there may be said to be three periods of growth through which government has passed in all the most highly developed of existing systems, and through which it promises to pass in all the rest. The first of these periods is that of absolute rulers, and of an administrative system adapted to absolute rule; the second is that in which constitutions are framed to do away with absolute rulers and substitute popular control, and in which administration is neglected for these higher concerns; and the third is that in which the sovereign people undertake to develop administration under this new constitution which has brought them into power” (Wilson, 1887).

The Constitutional history of Kenya places it around the early stages of second period, which means that the bureaucratic practices are still steeped in the influences of the first period. Kenya is just emerging from the first period of the constitutional historical period, where the primary concern is that of reforming a public service that was neo-patrimonial and adapted to absolute to a public service that is professional and neutral. In spite of the fact that, public administration practices in most developed countries moved from bureaucracy to New Public Management awhile back (Hood 1999, Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2004, Christensen and Laegreid 2007) and are now into New Public Governance (Morgan and Cook, 2014; Pestoff, Bradnsen, and Verschuere, 2012), Kenya is just making the transition from bureaucracy to New Public Management. In other words Kenya for all intent and purposes is trying to develop a public service that closely aligns to the traditional bureaucracy than other models.

Consequently, in the quest for ethics and integrity in the public service within a bureaucratic environment, laws and codes are appropriate in establishing the guidelines on the use of public funds, property, facilities and influence, and in safeguarding the independence of public officials by specifying unacceptable forms of conflict of interest. In addition, they are needed to establish minimum norms and standards of behaviour, clarify the responsibilities of public officials and employees, and prevent abuse of public office. However, laws and codes alone, encourage a legalistic approach to interpretation of ethics that honours no more than the letter of the law and induces people to use narrow technical rules as the only moral criterion of conduct, creating the attitude, “If it’s legal, it’s ethical” (Josephson, 1990). Even though laws and codes can coerce limited compliance, they are far too narrow and minimal to provide a substitute for ethics; they deal only with a narrow spectrum of ethical issues facing professionals in the public sector. If not complimented with other initiatives they may be counterproductive because they invite those subject to the regulations to adopt a minimalist approach to standards of ethical propriety.
The centrality of professionalism, ethics and integrity as a critical element in enabling the public service to contribute effectively to development in any country cannot be over-emphasised. The challenge has always been how! Ethics and integrity matters are difficult, controversial, and sensitive subjects. Codes of Ethics by their own nature cannot prescribe actions for every possible case that might arise. In robust environments, ethical dilemmas arise because rules conflict, or miss the mark, or otherwise seem likely to produce adverse unintended consequences in a given case (Whitton, 2007). At the very extreme, relying on strict adherence codes and regulations or a ‘zero-tolerance approach produces a similar effect found in traditional bureaucrats—discouraging public servants from developing the judgment skills needed for resolving complex matters, or situations not covered by the codes, thereby effectively killing experimentation, innovation and creativity.

Starting from the recruitment process, improving ethics, integrity and professional standards in the public service needs to be understood as a dynamic process, similar to developing new institutional knowledge, not merely as setting and training on new aspirational and compliance standards. Capacity building initiatives aimed at instilling new institutional knowledge of making ethics and integrity a standard institutional behaviour, must ensure that it takes a coherent, systemic, critical, and sustained approach to the creation, implementation and absorption of such standards to be the norm (Whitton, 2007). According to Park and Blenkinsopp (2007), once in the service such programmes inevitably begins with the development of codes of conduct, followed by ethics training for staff to understand the ethical goals and values, increase their ability to deal with ethical issues and introduction of initiatives that encourage ethical behaviour. The codified and formalised knowledge then must be institutionalised, by the leadership, and - crucially - by coherent, consistent, and public implementation by management (Whitton, 2007).

Conclusion

The importance of ethics, integrity and professionalism in the public service in Kenya cannot be over emphasised. However, the strategies and approaches aimed at instilling the same in the public service must take into cognizance the constitutional historical period to understand the nature of public administration and the various influences public servants are subjected to. Further research may therefore be necessary to determine if non-compliance, clearly reflected in the Executive Order No. 6 is due to weak implementation regime or public servants are taking advantage of loop-holes in existing laws, regulations and codes, including the appointment system. Similarly, it is crucial to revisit the ethics and integrity initiatives such as training, to determine the effectiveness of the curriculum and training methodologies.

Ethical leadership has a huge impact on followers’ attitudes and behaviour. Aristotle taught that “We learn by practice and the best practice is to follow a model of the virtuous person.” A leader preaches a better sermon with his/her life than by the lips, because the most potent inspirational technique is to lead by example (Josephson, 1990). The governments need to demonstrate that – from the top – that the role of ethical standards in the delivery of public services is understood, supported and lived out. Making a meritocracy
of the civil service helps bring in high-quality staff, confers prestige on civil service positions, and can do a great deal to motivate good performance (World Bank 1997). For the desired impact, the rhetoric of advocating ethics awareness and professionalism in the public service through high level meetings, development and launching codes of conduct and related initiatives must be matched by a recruitment process demonstrating respect for expertise and professionalism.

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The Rationale for Local Governments’ Decentralisation Implementation Role Examined: An International Reflection

Stephen Gunura Bwengye

Abstract

Local governments (LGs) have come to play an important role in decentralisation of policy reforms. Many national constitutions and other national laws, assign a crucial decentralisation implementation role to LGs. This article, from an international perspective, argues that while the rationale for assigning such a role to LGs lies in a number of expected benefits, experience reveals that little has been realised. Drawing experiences from various countries with an empirical case study reflections on Uganda, the article demonstrates that realisation of the expected greater efficiency and accountability in service delivery; improved local development; and enhancement of democracy have largely remained a distant reality. This is especially so in the developing countries. For developed countries, although the extent to which the expected benefits have been realised is comparatively higher, there are also still many issues to address. It is argued that if the expected benefits are to be realised in all countries, issues of state commitment and willingness to decentralize, financial and human resources constraints, citizens’ empowerment, and commitment to democratic principles will have to be addressed.

Key Words: Local governments, decentralisation, democracy, local development, citizen participation, accountability.

Introduction

The role of local governments (LGs) in decentralisation of policy reform continues to attract attention from governments in various countries. In both developing and developed countries, various governments are increasing the powers of LGs; assigning them a crucial implementation role in decentralised development and service delivery programmes; and working to make them more responsive and effective. While the reasons for this development may vary (see USAID 2000:5), it is expected that by giving more authority and responsibility to LGs in implementing the decentralisation reforms, there will be a number of benefits among which include greater efficiency and accountability in service delivery; improved local development; and enhancement of democracy (UNDP 2003:9; Okorley, Gray, & Reid, 2009:237; Scott, 2009). Based on international literature review, this article examines the extent to which such expected benefits have been realised.

