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AJPAM GUIDE TO CONTRIBUTORS

AJPAM is the official Journal of the African Association for Public Administration and Management (AAPAM), Africa's continental professional association for public administrators and managers. AAPAM brings together policy makers, management practitioners and scholars associated with the state and non-state sectors. AAPAM is also affiliated with other International and professional bodies across the globe.

AJPAM is a bi-annual publication published in January and July each year. Manuscripts discussing a range of issues of public administration, leadership, management, development and related matters across the continent and from other parts of the world are welcome.

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1. Title page, with full names of author, an abstract of 150-200 words and relevant keywords
2. Be formatted in MS word, be typed double – spaced with a size 12 font.
3. Not exceed 6,000 words.
4. Bibliographic references should be in the Harvard style
5. Ensure that in the event that endnotes are used, they should be very brief, limited to observations and comments that do not form part of the bibliographical reference. Endnotes should be numbered in the text and placed in a consecutive

order at the end of the text, immediately before the list of references.

6. The Tables and Figures should be appropriately named, numbered and placed in the text.

Authors are advised to ensure that their articles;

a. Present new knowledge in the field of Public Administration and Management.
b. Employ scholarly and professional language in English or French.
c. Generate discussions that can lead to mapping out solutions to challenges of Public Administration and Management.
d. Express perspectives from different African Regions.
e. Contain, as far as possible, implications for public sector managers and administrators.

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Professor Ukertor Gabriel Moti

The 41st Annual Roundtable Conference of the African Association for Public Administration and Management (AAPAM) was held at the University of Western Cape, Cape Town, South Africa from 6th to 9th December 2022, with the theme: *Africa's Renewal in the Era of Sustainable Development: Shared Responsibility for Strengthening of Public Institutions.* Preparations for the Annual Roundtable Conference took place in the backdrop of a global pandemic that ravaged the world for the past two years. The COVID-19 pandemic, without a doubt, was a defining global health crisis of our time and the greatest challenge since World War Two. The global spread of the virus overwhelmed health systems disrupted the global economy and led to widespread social disruption and mitigation measures including lockdowns. These measures negatively impacted activities of multilateral institutions like AAPAM which was forced to suspend most of its training programmes together with the prime-time Roundtable Conference (RTC).

This calls to mind the quest for democratization of inherited institutions as an important cornerstone of the African renaissance as it is understood that no meaningful development can accrue without first building viable and resilient institutions as echoed by former South African President, Thambo Mbeki. The project of building institutions is a shared responsibility among and between social partners and global players in the era of sustainable development more particularly with regard to governance and public administration. This thinking raises important questions of how Africans can recognize and respond to the call for the ''Africa We Want'' in a way that is authentic to who we are. How can African Member States intentionally plan for a sustainable institutional future? What do the new realities within which Africa exists mean for how its Member States structure and deliver efficient and effective services to their citizens and how can this be rendered as a shared responsibility?

Quality papers were received and presented at the RTC. In line with AAPAM's publication policy, it was appropriate to share some of the papers with our governments, citizens, partners and readers. The African Journal of Public Administration and Management (AJPAM), therefore painstakingly selected seven papers representative of the different sub-themes of the conference for this edition of the journal.

Omoti Kefas of the Parliament of the Republic of Kenya in the paper titled: *The Position of Public Administration in Regional Integration: A case of the East African Community,* examines regional integration challenges among partner states from the angle of governance and administration. The investigation adopted a qualitative research methodology based on data obtained from literature review and interviews. The East African Community is reputed as one of the most progressive regional blocs in Africa. The paper argues that success in integration rests on the robust role of institutions and public administrators. The study reveals that there is however, little evidence of economic development in partner states attributable to regional integration as a result of a general shortage of professional staff including administrators leading to failure in the execution of planned activities. It is in this context that the paper recommends blending of institutional management and administration as interdependent variables of regional integration.

Omololu Fagbadebo and Isioma Ile from South Africa in their paper: *Leadership and the Actualisation of Sustainable Development in Africa: The African Peer Review Mechanism in Focus,* noted that accountability, effectiveness and inclusiveness are three pillars of good governance and adherence to these principles, African governments, which the UN Committee of Experts on Public Administration (CEPA) emphasised, would stimulate growth and sustainable development. However, this requires a synergy between the institutional structures and ethical leadership practices capable of strengthening state capacity for effective public service delivery. The paper argues that African leaders' insatiable appetite for personal aggrandizement has remained a challenge to the promotion of good governance principles and practices as envisaged by the APRM. The state capture phenomenon, in different dimensions and fashions, for instance, has dominated African public administration with public institutions becoming the avenues for the

promotion of the pecuniary interest of public leaders. Compromised public institutions coupled with deficient leadership have remained a central challenge to good governance in the continent The duo therefore, submit that committed institutional and political reforms are sin qua non for the stimulation of ethical leadership that is committed to the promotion of the principles of accountability, effectiveness and inclusiveness in the administration of African states.

Malowa Davis Ndanyi of Makerere University, Kampala, Uganda examined the contribution of non-governmental organisations towards sustainable development at the subnational level in his paper titled: *Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) and Their Contribution Towards Sustainable Development of Local Governments in Uganda.* He posisted that through Non-Governmental Organisations a number of projects, programmes and initiatives are introduced to assist communities to be empowered and to acquire sustainable development bringing with them community skills development, community participation, gender conscious initiatives, civic competence trainings, micro finance provision and wealth creation projects thus contributing to the community well-being and overall empowerment through individual community participation and improved economic generation to the overall community sustainable development. He noted that, through such initiatives NGOs contribute towards community self-reliance and empowerment and majorly to the realisation of individual community potential hence community motivation to improve their individual livelihood. In a nut shell the paper demonstrates that using the roles/functions of NGOs, communities can achieve the realisation of sustainable community development in a shared responsibility.