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2The article is based on research for a PhD thesis titled: “Monitoring role of local governments in implementing decentralisation policy: the case of Uganda”, submitted to the University of Pretoria, November 2014.
Greater Efficiency and Accountability in Service Delivery

It is generally assumed that local governments can perform better than national governments in terms of efficiency, effectiveness and accountability in service delivery. Improved service delivery is expected to be achieved by better matching of public services to citizens’ needs and preferences; and improved technical efficiency because of “a race to the top” as different LGs compete with each other for taxpaying firms and residents by providing more attractive service mixes and incentives. A decentralised authority in comparison to central government can be more accessible and responsive to local needs. Programmes can be easily adapted to particular local conditions and needs because local authorities are more knowledgeable about local circumstances than central government authorities. (UNDP 2003:9; Brinkerhoff & Azfar 2006:5).

With regards to accountability in service delivery, community participation and the close relationship between the community and government at the local level are expected to enhance accountability. Participation in decision-making close to the people provides an instrument to prevent governments from abusing their powers, as it is more difficult to hide corruption among those in authority when the citizens know the officials than in situations where the “Government” is far away and inaccessible. Therefore, employees holding authority in the LGs are, less likely to have the opportunity to hide their corrupt practices. In addition, it is easier to hold local public officials and politicians accountable for their actions than it is to impose accountability on officials and politicians at higher levels of government, as members of LGs are often less 'protected' politically than officials and politicians at the central government level (UNDP 2003:9 Stijnsmans, 2004).

It is further argued (Brinkerhoff & Azfar 2006:5; UNDP 2003:9-11; World Bank 1997:20) that both the availability of information necessary for making proper decisions and the potentially higher degree of accountability should lead to a better use of available resources. This should provide an opportunity to achieve efficient utilisation of resources. Resources can be allocated most efficiently if responsibility for each type of public expenditure is given to the level of government that most closely represents the resource beneficiaries. This would contribute to a reduction of service delivery costs.

In practice, the extent to which LGs have created greater efficiency and effectiveness in service delivery by matching public services to citizens’ needs and preferences especially in developing countries, is an ongoing debate. Crook (2003) for example, in a study on African decentralisation and responsiveness to citizens in poverty reduction programmes in Ghana, Ivory Coast, Nigeria, Kenya and Tanzania, finds very little relationship. This means that decentralising service delivery to LGs does not necessarily match public services to citizens’ needs and preferences. Robinson (2007) reveals that in the majority of cases reported from Asia, Latin America and Africa, the quality of public services has either remained unchanged or declined as a result of decentralising service delivery to LGs. In Uganda, greater efficiency and effectiveness in service delivery under decentralisation remain far from reality. An analysis of monitoring work plans for all 15 (100%) LGs under study, revealed that in all cases, the allocated
funds are inadequate and cannot effectively finance the planned monitoring activities. This has negatively affected the quality of work especially for construction projects. And according to all 18 (100%) interviewed LGs political office bearers and the overwhelming majority (35 of 37 [95%]) of LGs officials, the situation is complicated by both the misuse of the limited funds and in ability of monitors (especially politicians) to understand project delivery specification.

For the expected technical efficiency through inter-jurisdictional competition where LGs compete with each other for tax bases, experience in developing countries shows limited tax bases in LGs. From countries in Asia to Latin America and Africa, the experience is that limited local tax bases negatively impact on decentralised service delivery in LGs. In Pakistan, LGs have had to contend with significant financial constraints which have an impact on their performance (Zaidi 2005:37). In Kyrgyz Republic, a limited tax base at local level prevents most LGs from properly maintaining local infrastructure and providing services to their communities (Gerster 2004:17), while in Thailand, inadequate local revenue resources and poor mobilisation of existing revenues hamper local service delivery (Chandra-nuj Mahakanjana 2006:23). For the case of Uganda, an overwhelming majority (35 of 37 [95%]) of the interviewed LG officials and all 18 (100%) LG political office bearers reported that the LGs’ efforts to mobilise their own revenue are not only frustrated by limited local revenue base but are also constrained by the limited autonomy. It was revealed that permission to exploit any new revenue source has to be obtained from the central government which may not grant it. It was further reported that because of this limitation, LGs have not tapped revenue from local private investments -which limits their tax base.

As for Latin American countries, Stein (1998:11-12) notes that the potential revenue from the tax bases that can efficiently be exploited locally is more limited than the spending obligations assigned to LGs in decentralised economies. In many African countries, governments impose expenditure responsibilities on LGs without reassignment of revenue sources and yet LGs have limited local revenue bases. In addition to limited local revenue bases, the levels and types of local taxes often result in the tax burden falling more on the poor than on the relatively better off members of society (Odd-Helge & Rakner 2003: vi).

Regarding accountability, practice indicates that community participation in LG programmes does not necessarily lead to more accountability. Accountability may be determined mainly by factors such as the political commitment and discipline imposed by the central authority. Olken (2005) found that in Indonesia, while community monitoring increased citizen participation and oversight, because of lack of political commitment from central government, it had little impact on local government corruption especially in infrastructure development expenditures. In a similar case, Grindle (2007) found that, in a number of municipalities in Mexico, participation in LG programmes under decentralisation did not increase accountability. In the case study of Uganda, interview with LG staff reveals that there are many cases in LGs where employees have continuously failed to provide genuine accountability for financial resources utilised in community projects. The majority (29 of 37 [78%]) of LGs officials interviewed and
an overwhelming majority (17 of 18[94%]) of LG political office bearers interviewed, revealed that in many cases, project funds are spent when the work done does not justify all the money spent especially with works projects. Brautigam’s (2004) observation that horizontal accountability institutions of central government may be more effective in curbing local government corruption than community monitoring supports these findings.

Comparatively, while the decentralisation relationship between central governments and LGs differs from country to country, reflecting the distribution of political power, economic functions and institutional arrangements, LGs in the European Union countries have generally made tangible improvement in service delivery especially under fiscal decentralisation. This has been consistent with the expected efficiency, effectiveness and accountability potentially associated with the spending autonomy of LGs under decentralisation. Notwithstanding such tangible improvements, many issues of efficiency remain unresolved in LGs. Because of dependency on financial transfers from the central governments, LGs do not fully internalise the cost of local expenditure. In practice, the high financial transfer dependency and lack of fiscal substantial autonomy negatively impact on LGs efficiency in utilisation of resources (Escolano, Eyraud, Moreno, Sarnes & Tuladhar 2012:17).