 Mataywa Busieka, Director of Research, African Peer Review Mechanism, South Africa argues that the successful implementation and sustainability of the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) is inextricably linked to the efficacy, adaptability, and integrity of African public administrations. Drawing on the theoretical frameworks of New Public Management (NPM) and Neo-Functionalism Integration Theory, he explores the critical role that a reformed and resilient public administration system plays in facilitating the AfCFTA's objectives and further argues that for AfCFTA to thrive, African public administrations must undergo transformative changes to become

more meritocratic, transparent, efficient, and responsive to the dynamic needs of intracontinental trade to combat corruption and enhance efficiency, adopting e-governance to streamline administrative processes, and enhancing the capacity of border and customs organisations through technological advancements. His paper is titled: *The Success of AfCFTA Depends on a Fit for Purpose African Public Administration.*

Ukertor Gabriel Moti of the University of Abuja from Nigeria in his paper titled: *Exploring Governance Capabilities of African leaders in Strengthening Public Institutions for Inclusivity in achieving the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and Africa Agenda 2063 given the COVID-19 experience,* argues that African leaders appear to be very much aware of the difficulties of change. This acknowledgment is shown in their reception of "Africa We Want", The Agenda 2063 which sets out Africa's long-term development vision of "an integrated, prosperous, and peaceful Africa, driven by its citizens and representing a dynamic force in the international arena". African states are dedicated to executing public and local advancement programmes that are pointed toward accomplishing the SDGs by 2030. Social and economic transformation in Africa requires radical change and strong, resilient, effective, and adaptive public institutions (inclusive institutions that recognise diversity-people living with disabilities and other vulnerable segments of the society). That is why Agenda 2063 perceives that the basic job in Africa's change initiative should be visionary and transformative leadership. However, Africa Capability Index (ACI) 2019 shows that only 10 or 21.7 percent of African countries have High capacity. 31 or 67.4 percent have Medium capacity while 5 or 10.9 percent have Low capacity. This poses a challenge to strengthening institutions inclusive enough to achieve the SDGs and Africa Agenda 2063. After exploring the governance capabilities of African leaders in strengthening public institutions for achieving the SDGs and Africa Agenda 2063, the paper suggests strategies to build the leadership capability of African leaders for institutional enhancement and sustainable development.

Valery Louw and Mpfareleni Mavis Netswera of the University of South Africa, South Africa in their paper: *Utilization of e-Tshwane online platform to enhance service provision in the City of Tshwane,* examined how Municipalities

in South seek to deliver essential services that have an instant effect on the quality of people's lives. In this era of fourth industrial revolution, service delivery is a mammoth task that requires innovation. Through the advancement of ICTs, the City of Tshwane has provided municipal services of high quality to its customers through the use of e-Tshwane platform. The e-Tshwane online platform is an innovative way to allow citizens and businesses to electronically interact with the city with the aim of improving service delivery.

Vusi Gumede of the University of Mpumalanga, South Africa in a paper titled: *The capacity and the organisation of the South African Government: Implications for Development Outcomes,* examines the extent to which South Africa can be viewed as achieving its developmental goals based on its institutional architecture and how the institutional set up has evolved since 1994. The analysis examines the progress, challenges, and prospects of South Africa in achieving its developmental goals. This analysis is undertaken in a comparative context and largely makes use of a developmental state framework. The analysis concludes that many mistakes have been made regarding the development approach pursued so far. Arguably, the country has not had a clear development agenda which would have considered perspectives and insights from research and advise from others. More fundamentally, the manner in which the government is organized and capacitated has constrained its effective functioning. The analysis supports the argument that the capacity and the organization of the South African government can be reconfigured in order to better pursue socio-economic development.

Finally, in a paper titled: *Development of a dynamic National Identity Management (NIM) system in South Africa: A prerequisite for strong national institutions,* Meron Okbandrias of the School of Government, University of Western Cape, South Africa, highlighted the for the identification of citizens through an identity management system as a prerequisite for building strung national institutions. He argues that the effort to strengthen the national identity database in South Africa as it in Kenya, Belgium and other countries, is necessary to properly manage citizens and their status and respond to the Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 17 of strong institutions. The impact of having effective NIS will not only make the national government efficient and

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secure, but its benefits cascade down to providing services in municipalities and businesses.

It is my pleasure to invite you to enjoy these articles from the 41st AAPAM Annual Roundtable Conference as we hope to go back to our regular publication of other articles in the next edition.

Professor Ukertor Gabriel Moti
Chief Editor.

The Position of Public Administration in Regional Integration: a case of the East African Community

Omoti Kefa, PhD.

Abstract

The East African Community is reputed as one of the most progressive regional blocs in Africa. There is however, little evidence of economic development in partner states attributable to Regional Integration. This paper examines regional integration challenges among partner states from the angle of governance and administration. The investigation adopted a qualitative research methodology based on data obtained from literature review and interviews. The paper argues that success in integration rests on the robust role of institutions and public administrators. The study reveals a general shortage of professional staff including administrators leading to failure in the execution of planned activities. It is in this context that the paper recommends blending of institutional management and administration as interdependent variables of regional integration.

Key words: *Regional Integration, Public Administration, Institutions, EAC*

Introduction

It is not possible to exhaustively analyze the role of public administration in Regional Integration in such a brief paper. It is however, practicable to summarize the salient features of the two concepts and identify significant associations. The Regional Integration (RI) concept embodies both the process and condition designed to catalyze and increase interconnectedness and interrelatedness between and within a group of geographically contiguous countries. In upgrading common interests, partner states take joint actions in one sector after another through the process of upgrading common interests. Literature (EAC, 1999; World Bank, 2000) depicts RI in three dimensions including a geographical scope, substantive coverage and depth of integration.