Improved Local Development

In implementing decentralisation, it has been argued that LGs are in a better position to improve local development projects. Local self-governance can remove institutional and legal obstacles to 'self-help' and it encourages innovative forms of solutions for local needs and problems. Development activities executed with the participation of the beneficiaries enable the adjustment of development activities to the specific development priorities of the local population (UNDP 2003:9-10).

It is further argued that most people are willing to contribute to local development projects if they can participate in the decision-making and accept that the particular project will improve their particular situations. When the local people determine how a particular programme should be designed, it enhances the sense of ownership and responsibility for the project. It also provides the citizens with a personal stake in the programmes’ success. The citizens are, therefore, more likely to put more effort in furthering the project’s goals. This in turn contributes to better results than if the development activities were decided upon by the central government. LGs may make development activities more sustainable by engaging project beneficiaries more directly in the implementation and monitoring of projects. The local population input in the early planning phases of a development project in turn also encourages the local population to carefully monitor and protect the results of their planning efforts (Brinkerhoff & Azfar 2006:17-18; UNDP 2003:10).

The argument that LGs have a clear understanding of the local conditions and, therefore, are in positions to match development activities to the specific needs of the local population has not been supported by experience especially in the developing countries. In the Philippines, Azfar, Kahkonen and Meagher (2001) found that there was no evidence of public officials at the provincial level of government having better knowledge of development preferences of the local population. Local officials at lower levels...
(municipalities) had only limited knowledge of the preferences.

Regarding encouraging innovative forms of solutions for local problems through community participation in the decision-making process, it is argued (Brinkerhoff & Azfar 2006:23) that community participation may make innovation more difficult. The processes may disproportionately empower groups that are more organised than other members of the community. In Asia developing countries such as Cambodia, Mansfield and MacLeod (2004:22) note that for participation in monthly meetings (where local community development issues are discussed), participation of community members is limited in many communes. It is the village chiefs who attend, while in others, village development committee (VDC) representatives attend the meetings. In many African countries, despite the increasing momentum for decentralising development and service delivery programmes, citizen participation in these programmes is still low. In a recent study on opportunities for citizen participation in local governance in Burundi, Gaynor (2011) found that despite an existing framework and a set of procedures for citizen participation in development projects, levels of citizen participation in such projects remains weak. Gaynor’s findings corroborate Massoi and Norman’s (2009) findings which concluded that in Tanzania, while decentralisation of responsibilities to LGs has improved central government administrative structures, actual participation by the rural and urban populace in the local development process has not been realised. Interview with local government staff in Uganda reveals that effective citizen participation in local development process remains a distant reality. According to the majority (14 of 18 [78%]) of the interviewed LG political office bearers and an overwhelming majority (35 of 37 [95%]) of LG officials, citizen participation is not only constrained by lack of awareness and in access to relevant information but is also constrained by the fact that for cases where citizens have participated, their ideas are never reflected in designed policy programmes.

LGs in developed countries appear to have comparatively registered higher levels and influence of citizen participation in development programmes than developing. In countries such as the United Kingdom of Britain, United States of America and Canada, the use of modern technology through cable TV broadcasts, video libraries, e-mail notification and policy websites, offers opportunities for quick and cost-effective ways to disseminate information about local governments’ development issues to reach diverse groups of citizens. While this has led to wider citizen participation and involvement in LG organised community development meetings and other local development activities, there are still considerable concerns about limited citizen participation in LG development activities such as budgeting processes in the developed countries (see Berner 2001:24-26).

Enhancing Democracy

Local governments are expected to create conditions necessary for enhancement of democracy. LGs’ structures theoretically provide opportunities for improved skills and capacities for citizens to effectively participate in decision making and influence public policy outcomes. They also create a new and expanded cadre of leaders with democratic skills. Mechanisms such as participatory budgeting, citizen oversight committees, service delivery report cards, information campaigns, direct elections, re-calls and referendums provide
avenues for citizens to engage with LGs in a variety of voice-related activities. Through the expanded political space, individual members of the community pursue being elected to local political office and this contributes to an expanded pool of LG leaders (Brinkerhoff & Azfar 2006:18-19). Donors, having recognised this potential, have come to support LGs in various countries especially in the developing countries to ensure that these benefits are realised (UNDP 2003:10).

It is however imperative to note that, as Gaventa (2005 cited in Brinkerhoff & Azfar 2006:4) argues, democratic enhancement concerns not simply the structures and procedures by which democratic governance is exercised. It must consider the quality and substance as well. For example, in principle, formal LG representative structures provide for political participation for citizens. Yet in practice, if political parties and elections function such that the interests of the poor, women, or minorities are consistently excluded, then the quality of democracy is called into question. The argument here is that enhancing democracy must effectively address issues of inclusiveness and participation to ensure active engagement of citizens from all socio-economic strata. (Fung and Wright 2003; Manor 1999; Crook 2003).

Experience shows that the acquisition and utilisation of participative skills and capacity that are expected to enhance democracy, may not apply to all citizens. Rao and Ibanez (2003), in a study of local social investment fund in Jamaica, found that, the better-off community members, the better educated and better connected, dominated decision-making for the social investment funded projects in local governments. These had higher access to information and higher involvement in village LG organised programmes activities than members of poorer households. The essence of expanded political space in enhancing democracy where individuals pursue being elected to local political offices is that, the individuals seek to be elected in free and fair elections where they are free to competent on the basis of their different political party agendas. In many developing countries however, especially in Africa, the question of free and fair elections continue to be a huge challenge. Local elections, like national elections, have been marred by fraud, intimidation, violence and bribery - making them far from being free and fair. Even where political parties have been allowed to field candidates in the local elections, opposition candidates have been harassed, arrested and denied platform to campaign and sell their programmes to the people (see Perrot, Makara, Lafargue & Fouéré 2014; Straus & Taylor, 2012; Laakso, 2007; Klopp & Zuern, 2007). Although political parties are free to participate in elections in Uganda, the ruling party tends to influence central government to frustrate LGs whose political leadership largely comprises members of the opposition. This was revealed by local government officials interviewed. The majority (30 of 37[81%]) of LGs officials stated that LGs that are headed by political leaders belonging to the opposition parties have continuously complained about missing on the priority list for government service delivery programmes. A senior LG political office bearer belonging to an opposition reflects on the situation thus “The central government for political reasons always frustrates LG councils which are dominated by the opposition and because of this; they cannot effectively carry out their activities”.

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3 Interview, Namubiru Rosemary, Vice Chairperson Wakiso District LG, 21 August 2013.
LGs are considered to constitute the institutional arena for achieving decentralisation’s democratic governance where citizens actively participate in election of their political leaders (UNDP 2003:10). The notion of democracy however, as Brinkerhoff & Azfar (2006:1) argue, cannot be restricted to participation in election of political leaders only. Although the right to elect political leaders is certainly a principle of democratic government, democracy also includes the ability to influence the decisions in development programmes that directly affect peoples’ lives. LGs are expected to provide these aspects of democracy. However, experience especially in developing countries shows that LGs have not made tangible achievements in enabling citizens to influence decisions that affect their lives. In many developing world societies, from Asia, Africa and Latin America, citizens influence on decision making has remained substantially weak as participation is often characterised by passivity or intimidation (see USAID 2000:46). In Bangladesh for example, Mohammad (2010: 3) reveals that people’s participation has had little influence on programme planning decisions resulting in many development programmes failing to produce desired outcomes. In West African countries of Niger, Benin and Cameroon, although village level participatory committees have been set up, World Bank (2002) found that members often lacked the skills to influence decisions in development programme planning and implementation. In Uganda, while LG implementation monitoring teams have been created, their recommendations are often ignored. According to an overwhelming majority (15 of 18[81%]) of the interviewed LGs political office bearers, the recommendations of the monitoring teams are rarely taken into account. Both implementers and policy makers do not consider monitors’ recommendations to make policy changes.

In the developed countries, the situation seems to be different. For instance, decentralisation has registered substantial progress in enhancing local democracy in the European Union member states. Guided by ideological commitment to decentralisation and local governments’ autonomy, the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of the Council of Europe has given a high priority to local democracy through citizen participation to its member states. In reality, all programmes that have the public participation as integral to their operation are executed by the LGs which are in closer contact with the citizens. As a result, the citizens feel more involved in the processes and in decision-making (ALDA 2011: 7-8).

In spite of such progress registered by LGs in developed countries, there are still many challenges to grapple with if LGs are to effectively enhance democracy. For instance in the case of European members States, the level of local democracy and the quality of local governance still vary (see ALDA 2011: 8-9) and a distinct review of experiences in some individual countries shows that there are still enormous gaps regarding citizens’ influence of local democratic processes through participation. In the United Kingdom, experience reveals gaps in the capability of public officials to engage citizens effectively in policy and decision-making. It also shows a culture gap where public officials are neither used nor convinced of the benefits of involving citizens in policy making. Similar gaps also exist amongst elected representatives who prefer to follow their own policy direction regardless of the public opinions (PIPP, 2009:11). In Germany, officials in LGs have little experience...
with public participation. They are critical and uncertain of its potential and significance. LGs lack central strategy on how to improve the political participation of citizens and citizens do not trust public institutions to solve their problems. Citizens are also not politically active because engagement tends to be primarily focused on social issues, not on political affairs (EIPP 2009:21). In Italy, a number of problems inhibit LG efforts to engage citizens in participation that effectively influences policy outcomes. Such problems include: protection of political interests where politicians have strong interests to maintain power and see political participation as irritant; capacity and competence where public officials are not equipped to facilitate participative processes effectively; and lack of strategic coherence as each central and LG department or local authority work in isolation on single issues (EIPP 2009: 28).

Conclusion

Examining the rationale for assigning decentralisation implementation role to LGs in terms of expected benefits was the focus of this article. Based on international experience from the various countries, it has been demonstrated that the expected benefits from LGs’ implementation of decentralised programmes have been largely aspirational in terms of what can be achieved if the LGs effectively execute their responsibilities rather than real (what is seen in practice). This is especially so in the developing countries. For developed countries, although there are still some issues to address, the extent to which the benefits of decentralisation have been realised is comparatively higher.

An important lesson, however, is that legal and political frameworks that assign decentralisation responsibilities to LGs and define the expected benefits of assigning such responsibilities alone are inadequate. Issues such as state commitment and willingness to decentralise; issues of financial and human resources for LGs; empowerment of all citizens to enable them to effectively participate in the development process; and commitment to democratic principles such as transparency and accountability have to be addressed by all governments if the expected greater efficiency and accountability in service delivery; improved local development; and enhancement of democracy are to be realized.

References


Cultural Impact on Public Administration and Governance in Africa: The Nigerian Case

Dhikru Adewale Yagboyaju

Abstract

This paper analyzes the central role of public administration in policy processes and realization of effective governance. Using Nigeria as country of study, it focuses attention on the relationship between public administration, governance and the environment. In particular, the cultural component of the environment is a key variable in the study. Data is drawn from historical and contemporary documentary materials on Nigeria’s society, economy and politics. This is complemented by analyses of special reports such as Ibrahim Index of Africa Governance (IIAG), UN’s Human Development Index (HDI) and annual World Bank reports. Responses from prominent practitioners at informal interviews also constitute part of primary data. The paper’s framework of analysis draws strength from the Weberian ideal bureaucratic construct, which can only realize set goals within the peculiarities of particular environments. The paper concludes that Nigeria’s weak governance system, part of which is the country’s public administrative system, nurtures a culture of impunity and underdevelopment that can only be addressed first and foremost through a cultural reorientation.

Keywords: Culture, environment, leadership, governance, Nigeria

Cultural Impact on Public Administration and Governance in Africa: The Nigerian Case

Introduction

The pre-occupation with the theme and agenda of development that was manifest in many parts of the World, particularly in the period immediately after the Second World War, produced results in forms of concrete deliverables of national economic well-being and high quality of life across Europe, the USA and many parts of Asia. This has not exactly been so in Africa where many countries, with obvious evidences of personal rule and dictatorial tendencies, intractable internal crises, poverty and general poor living conditions, have sunk into the abyss. General decaying infrastructure amidst poor governance and poor economic performance has since the 1980s, when it became a source of serious public concern, remained an evidence of Africa’s development problems.

Almost four decades after the initial serious public concern over the effects of Africa’s political economy of underdevelopment, and two decades into the twenty-first century, rather than significantly improve, a large part of Africa is still ravaged by hunger, unemployment, poor living conditions and avoidable deaths among other evidences of underdevelopment. In Nigeria, this paper’s main case study, abundant human and material

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resources have so far not been effectively harnessed to improve the living conditions of the generality of the ordinary citizens. According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), “54% of Nigerians were living below the poverty threshold of $2 per day in 1999”, but in its 2018 Nigeria Economic Outlook, the African Development Bank (ADB) says “152 million or 80% of the population live below the poverty level”. This is eighteen years after the reintroduction of civil rule and the commencement of the country’s Fourth Republic that came with great hope of a new beginning (The Punch 2018:18).