The main goal of RI is to abolish discrimination between local and foreign products, services and factors of production in member countries while maintaining protection against third countries. In this context, RI facilitates the creation of suitable environment for inclusivity and participation of the private sector and the development of common infrastructural programmes for the benefit of the region. RI therefore, turns previously separate units into components of a coherent system and designates a relationship amongst units in which they are mutually interdependent (Mwabufo, 2009; Eke and Ani, 2017). The centrality of the regional citizens' wellbeing and communal acceptability of the RI efforts is key (Deutsch 1967; Haas, 2005) because the population would expect a sense of community, institutions and practices that are strong and wide enough to assure long term dependable developmental gains and, in the long run, facilitate high economic growth for partner states (ADB, 2013).

Background and Context

RI follows a four-step process, starting with a Free Trade Area (FTA) where partner states remove barriers to trade in goods and services amongst themselves while - maintaining individual country tariff policies towards third countries. Under customs union stage, partner states retain the features of FTA besides a Common External Tariff. The third phase of RI is the Common market which adds liberalized circulation of factors of production such as labour, capital and entrepreneurship to the characteristics of the customs union.

At the apex of RI is the economic union which is a supranational body that enjoys total unification of the monetary, social and fiscal policies of partner states (Edblad, 1996, Demelo et al 2014).

Successful implementation of RI broadly depends on guiding principles that would ensure consistency and complementarity between or among partner states programmes and the regional agenda. These include open regionalism, subsidiarity and pragmatism. Open regionalism advocates for outward oriented economies that are market driven and private sector led. This calls for partner states to actively endeavor to lower or eliminate obstacles to free trade and investments through elimination of tariff and non-tariff barriers. The outward orientation is believed to lead to diversification and expansion of the local economy through exports. The market driven integration process envisages a market situation where there are no national or regional monopolies that might frustrate competition, free trade and investments, but rather there exists competition across the borders and a free market. The private sector involvement in all these is critical in the functioning of the market and ensuring a trickle down of the free trade benefits to the citizens, under the support of partner state governments and regional organizations that are responsible for policy, legislation and guiding regulations.

In Africa, although RI attempts were made as early as 1910 with the formation of the South African Customs Union (SACU) and in 1919 when the East African Community (EAC) was initiated (Geda and Kibret, 2002), the concept gained prominence only after independence of most African Countries in the 1960s when the newly created states realized the need to compete with the rest of the world, particularly the West. A number of the newly elected leaders called for the integration of Africa soon after independence of their respective States, but it was mainly in the 1970s and 1980s when concrete steps were taken to re-launch economic integration institutions. The leadership found it wise to work in solidarity and create an environment of collective self-reliance, initiate development of infrastructural facilities and secure peace. This led to the establishment of organizations such as the Organization of African Unity (OAU), the East African Community (EAC), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) among others.

The African experience with regional integration reflects the various challenges associated with regional economic development. For instance, immediately after independence in the 1960s, poor economic conditions of most of African countries called for the pooling of resources for enhancement of regional development. At that time, RI was viewed as a tool for safeguarding the recently acquired political freedom and facilitates economic development (Qobo, 2007).

Regional Integration literature is dominated by economists and political scientists who tend to focus on different sides of the same coin. The economists see RI under the lens of the customs union which concentrates on welfare gains and losses associated with RI. Such include economies of scale, improved production efficiency and specialization that follow the formation of custom union. Political scientists typically explain RI under the prism of functionalism, regionalism and federalism theories. Briefly, let us review these theories and relevance to RI.

Functionalism Theory

This is a creation of David Mitrany in the 1930s. Mitrany was of the view that the most prominent impediment to global society was the "worship" of political borders (Mitrany, 1932) and the best way to soften interstate or federal rivalry was to adopt what he called "technical agencies" for the execution of intergovernmental cooperation in all technical sectors. Mitrany asserted that the alternative to political borders was what he called functional integration of material activities on an international scale and cultural devolution on a regional scale. This line of thought was later developed by Ernst Haas in what is currently known as *neo functionalism* which contends that state sovereignty cannot be transferred through a formular, but only through a function. Hass envisaged a circumstance where material needs for living provided by technical experts of international agencies could facilitate cooperation among statesmen to solve security and power conflicts. The neo functionalist approach therefore advocates for superseding political boundaries in favor of a natural growth of common activities and common administrative agencies that serve member states more efficiently in the provision of human welfare. Neofunctionalism also accommodates a plurality of actors such as statesmen, civil society actors and social elites who together distort rationality as the different actors pursue RI ideals for different reasons

(Alexandarescu, 2007; Taylor, 1975; Mitrany, 1946; Hass, 2005, Laursen, 2008).

The neo functionalism theory has however been criticized on account of its European specificity. Scholars (Polger, 2012, Borzel and Risse,2019) view functionalism as an historical descriptive approach of the European integration and not as a theory that explains or predicts the future of regional integration variables. While the theory offers framework for analyzing regional integration generally, it has pitfalls. It is criticized on account of assuming that every part or actor in the RI process would work in harmony with others for the greater good of the region. This is overly simplistic and ignores the complexities of regional integration such as competition for natural resources, power imbalance and peer rivalry inherent in any society. However, the theory significantly brings out the complexity of international cooperation and points to the need for a multiple perspective lens in regional analysis.

Liberal Intergovernmentalism (LI)

Under this, researchers focus on the responses of states to perceived need of managing costs of growing economic collaboration. The theory appreciates the role of states in the management of political chaos within a region but ascribes success in development to the bargaining and negotiations with partner states (Akilatan, 2023). The Member states political legitimacy and policy making power remains intact as they make rational choices in the pursuit of the national interests. Akilatan asserts that the choices have to be rational enough to address both constraints and opportunities that arise from economic interests of local investors and institutions.