Yet, many local and international reports, have calculated that the country earned phenomenal incomes from crude oil and gas, even within the relatively short span of the ongoing Fourth Republic (see Soludo 2015:60; 43 and 46). In fact, Tim Okon, a former senior executive of the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC), the agency in charge of the country’s oil and gas industry, once revealed that revenues, which exceeded “$300 billion flowed in between 2010 and 2014 alone” (The Punch 2018:18). While the generality of the people are pauperized, elected officials and several other categories of public office holders live in opulence.

How and why have many of the public administrative systems across Africa contributed to poor governance, underdevelopment and the poor living conditions of the generality of the ordinary citizens? What are the peculiarities in the environments of these administrative systems which, unlike their counterparts in the developed world, impede their performances? What is to be done so as to earnestly and effectively address the abysmal performances and the devastating effects of underdevelopment across Africa?

From the study questions above, the objectives of this paper are partly drawn. Of particular relevance is the question on the peculiarities of the public administrative systems in that every country’s public administration is in a causal relationship with its environment. For example, the Nigerian environment consists of the country’s history, geography and such others that constitute its culture, and all of this directly affect the outcome as well as the performance of the public administrative system.

The main thesis in this paper is, therefore, on this causal relationship, while its recommendations centre essentially on the identified inadequacies and shortcomings arising out of the relationship as against examples of best practices drawn from around the globe. The rest of the paper is structured into four main sections. These are namely: conceptual clarifications which include governance context; environment in perspectives; the case of Nigeria and; conclusion.

Conceptual Clarifications

Two key terms, governance and environment attract most attention because of their centrality in the subject matter of this study. The concept of governance is used in this paper as involving the manner in which allocative and regulatory mechanisms are exercised in the management of resources (natural, economic, and social) for the good of the citizenry. This broadly embraces formal and informal institutions by which authority is exercised (Simbine and Oladeji 2010: 807-842; UNDP 2007). Environment as a concept is used here to embrace the habitat and abode of history, geography, culture, formal and informal institutions. Reference to cultural impact in the title of the work draws attention
to the effects of attitudes, beliefs and values which underpin the operation of Nigeria’s public administrative system.

**Governance context**

Two broad sections – the authorities or political leadership and the administration or bureaucratic establishment make up most modern governments around the world. The first, according to Leeds (1981:4), consists of the persons in “authoritative decision-making positions” or the “effective” leaders in a state. Studies in and on Africa, especially during the continent’s long encounter with military rule and other forms of one-man and one-party regimes, between the 1980s and 1990s, have documented activities of holders of such leadership positions that were, against the practices in many advanced democracies, antithetical to development. For example, Adamolekun (2002:3) noted, “state officials in many countries in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) have served their own interests without fear of being called to account…” mostly because countervailing power, which a functional state and institutions of public administration represent, was absent. A World Bank Study Group in SSA had earlier in 1989 raised a similar viewpoint. In a report in which it catalogued the litany of Africa’s development problems the group noted:

*Politics becomes personalized, and patronage becomes essential to maintain power. The leadership assumes broad discretionary authority and loses its legitimacy. Information is controlled, and voluntary associations are co-opted or disbanded. This environment cannot readily support a dynamic economy* (World Bank 1989:1).

Although, there have been pockets of improvement in Botswana, Ghana and Liberia among others across Africa, neither the pace nor the sustainability is sufficiently convincing. The rest of the continent yet to be covered is also hugely disturbing.

One incontrovertible point that many works in the area of development studies (see Adamolekun 2002:3-16; Taylor 2005:51-52) have noted is about the quality of leadership needed in a developing country. The leadership must be development oriented and committed to the development of the entire society over which he or she presides, ensuring the formulation and implementation of life enhancing policies for the generality of the citizens. This is essentially a “transformation task”, which involves moving a country “from a lower level of development to a higher level with reduced poverty, marked by significant improvements in respect of the basic needs of education, health, food, and housing” (Adamolekun 2002:190). Available evidence in the literature clearly indicates that the success stories in Chile, China, Indonesia, Singapore, Malaysia, South Korea, and Taiwan typify the kind of leadership analyzed above, even when there has been limited electoral participation in many of these countries.

Thus, development can be defined as the “ability of any given country to meet on its own terms certain specifiable human needs within its own territorial boundaries” (Macamo 2005:5). Developing countries, by this definition, are those countries that are striving towards achieving this ability, while the underdeveloped and less developed are the ones without visible and purposive efforts that could lead to the attainment of this ability, irrespective of whether they have the potentials or not. Underdevelopment becomes a culture
when inadequacies and factors with which they share causal relationships are constant rather than invariant.

The second in the two broad layers of leadership in modern governance is made up of people working in the management of the public bureaucracy. This is the sector which ensures the translation of the vision of the political leadership into concrete deliverables in the form of physical infrastructure and services to the generality of the citizens. They do all of these by helping to create, interpret and enforce rules binding on citizens, and they are permanent officials found not only in the ministries, departments and agencies of the civil services, but also across the judiciary and police force, among others. Whereas the political actors, in most democratic systems, are subject to periodic electoral tests in deriving their legitimacy, the civil servants are not. Rather, they derive their legitimacy “from a competitive professional process” that recruits them on the basis that they “are capable of implementing programmes and providing efficient and effective services” (Ezekwesili 2011:19).

This employment and promotion process that is largely based on technical competence is in compliance with a key structural characteristic in the “ideal-type” bureaucracy popularized by Max Weber (1864-1920). Broadly, bureaucracy is defined in terms of an organization’s basic structural characteristics. These include:

- A well-defined hierarchy of authority;
- Division of labour based on functional specialization;
- A system of rules covering the rights and duties of incumbents of various positions in the organization;
- A system of procedures for dealing with work; impersonality of interpersonal relationships; and selection for employment and promotion based on technical competence (Weber 1946; Baker 1972).

While there is so far no evidence of full actualization of Weber’s “ideal-type”, there are many adaptations of the bureaucratic system around the world.

The steady increase in the importance and centrality of public administration can be linked to the expansion of state activities in modern times. Whether in capitalist, socialist, developed or less developed countries, public administration has over the years become an “all-encompassing factor of the daily life of the individual as well as the community”, which has seen the emergence of what has been labeled the “Administrative State” (Basu 2004:84). Many modern states have, since the early liberal era of a laissez-faire state, and the idea of curtailing the involvement of the state in economic planning and management to except perhaps that of a minimalist regulator, undertaken new roles in economic and social change in their societies. Indeed, the so-called “developmental states” have been found with most impressive track records vis-à-vis growth and economic progress (Taylor 2005:51-52).