The preferences of individual partner states are demonstrated in a clear way by economic interest as opposed to preference in general outcomes. The policies thus derived from bargaining are quite substantive and fix an equitable mode through which the gains of integration are shared. In a nutshell, LI maintains that states give rise to incompatible national interests and fail to cooperate when state fundamental preferences are divergent and lead to conflicts because of the uneven benefits distribution. In the EAC context, perceptions of the unfair distribution of gains led to the collapse of the initial bloc in 1977. Bargaining and gains distribution efficiency is still a matter of concern for the expanded 8 Member EAC bloc.

Pragmatic and gradualism

Trust and commitment are critical aspects under the pragmatic and gradualism lens. The integration process is built on pragmatic and gradual steps that reinforce trust and commitment amongst partner states and guarantees sustainability of the process. The regional vision bearers are expected to have a clear picture of the future state of the region as they move ahead with–schedule of activities and planned programmes that are realistic and accommodative. The gradualism approach therefore, advocates for seizing of low-risk opportunities to progressively build experience and mutual trust, which are essential for integration before states move forward and deeper over time. Ultimately, the countries making up the region must become a new political community, superimposed over the preexisting, thereby creating a unified geographic base for markets (Haas, 1970).

The Regionalism Theory

Farrel et al, 2021 define regionalism as a policy and project whereby states and non-state actors cooperate and coordinate strategy within a region. It could also be described as the process by which actors engage in activities across the state boundaries as state actors develop conscious policies of integration with other states (Hettne, 2000). Regionalism first emerged in the 1950s but its influence and discussion stagnated in the 1970s because of the apparent slowdown of the West European integration process and development of free trade blocs in developing countries (Tshimpaka, 2019). By 1980s, the theory had evolved into what scholars call new regionalism which basically advocated the need for states to react to the global trend of shunning protectionism.

Regionalism aims to promote common goals in one or more areas of interest such as security, trade and investment. This may give rise to emergence of regions with regional actor, networks and organizations. The regions that arise could be fluid and varying composition, capabilities and aspirations. The theory embraces economic, cultural and political aspects of integration thereby extending the understanding of regional activities beyond the creation of free trade agreements.

The theory fairly explains the integration process witnessed among the EAC founding Countries, namely; Republic of Uganda, Republic of Kenya and the United Republic of Tanzania who by treaty initiated the formation of the EAC

through the East African Customs Union and a common market. The founding partner states agreed to adhere to universally acceptable principles of good governance and be bound by social and economic policies crafted by state actors coordinated by an organ named the council of ministers (EAC, 1999). The EAC performance as a regional bloc has also witnessed some challenges as predicted by the regionalism theory including noncooperation by some partner states whereby the Republic of South Sudan and the Republic of Burundi have consistently failed to remit their annual contributions. Generally, even though States are supposed to cooperate in furtherance of their socio-economic interests, the ability of the states to cooperate is linked to their willingness to do so and the limitations of sovereignty (Gumede, 2019; Muyengwa, 2014).

From the foregoing, it is not possible to adequately describe what goes on under regional integration nor predict future outcomes using one single theory. The EAC domestic picture is, however, best articulated under regionalism.

The Regional Integration Institutional Problem

African Regional Integration blocs demonstrate reasonable progress in some areas but remain hampered by some constraints such as weak policy coordination, harmonization and fragile political commitment. Literature (Uzodike, 2009) paints a picture of general failure of the African Integration Agenda because it is yet to impact positively on the Continent's economic performance.

For instance, the realization of EAC dream and objectives seems to be affected by issues such as poor governance and leadership, institutional mismanagement, emphases of partner state sovereignty in terms of national interests' verses regional interests (Jiboku and Okeke, 2017; Haas, 2005; Dzinesa *et al*, 2018). The poor performance has also been attributed to inadequate political will and commitment to the process; high incidence of conflicts within and among partner states; poor design and sequencing of regional integration arrangements; multiplicity of the schemes and overlapping memberships; inadequacy of funding; exclusion of key stakeholders from the regional integration process and institutional challenges (ACBF, 2006; Terada, 2010; Sako, 2006; Nagar and Nganje, 2016; Nagar and Malebang, 2016)

The scope of this paper is limited to institutional and administrative challenges. Weak national and

regional institutions impact not only partner state choices in terms of the activities they decide to engage in but also for the international support partners who due to the RI complexities and differences of procedures among partner states must also select where to apply their funds. Weak institutions manifest in inadequacy of human and institutional capacity for the design and implementation of cooperation and integration programs and activities. Institutional capacity is further compromised in cases where states subscribe to multiplicity of schemes, which imposes a huge burden on the limited administrative and financial capacities of the countries concerned, hence failure to effectively implement their programs and policies. Institutional problems imply the partner state's inability to adequately ensure good governance, accountability, and transparency, which are vital for political stability and necessary for the attainment of economic objectives of regional integration.

The Centrality of Public Administration in EAC institutional transformation

In the words of Vigoda (Vigoda,2002) Public administrators and citizens through their elected leaders play the ever-important role of setting RI strategic goals and guarantee benefits (flow of RI resources) of citizens. In the Context of the EAC states, programms with potential to improve the wellbeing of citizens and generate more value for effort need to governed by leaders and administered by practitioners who understand both the people and the development processes (Peters *et al,* 2010).