Prominent among the factors that account for this expansion of responsibility include the rise of industrialization and the resulting growth of urbanization, change in the political philosophy of individualism to social welfarism and the vast increase in the population of many countries, and all of the challenges as well as problems caused by the expansion. According to Basu (2004:84), this led to the “adoption of planning on the part of many states to solve the ever growing problems of administration”
which, in turn, also contributed to the challenge of “big government” in many countries. As deployed here, big government or the practice of government’s involvement in practically every important aspect of national life requires a large apparatus, and this is what public administration, in many ways, seeks to provide.

In Nigeria, this is yet to significantly happen, and this can be understood by adopting the criteria for prosperity assessment offered by the Ibrahim Index of Africa Governance (IIAG), and the United Nations Human Development Index (HDI), for example. Prominent areas of focus here include education, health, safety and rule of law, sustainable economic opportunity and social capital. Year after year, between 2007 and 2016, the period selected by this paper, Nigeria despite its enormous human and material resources has performed abysmally (see Adamolekun 2016: 1-35).

Environment in perspectives

The incorporation of the general systems theory as a framework of analysis in political science can be traced to David Easton who, in his major works (1953; 1965; and 1971 among others), popularized the systems theory. In it, the following components are listed: system, inputs, environment, outputs and feedback. The environment that is often used interchangeably with the term ecology is uniquely important because unless a system is “closed” (totally self-contained), it depends on links with the external environment to which it must adapt and from which it gains support and aid (feedback) for its survival. So important is the environment or ecology that it is, according to Riggs (1962:9-15), at the very core of comparative public administration as a field of study. For Riggs, any truly scientific study of public administration “must be comparative and to be truly comparative, it must be empirical and ecological”.

Every public administrative system is therefore a product of the peculiar social, cultural, historical, economic, geographical and political milieu within which it operates. In this light, the following clarifications made by Gau (1947:1-19) and Riggs (1962:2) and subsequently adopted by Heady (1966) and Basu (2004) are quite useful. They are as follows:

There is often a tendency especially among the developing countries to imitate or transplant institutions, or organizational structures which have been found to be working successfully in the West in their own countries. Before doing so it would be wiser on their part to examine the peculiar nature of the environment in which these institutions have flourished and to see whether similar environmental conditions can be created at home;

To analyze the structure and function of the administrative system of any country, it is necessary to undertake the study in a sociopolitical perspective. The point is that bureaucracies as well as other political and administrative institutions “can be better understood if the surrounding conditions, influences and forces that shape or modify them are identified and ranked to the extent possible in order of relative importance” (Heady 1966:24);

The role of the environment has special significance in the study of comparative public administration. Every administrative system has its own peculiar characteristics (Basu 2004:103).
Put aptly, the administrative system operates within an environment that comprises internal and external dimensions. Both the internal environment (formal structures and procedures, as well as mechanism of control) and external environment (social, economic, political and historical) factors influence the functioning of the administrative system. Globalization or the raging of a global village is, in a broader context, also part of the environment within which today’s public administration operates. Adaptability affects public administrative systems in different ways and this depends on how cautious particular systems are. The paper returns to the impact of globalization in a concluding part in the next section.

The case of Nigeria

The history of a well-structured public administrative system in Nigeria can hardly be separated from the country’s colonial experience under British control. Nigeria inherited the colonial administration, which was generally perceived as distant, alien and, quite importantly, seen as a collection of institutions whose activities have little or no bearing on the welfare of the generality of the ordinary indigenous people. The colonial administrative system or “administocracy”, because of its emphasis on law and order over and above the feelings and wellbeing of the generality of the indigenous people also had an autocratic character. It was averse to a functional development of the people and, according to Gyekye (1997:234), “it made the subjected people intellectually servile to the system of ideas and values introduced to them” and, therefore, “making them think almost invariably, in terms of the conceptual systems of the colonial rulers that they have come to know and absorb”.

With an ideological and emotional attachment which, at best, was to get as much as the indigenous people wanted from the colonial state, its institutions and their successors in the post-colony, while giving back little or nothing, the people already laid a fragile foundation for the public administrative system in independent Nigeria. Chinua Achebe’s novel No Longer at Ease (1969) and Peter Ekeh’s seminal conceptualization in the theory of the “two publics” (1975) succinctly help in analyzing the effects of this colonial origin as well as ethnocentric factors and leadership failure on the overall attainment of development aspirations and goals in modern Nigeria.

As noted in the preceding section of this paper, the form of education and training received by the indigenous people from their colonial masters was obviously not sufficiently progressive. This largely accounted for the acute shortage of skilled manpower to fill the vacancies created by the departure of the colonial administrators after political independence in 1960. The decision of Nigeria to immediately nationalize or Nigerianize its public bureaucracy, despite the obvious lack of capacity, led to the filling of the huge void caused by the departure of the foreigners with many poorly trained and inexperienced native officials (Yesufu 1969; Adu 1969; Palmer 1988; Okafor 2005). In addition to this somewhat historical factor, there was the effect of the unequal development in the then regional administrative systems. There was also the politics of regional affiliation, which denied the country a national character. This and, in particular, the uneven regional development in which the West had a headstart, in terms of education, social infrastructure and services, therefore necessitated policies such as zoning, federal character principles and
quota system whenever vacancies in sensitive federal positions were being filled. Since ethnic balancing and widespread representations are the primary considerations in the federal character principles and zoning, merit is often sacrificed. This also applies in the exploitative ways to which the consociational theory of Lijphart (1977; 1969) is applied in Nigeria and many other “plural societies” in Africa as well as across the remaining world.

Nigeria started with the British parliamentary system immediately after independence. This had its own peculiarities of administrative demands and challenges while it lasted. The public bureaucracy, for example, had to see to the conduct of periodic elections and the monitoring as well as supervision of the conduct of political parties, especially during elections. These changed in 1966 with the collapse of the country’s First Republic and the introduction of military rule. Not only did this mean the removal of a government established by constitutional processes but also the suspension of the constitution, proscription of political parties as well as prohibition of associational rights and, therefore, violation of human rights and dignity. Of course, public administration, as the action part of government, was not left out in the impact of all of these.