Public administrators also have potential to enhance institutional coordination and coherence and, effectively stem challenges associated with the multiplicity of actors and demands that EAC institutions present. Some of the EAC institutions such as the East African Business Council and the East African Civil Aviation Authority are relatively large and therefore require professional administration practitioners to direct programmes implementation and monitoring. Some institutions including the EAC Kiswahili Council perform quite poorly because of general lack of public administrators besides other professional staffers. The prevailing situation is inconsistent with Begum and Momen (2019), Bouncart and pollitt 2002 and, Hood and Lodge (2004) who all agree that the public administration function is a major issue in any organization because of

its influence on program implementation. This need is amplified in organizations that have diversity of stakeholders which requires efficient coordination to facilitating of activities in a manner that avoids overlapping and inconsistencies as witnessed in the EAC organs and institutions.

It is not possible to execute development programms within the EAC framework in the absence of good governance and public administration. A review of the East African Community (EAC) audited accounts of selected EAC institutions for the financial year ended 30th June 2018 (EAC, 1999; EAC, 2021) revealed a general failure to execute planned activities. For instance, the budget performance for the East African Health Research Commission (EAHRC) was as low as O%, for some activities while the annual operation plan failed to realize planned activities totaling USD491, 374.

The same institution lacked adherence to Provisions of the EAC staff Rules and Regulations as evidenced by irregularities such as absence of staff performance appraisal tools. Poor administration is also evident in the procurement of goods and services. There was reported a case where rent was being paid for premises not in use by EAHRC, despite the commission staff being housed at the EAC Headquarters in Arusha. There was also evidence of inappropriate application of direct sourcing procurement method whereby the EAHRC procured ticket services worth USD 28,514 without evidence of competitive tendering as required under the EAC rules.

The same report indicates low administrative capacity of yet another EAC institution; the East African Kiswahili Commission (EAKC). The Commission in the year 2018, incurred unbudgeted expenditure of USD 111,227.82 despite a severe staff shortage occasioned by reluctance to recruit core staff. Governance and administration challenges are further revealed in the allocation of resources as core activities were allocated only 5% whereas non-core activities including staff emoluments were allocated 95% of the commission budget.

Further, a review of the East African Competition Authority (EACA) revealed malpractices such as absence of records for the resources and obligations; untimely submission of financial statements, improper revenue recognition and unjustified direct procurement. The three institutions mentioned above lacked checks and balances which

exposed them to errors and inefficiencies in operations. These could have been avoided had the place of administration been factored in the structuring of the EAC staff establishment.

The study revealed low implementation of EAC regional policies, laws and regulations. Adoption and ratification of protocols and policies is rugged and differs from country to country giving an indication of poor governance and coordination between the EAC secretariat and the partner states ministries and agencies especially those responsible for trade and taxation. This was more evident in the One stop Border Posts (OSBP) established under the EAC OSBP Act, 2016. A visit to sample OSBPs revealed presence of several border control government agencies on one side of the border and absence of counterparts in neighbouring partner states. This restricts free movement of people across the border points and is compounded by xenophobia tendencies exhibited by some partner state countries. This researcher visited the Isebania border post located at the border between Kenya and the United Republic of Tanzania and learnt that border control officers on the Tanzanian side made it difficult for Kenyan businessmen to cross the

border despite the existence of a protocol meant to facilitate free movement of goods, labour and capital.

The staff deployment inconsistencies are indicative of weak coherence and poor governance; in short lack of administration. Further, the development of support facilities on either side of the border was not coordinated enough to minimize duplications and redundancies. The implementation of EAC regulations and standards at institution level was also lacking. At the Lake Victoria Basin, implementation of the Lake Victoria Transport Act (2007), Regional Effluent Standards (2017), Water Release and Abstraction Policy (2015) was weak, devoid of a professional, practitioners' touch. Weak staffing practices further jeopardize the realization of the EAC dream because it creates unpredictability and uncertainty for the users of the EAC facilities and services. This also runs contra to the position held by scholars in the human capital field (Dummert, 2012) who assert that appropriate staffing improves organizational functionality through positioning of resources in a way that promotes a healthy work environment. The work environment witnessed at some of the One Stop Border Posts is anything but healthy.

As per the EAC Treaty, each Partner State has established in its administrative structure a Ministry in charge of Community Affairs to co-ordinate its affairs at the national level so that in the spirit of the treaty, the citizens are informed and actively participate in the raising of standards of living through the promotion of trade and implementation of development and infrastructural programmes by the various EAC institutions. For this to happen, the EAC must uphold good governance, a free-market economy and rule of law. During an interaction between Members of the Kenyan Parliament and Management of the Lake Victoria Basin Authority (LVBA), it was observed that most of the East Africans in the Basin were not aware of the activities of the Commission despite implementation of projects in forestry, water distribution and sanitation.

The basin is an important source of water for domestic, industrial, irrigation and hydropower but has failed to deliver tangible benefits to the 45 million catchment population despite heavy investment in the specialized EAC institution under whose management it falls. The basin suffers stress within the lake and on the shoreline because of uncontrolled activities including overfishing, construction and pollution. This points to a dire need of public administrators to promote, facilitate and coordinate activities of different actors in the LVBA to ensure not just national oversight but also High-level support for regional LVBC projects and Programs.

The review of the institutions suggests that East African leaders may not achieve success at the EAC level if they fail to do so at partner state level by creating institutions and sound policies that focus on uplifting the welfare of citizens. The EAC institutions and organs also need a dose of Institutional values that immunizes the institutions against poor performance, corruption and blunder of public resources; and capture a commitment towards democratization, upholding of the rule of law and respect for human rights are necessary to be sustained. If institutions are strengthened, it could be the first and most important step on the path towards a successful regional integration that supports the realization of the EAC dream.