Economically, the environment consists of financial institutions, the organized private sector, natural and mineral resources, technology and agriculture, all of which have varying impact on the public service organizations. Nigeria was largely an agricultural economy in the 1960s (Olalokun 1979: 160-166). The discovery of oil and the accompanying developmental urgency brought about by the huge earnings from the sale of crude oil changed all of these. Obviously, the effects of the oil boom were overwhelming for Nigeria’s inherently weak public administrative system. Many new agencies were created and sometimes, duties were merely duplicated (Nwosu 1977). The civil war of 1967-1970 also added different forms of pressure both during its prosecution, when recruitment as well as drafting of personnel and procurement of weapons needed to be effectively managed, and in the post-war period of reconstruction, rehabilitation and reintegration – 3Rs, in particular.

Despite the increase in the number of government agencies, offices and the staff strength, efficiency did not correspondingly increase at this (1960-1970) point in time. Thus, it was, according to Okafor (2005:67), “the decade of public bureaucratic inflation and decay in Nigeria”. It is important to note that the enlargement of the public bureaucracy was first a response to the shortage of skilled personnel caused by the departure of the colonial administrators. This was followed by the discovery of oil and the huge earnings from its sale and, thereafter, the outbreak of the civil war. Nigeria, in particular at the federal level, was not fully prepared for these developments and the accompanying challenges, explanations are provided below on all of these.

First, a large number of the provided jobs was given out in form of continuation of the welfaristic and compensatory programme, which the early nationalists and politicians had for their supporters and close associates. Thus, the primary requirement for such job opportunities was closeness or connection to the ruling political party. This continued, albeit without party but other primordial and particularistic considerations, under successive military regimes in the country. Over time, this practice crept into the core civil service,
such that bureaucrats also extended jobs and employment opportunities to friends and kinsmen, not necessarily on merit.

Secondly, being appointments based on patron-clientele considerations such as ethnic, political, religious and family, promotions were also based more on these factors than on merit. Rules for promotion often fail to distinguish between productive and nonproductive workers, while dismissal is quite rare. Thus, as it was right from the beginning, the state in Nigeria increasingly became “a magnet for all facets of political and economic life” because of the prebendal nature of public life, which makes the exploitation of the offices of the state quite easy (Joseph 1991:1).

Nigeria, like many of its peers also attempted to regulate its economy through various national economic planning programmes and development plans that were put in place after independence, but most of these plans failed because of “the internal contradictions arising from the plan environment” (Mukoro 2005:120). Such contradictions include Nigeria’s “centralized” or “military” federalism, which makes the country a bad example of federalism (Elaigwu 1979; Osaghae 2010:663-686), and the ideological pursuit of “mixed economy” in which government was involved in every sector of the economy, including areas where the private sector could have done very well by preventing wastages as well as the huge loss that government’s involvement brought about. Importantly, a well-trained and competent civil service needed for the successful execution of development plans and such other programmes as well as the utilization of the oil wealth for Nigeria’s technological breakthrough, was obviously absent.

While the foundation of these problems, part of which constituted the major reason given for the military coup of 1966, had been laid right from the immediate post-colonial administration, the effects and consequences became more profound during the nine-year military rule of 1966-1975. The military regime that took over in 1975 purged the public service of tens of thousands of officials for diverse reasons. These ranged from lack of productivity and inefficiency to acts of gross misconduct such as fraud and general malpractices. Prior to this mass purge, and as earlier stated, the general impression was that losing government job in Nigeria is hardly ever possible. Of course, this action which was carried out in the military tradition of “immediate effects” did not enjoy wide acceptability, both from within the body of public servants and even the rest of the society.

In view of this, critics were of the opinion that the exercise created more problems than solutions. These include a feeling of uncertainty that was never before then part of Nigeria's public service, as no one was sure in the aftermath of the exercise who the next victim was. According to Olaopa (2008:151), the telling effects of this and several similar exercises under successive military regimes in Nigeria manifested in the several structural defects in the federal service, in particular. At some points, “there was a gradual breakdown of institutions and virtual collapse of the system’s responsive capacity to the challenges of the speedy recovery and growth of the economy”. This was mainly because “the relationship between officers increasingly became characterized by a spirit of jealousy and animosity rather than cooperation and teamwork” (Olaopa 2008:151). While the psychological effects of uncertainty, implied in the criticisms above, cannot be underestimated,
it must be noted that in no part of the mass purge did any of the prominent critics cite a possible instance of witch hunting or vendetta. The need to improve public service delivery in Nigeria has also warranted other reforms since after the 1975 exercise and these include the exercises in 1988, 1995 as well as the one between 1999 and 2007. The “change” mantra of the administration that was inaugurated in May 2015 also has elements of reforms, particularly in view of the focus on corruption, corruptive tendencies and their consequences.

The reintroduction of civil rule and the commencement of the ongoing eighteen-year old Fourth Republic, in 1999, as well as the first major reforms during this period are quite epochal and, therefore, deserve some attention here. This dispensation is not only unique in that it commenced sixteen years after the 1983 collapse of the Second Republic, which only had an ill-fated transition programme or “Third Republic”, 1991-1993, in between, but also because it has been in view of its span of eighteen years, so far, the longest in the history of democratic rule in Nigeria. The then President Olusegun Obasanjo highlighted what, in his words, constituted the “crises in Nigeria’s public management” as well as the manifestations of “the deterioration in the quality of governance”, all of which were traceable more to the prolonged period of military rule and its adverse effects on public service in general(Olaopa 2008:156). In his inauguration speech in 1999, Obasanjo cited the following as the most critical aspects of the crisis:

*Inefficiency in the delivery of social services; insensitivity to general welfare; indifference to the norms guiding the conduct of public officials and; rampant corruption.*

These observed lapses contributed to the weakening of public institutions, distrust of government by the citizens, infrastructural collapse, and a general sense of despair among the ordinary citizens, in particular. This was, obviously, too much for the new government to contend with, especially when the effects of the then stagnant and distressed economy are also put into consideration. The average GDP growth rate was, at the time, “2.8% and this made it one of the slowest growing economies in the world on a per capita basis” (Olaopa 2008:157).