The foregoing specifically points to an urgent need to transform the EAC institutions and organs alongside partner state agencies involved in the harmonisation and implementation of policies, laws, regulations and standards. The current focus on

narrow nationalistic concerns can only be cured by strengthening of human and institutional capacity within government ministries such as trade and industry, security, finance and agencies responsible for trade laws and negotiations.

Regarding awareness of EAC programs and activities implemented by various regional and partner state agencies, there is need to strengthen national and regional frameworks for consultation and effective participation of all stakeholders. The promotion would involve the hosting of activities such as public presentations by high-level diplomats; the sponsoring and hosting of school competitions; and inviting representatives from partner states (Nagar and Mutasa, 2017). The promotion of EAC activities in commemoration events across the region would require involvement of public administration.

The centrality of public administration would be felt more if the EAC Council of ministers agreed to the modernization of government bureaucracies to minimize on time lost in documentation of trade processes and encouraging the development of closer contacts between sector administrations, industry and other stakeholders to ensure that are easily understood and cooperative solutions developed. This is key in addressing challenges such as the refund of value added tax retained by some partner states on account of non-uniformity of tax regimes and different tax automation levels in partner states. To address bureaucracy and non-tariff barriers, partner states must put in place adequate administrative arrangements to address the changes in the business environment and future challenges to cross border trade.

Public administration is also central in the preparation and operationalization of the legal basis for a regional Public Procurement regime. During the interaction with the management of the East African Business Council, it emerged that partner states legislations on procurement were not aligned. For instance, the Kenyan Public Procurement and Asset Disposal Act tended to give preferential treatment to local suppliers which effectively denied firms from other partner states a level playground. It is our submission that a common Community Public Procurement Policy outlining laws, regulations and practices, is necessary in order to ensure effective integration and efficient operations. The Kenyan Public Administrators must take

their position at the table and negotiate with their peers at the EAC institutions and partner state ministries to facilitate unified and open space. This would give rise to a regional regime covering procurement of goods, services and works at all levels of government and the Common market.

In short, there is no replacement of the Public Administrator in ensuring that the establishment of general principles to be observed by all Member States in all spheres of regional Integration including elimination of existing barriers to market access and creation of common obligations governing access, entry and participation in the Public Procurement markets. The Public Administrator would also be the immunization jab required in harmonization of laws, regulations, creation of common obligations and discipline to be observed by all Member States.

Conclusion

This paper contributes to existing literature on Regional Integration and has demonstrated the critical role of public administration in the advancement of the Regional Integration agenda particularly in capacity strengthening of procurement and the human capital function at the regional and partner state institutions. The various functions of EAC institutions and organs currently handled by untrained, non-specialist staff at all levels of administration could benefit from skills of public administrators and policy makers and possibly increase efficiency of the institutions and generate more value for effort of all East Africans. Besides strengthening institutional governance, administrators have also potential to build citizen to citizen trust through public participation activities and promotion of the Integration dream across partner states.

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Leadership and the actualization of sustainable development in Africa: The African Peer Review Mechanism in focus

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Abstract

Accountability, effectiveness and inclusiveness are three pillars of good governance. Adherence to these principles by the government, which the UN Committee of Experts on Public Administration (CEPA) emphasized, would stimulate growth and sustainable development. This requires a synergy between the institutional structures and ethical leadership practices capable of strengthening state capacity for effective public service delivery. Compromised public institutions coupled with deficient leadership have remained a central challenge to good governance in the continent. Using a case study approach, this paper seeks to examine the various dimensions and dynamics associated with practices within the context of the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM). While APRM encourages self-assessment by countries, it is expected that the findings of such activity should serve as a guide for the promotion of good governance and sustainable growth and development. This paper argues that African leaders' insatiable appetite for personal aggrandizement has remained a challenge to the promotion of good governance principles and practices as envisaged by the APRM. The state capture phenomenon, in different dimensions and fashions, for instance, has dominated public African public administration with public institutions becoming the avenues for the promotion of the pecuniary interest of public leaders. This paper submits, therefore, that committed institutional and political reforms are sin qua non for the stimulation of ethical leadership that is committed to the promotion of the principles of accountability, effectiveness and inclusiveness in the administration of African states.

Keywords: *accountability; good governance; ethical leadership; state capture; corruption*

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Introduction

The African peer Review Mechanism (APRM) is "a voluntary self-assessment instrument" for the governance performance of members states of the African Union (AU) (APRM 2019). It aimed at a systematic assessment and review of governance issues in members states for the promotion of stable political order, accelerated economic integration at the sub regional and continental levels, economic growth and sustainable development (APRM 2019; APRM 2021). The mechanism measured the performance of African states using fur thematic issues: democracy and political governance economic governance and management corporate governance socio-economic development. Given the importance of these issues, the AU leadership at its 28th Ordinary Session of January 2017, mandated the APRM to "play a monitoring and evaluation role for the African Union Agenda 2063 and the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SGD) Agenda 2030" (APRM 2019:10).

The AU Agenda 2063 is a 50-year blueprint and master plan designed for the transformation of the continent "into the global powerhouse of the future" (AU 2020). The seven aspirations of the AU Agenda 2063 are

A prosperous Africa based on inclusive growth and sustainable development, An integrated continent, politically united and based on the ideals of Pan-Africanism and the vision of Africa's Renaissance; An Africa of good governance, democracy, respect for human rights, justice and the rule of law; A peaceful and secure Africa; An Africa with a strong cultural identity, common heritage, shared values and ethics; An Africa whose development is people-driven, relying on the potential of African people, especially its women and youth, and caring for children; Africa as a strong, united, resilient and influential global player and partner (AU 2015:2).

The components of these aspirations include poverty eradication through socio-economic transformation, effective management of the vast resources for sustainable growth, promotion of good governance through inclusive public policies, among others.