It is puzzling that a country which consistently earned about $11 billion annually for 20 years before 1999, mostly from oil and gas, and one which appropriated about $500 billion as federal government expenditure over the same period could be ranked as world’s 20th poorest economy (World Bank2000; World Development Report 1997). The United Nations Human Development Report, in its Human Poverty Index (HPI) for two consecutive years from 1998 also ranked Nigeria as one of the world’s poorest countries (Olaopa 2008:157). Therefore, according to Obasanjo (1999), there was the need for transforming the country from a state of chaos and hopelessness, which these reports and similar others implied, to one characterized by order and promise that only a foundation of a “Genuine Renaissance” could bring about Subsequent administrations, Umar Yar’Adua (2007-2010), Goodluck Jonathan (2010-2015) and Muhammadu Buhari (2015 till date) also came on board to introduce “the Seven-point agenda”, “Transformation agenda” and “Change agenda” respectively. Obviously, the successful execution of all these programmes needs a well trained, well equipped and competent civil service.
The historical, political and economic factors in the environment of the administrative system that are analyzed above cannot operate in isolation or be independent of cultural factors. Indeed, culture as the entire sum total of beliefs and social behavior affects public policy and the administrative system in charge of implementation in many ways. According to Waldo (1955:11), “administration is part of a cultural complex and it is not only acted upon it acts” because administration can be described as “the major invention and device by which civilized men in complex societies try to control their culture”. For Riggs (1964:78-90), most developing nations exist in an environment where the traditional and modern ways of doing things (prismatic theory) co-exist and, therefore, resulting in problems of communication, political mobilization and ethical/ethnic confusion, among others. In Nigeria, like in many other parts of Africa, there are many indigenous languages, but the official medium of communication is English language and, “with the high level of illiteracy, the substance of message being disseminated is lost to reason and only the few literate population benefits” (Mukoro 2005:121).

Fanatical ethno-religious allegiance is common, and the civil service is torn by the presence of such allegiance and the pursuit of development goals becomes a far cry. The conceptualizations by Ekeh (1975) and Joseph (1991), in the “two publics” and prebendal theory respectively, aptly capture this phenomenon as cited in a preceding section of this paper. However, specific illustration with certain aspects of the extended family system of many African societies is not out of place. In this system, an individual bears a dual responsibility for himself and for members of the extended family. Such responsibilities are often onerous and to be able to shoulder them requires an adequate personal economic position. An individual public official who has access to public resources “may in the process of striving to achieve that adequate economic position take advantage of his official status and commit acts of official corruption” (Gyekye 1997: 196).

Such acts include nepotism, favouritism, clientelism, patronage, tyranny of cronyism and impunity, all of which leave ample room for distracting “intrigues, scheming and cabalism” (The Punch 2017:24), which have come to typify many public administrative systems across today’s Africa. All of these are manifestations of corruption that were initially “solidaristic”, in view of the large number of beneficiaries during the early parts of many post-colonies in Africa, but which became more “egoistic” as the number of beneficiaries reduced to family members and close associates whenever military rulers are in charge. Therefore, the endemic nature of corruption in Nigeria is a clear manifestation of something fundamental about the society. This is, for example, why fighting corruption, especially within government circles in Nigeria, cannot “begin and end with sanctioning the perpetrators of corruption and impunity, important as that is” (Olukotun 2015:64).

At this point, it is apt to draw attention to happenings around the world in the age of globalization – the global village, and the effects on Nigeria’s public administration. Two critical areas of interest are namely, the wave of democratic reforms across Africa (Lewis 2006: 9-21) which, more or less, is in response to happenings elsewhere, and prominent international reports on governance and development. A careful examination of these two elements show that they are interconnected, particularly because of their
common focus on issues such as transparency, accountability, freedom to participate in the selection of representatives and good governance, in general.

Nigeria’s Fourth Republic and, in particular, its civil service reforms and the establishment of agencies such as the Independent Corrupt practices and related offences Commission (ICPC) as well as the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) among others seem ready to embrace global best practices. However, the abysmal performance of these agencies, typified by the insignificant reduction in the perpetration of high level corruption and abuses, is indicative of an environment that is not fully ready for reforms (Adamolekun 2016: 1-35).

Mo Ibrahim Foundation (Ibrahim Index of African Governance – IIAG) and UNDP’s HDI are selected for international reports on governance and development. Based on available information on the website of Mo Ibrahim Foundation, public service across Africa is under severe pressure because job motivation is mainly about job security rather than wages, mobility within or outside public service is almost nonexistent, while the environment that is populated by “ghost workers” – euphemism for non-existing staff who get paid is generally anti-development (www.MoIbrahimFoundation; UNDP 2016). In such conditions, it is not surprising that many of the best-trained choose to work abroad. Olukotun (2017:48) provides concrete evidence for this- brain drain, and even for the exponential increase in the population of Nigerian students seeking higher education abroad.

The views of respondents on the effects of the cultural factors are quite similar. The respondents include Mr. Oladiti Oladapo, retired Permanent Secretary, who was also Head of Service and Secretary to the Government of Oyo State, Nigeria, between April 1995 and February 1997; Professor Lai Olurode, one-time Dean of Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Lagos and, between 2010 and 2015, National Commissioner at the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC); and Dr. Tunji Olaopa, one-time Permanent Secretary in Nigeria’s Presidency and, at some point, Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Communication Technology before his exit from the federal civil service in 2015. However, they also shared a common opinion that there were higher societal values, which positively affected the public service before the advent of military rule and subsequent civilian dispensations in the country.

Conclusion

Public administrative systems across Africa, for which Nigeria is selected as a sample in this paper, generally typify a culture of underdevelopment. Despite the country’s

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Vol. XXVI No. 1. January - June 2019
human and material endowments, the totality of which makes it a reference point for the entire black race, its environment is overwhelmed by the effects and consequences of corruption. Any serious attempt to reposition Nigeria’s public administrative system to one that is development – oriented must, therefore, include a well-structured and clearly articulated anti-corruption war. Most of the efforts so far made have been to attack the consequences of corruption and impunity rather than locating the foundational causes, drivers and facilitators so as to prevent it.

The point being made here is that no public administrative system can catalyze growth and development in an environment of endemic corruption. It must also be noted that although the fear of sanctions will deter those who plan to engage in corruption, it does little to capture or deal with fundamental aspects of a malaise that has graduated into an ossified national culture. Fighting the consequences of corruption rather than preventing it is expensive and time consuming, just as the notion is popularly held, “prevention is better than cure”. The judicial process in Nigeria is like many other sections of the country’s public administrative system that are fraught with loopholes and, therefore, exploitable for culprits to either evade or postpone justice. This obviously does not provide an enabling environment for development goals and the administrative processes required for their attainment.

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www.MoIbrahimFoundation

Endnotes

Interview with Mr. S. O. Oladapo, retired permanent Secretary and one-time Head of Civil Service and Secretary to Government of Oyo State, on 10 October 2017; interview with Dr. T. Olaopa, retired Federal Permanent Secretary and later Vice Executive Chairman, Ibadan School of Government and Public Policy, a private initiative for improving policy performance in Nigeria, on 18 October 2017; and telephone interview with Prof. Lai Olurode, former Dean of Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Lagos and one-time National Commissioner at INEC, on 19 October 2017.
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