These aspirations are in tandem with the interconnected 17 goals of the SGD Agenda 2030, among which are poverty eradication, zero hunger, good health and well-being, gender equality. The summary of the SGDs,

according to the World health Organization (WHO), is "a call to action to end poverty and inequality, protect the planet, and ensure that all people enjoy health, justice and prosperity" (cf. Rapando 2022). Both the AU Agenda 2063 and the SDGs address one major issue: governance.

Regional Organizations and Governance

The promotion of good governance has been central to the activities of different organizations in the global system. Supra-national and international organizations and bodies, especially the World Bank, have been championing campaigns and programmes against corruption and mismanagement of public resources designed to promote public goods (Ivanov 2007; The World Bank 2021). The global financial and economic agency "considers corruption a major challenge to its twin goals of ending extreme poverty by 2030 and boosting shared prosperity for the poorest 40 percent of people in developing countries" (The World Bank 2021). The Bank as a donor agency is concerned about the consequences of corruption on the lives of citizens in developing countries, noting that every act of malfeasance "robs the poor of an equal opportunity in life and prevents governments from investing in their human capital" (The World Bank 2021).

Corruption erodes trust in government and undermines the social contract. This is cause for concern across the globe, but particularly in contexts of fragility and violence, as corruption fuels and perpetuates the inequalities and discontent that lead to fragility, violent extremism, and conflict. Corruption impedes investment, with consequent effects on growth and jobs. Countries capable of confronting corruption use their human and financial resources more efficiently, attract more investment, and grow more rapidly (The Wold bank 2021).

Given the intensity of the consequences of corruption, the World Bank had mapped out a series of intervention programmes and activities to help states in anti-corruption campaigns. These include institutional capacity building for the promotion of transparency and accountability in the public sector (The World Bank 2021). In addition to this, the Bank also designed and implemented innovative discourses on anticorruption activities.

The World Bank Group's work revolves around sustainability and changing outcomes by helping both state and non-state actors

establish the competencies needed to implement policies and practices that improve results and strengthen public integrity (The World Bank 2021).

The anti-corruption role of the World Bank is in the continuation of the global efforts championed by the various organs of the United Nations Organization (UNO) to ensure good governance and respect for human rights (Kohler and Bowra, 2020; Murphy and Albu 2018). To the global body, corruption is considered as an ani-human rights phenomenon (Kohler and Bowra 2020). Thus, transparency in government activities and handling of the public sector management, leadership accountability, public participation and equality are effective anti-corruption strategies that all states must adopt.

The World Bank, in particular have a series of governance approaches, initiatives and strategies to insulate countries form the scourge and consequences of mismanagement of public resources. The Bank provides leadership in the establishment of global transparency standards (The World Bank 2021). The Global Initiative for Fiscal Transparency (GIFTS) was established in 2011 as a mechanism to ensure a sustainable measurable "improvements in fiscal transparency and inclusive participation by advancing global norms, peer-learning, collaborative assistance and promoting the use of digital tools" (GIFT 2022). This entails standards set for asset disclosure, open government and public participation in fiscal activities.

In addition to this, the Bank also supports and assists in the establishment and implementation of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI). Given the importance of natural mineral management to economic growth, the EITI is interests in the promotion of accountable management of mineral resources such as oil and gas (Landau and Bassetti 2020). The primary focus of the EITI is to ensure transparency in natural resources revenue collection including contractual activities with extractive companies, "data on resource production, and extractives-related employment numbers" (Landau and Bassetti 2020).

Aside from EITI, the Bank also supports the Publish What you Pay (PWP) initiative, a global civil society advocacy programme rooting for open and accountable extractive industry in a manner that would ensure that natural resources revenues are expended on development-oriented programmes (Van Alstine, 2014; Garuba, D. S., &

Ikuba 2010). Fishery transparency and all other forms of anti-money laundering rules and regulations e also among the initiatives supported by the World bank to promote governance in the management of national resources in a manner that would induce sustainable development.

Other initiatives supported by the World include the engagements in anticorruption forums and groups at the international and regional levels, thereby promoting alliances designed to foster development. The International Corruption Hunters Alliances (ICHA) and the various Regional Parliamentary Networks are also part of the World Bank initiatives and strategies to combat corruption. In terms global anti-corruption campaigns, the World Bank engages other regional and supra national economic groups such as the anti-corruption working groups and task teams of the G20 economies and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD, respectively and Financial Accountability Task Force (The World Bank 2021). In all these initiatives and strategies, the World Bank works in tandem with various countries, intentional and regional donor agencies and groups, in a global campaign to deal with the corruption pandemic that has remained the challenge to the realization of the aims of the SDGs, especially in developing countries.

At the regional level, there are a series of programmes and protocols that seek to regulate national economies in a manner that would stamp out corruption in the management of national resources. In most developed countries, the various regional bodies have instituted organizational approaches to deal with the rising tide of corruption and mismanagement of national resources. The Organisation of American States (OAS) adopted its Inter-American Convention Against Corruption (IACAC) in 1996, as an international anti-corruption legislative framework (Sutton 1996; Altamirano, 2007; Huhle 2022; Ramanzini and Gerbelli 2020). The member states of the OAS were concerned adopted and ratified the IACAC as a regional strategy and protocols for the promotion and strengthening of the development of the needed mechanisms in each state for the prevention, detection, punishing and eradication of corruption (Perla 2016). In addition, they sought the promotion, facilitating and regulation of concerted efforts, measures and actions for an effective anti-corruption mechanism that would insulate the public sectors

performance form the consequences of grafts and impunity. This initiative has recorded tremendous successes in its drive (Guerzovich, 2012).

In 1997, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) established the Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions. The essence of this instrument was to avert the consequences of the prevalent corrupt practices through bribery in global business interactions (OECD, 2011). Also known as the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention that became effective in 1999, the instrument criminalizes bribery of foreign officials and expects member states to prosecute any culprit. Article 1(1) of the Convention states

Each Party shall take such measures as may be necessary to establish that it is a criminal offence under its law for any person intentionally to offer, promise or give any undue pecuniary or other advantage, whether directly or through intermediaries, to a foreign public official, for that official or for a third party, in order that the official act or refrain from acting in relation to the performance of official duties, in order to obtain or retain business or

other improper advantage in the conduct of international business (OECD 2022).

With strict adherence to the rules guiding its monitoring and implementation, this Convention has reduced the rate of bribery of public officials and instituted the best practices in international business transactions among OECD member states (Cooray, A., Jha, C. K., & Panda, 2022; Bahoo, S., Alon, I., & Paltrinieri, 2020; Harrington2019).

The Criminal Law Convention on Corruption (CLCC) and the Civil Law Convention on Corruption (CLCC) were the two legislative instruments approved by the Council of Europe (COE) in 1999 (CLCC, 1999a; 1999b). These Conventions were designed and drafted as broad instruments to criminalize corrupt practices in Europe (Yan 2021; Fagbadebo 2019). The Convention is also a body of measures to improve international co-operation in the area of prosecuting corruption offences. As an international instrument, the CLCC has remained a global framework for transaction of business activities as well as defining the relationships among states in term of financial transactions.

African Union and its Governance Agenda

Africa is a continent reeling in the crisis of governance (Fombad 2023). And corruption is one of the challenges militating against the institutionalization of the culture of good governance in the continent. As Fombad (2023:320-33), the menace casts "an ominous shadow over the prospects for social, economic, and political progress and undermining efforts over the years to establish a culture of constitutionalism, democracy, good governance, and respect for the rule of law". From all available data, Africa is he home to the most corrupt countries and leaders in the world with an estimated loss of a minimum of $148 billion yearly to corrupt practices (UNCTAD 2020). Annually, African leaders steal between $20 billion and $40 billion of their national resources revenues through illicit business transactions while annual capital flow out of Africa stood at $88.6 billion (UNCTAD 2020).

On 11 July 2003, African leaders under the auspices of the African Union (AU) at its Second Ordinary Session, adopted the African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption (AUCPCC) as an instrument to fight the bourgeoning corruption in the continent (Fagbadebo 2019). This was the first major attempt by the continental body to address the corruption pandemic that constituted the major rationalization for military intervention in politics (McGowan 2003; Japhet 2012). The Convention took into consideration the concerns of the AU leadership "about the negative effects of corruption and impunity on the political, economic, social and cultural stability of African States and its devastating effects on the economic and social development of the African peoples" (AUCPCC 2003). It also acknowledged the fact "that corruption undermines accountability and transparency in the management of public affairs as well as socio-economic development on the continent" and recognized "the need to address the root causes of corruption on the continent" (AUCPCC 2003).

This preamble is an indication that African leaders were aware of the enormous impact of corruption in the continent and the necessity to stamp it out of the public sector. They were "convinced of the, need to formulate and pursue, as a matter of priority, a common penal policy aimed at protecting the society against corruption, including the adoption of appropriate legislative and adequate preventive measures" (AUCPCC 2003). In other words,

they knew what to do to deal with a phenomenon that has earned the continent state of backwardness in the committee of nations. Past expression of intents was left with no actions while citizens reeled in pains of bad governance with the associated consequences on the socio-economic well-being of the people.

The Convention frowned at illicit enrichment of public officials, defined as "the significant increase in the assets of a public official or any other person which he or she cannot reasonably explain in relation to his or her income" (AUCPCC 2003). The Convention has five major objectives. These are

Promote and strengthen the development in Africa by each State Party, of mechanisms required to prevent, detect, punish and eradicate corruption and related offences in the public and private sectors. Promote, facilitate and regulate cooperation among the State Parties to ensure the effectiveness of measures and actions to prevent, detect, punish and eradicate corruption and related offences in Africa. Coordinate and harmonize the policies and legislation between State Parties for the purposes of prevention, detection, punishment and eradication of corruption on the continent. Promote socio-economic development by removing obstacles to the enjoyment of economic, social and cultural rights as well as civil and political rights. Establish the necessary conditions to foster transparency and accountability in the management of public affairs (AUCPCC 2003).

Article 3 of the Convention stipulates the principle governing the realization of its objectives.

These objectives are Respect for democratic principles and institutions, popular participation, the rule of law and good governance. Respect for human and peoples' rights in accordance with the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights and other relevant human rights instruments. Transparency and accountability in the management of public affairs. Promotion of social justice to ensure balanced socio-economic development. Condemnation and rejection of acts of corruption, related offences and impunity (AUCPCC 2003).

The Convention identified 9 acts of corruption, including direct or indirect solicitation or acceptance, offering or obtaining of bribe by public officials, illicit benefits and enrichment diversion of public resources for personal use, and

concealment of proceeds. These are the major corruption practices that have fueled illicit capital flow out of Africa thereby making the continent a paradox of poverty amid abundant resources. This is a reality of the resource curse syndrome in Africa where the abundance of natural resources, has generated "low economic development, and misuse of natural resources" (Demissie 2014: ii).

The AUCPCC is an excellent document in preparation with robust legislative frameworks capable of insulating the continent from its decades of economic woes and failings defined by corruption. Article 5 of the Convention contains requisite legislative measures designed to ensure the promotion of ethical conduct and behaviours among cities and public officials. Article 5(8) states that every member states should

Adopt and strengthen mechanisms for promoting the education of populations to respect the public good and public interest, and awareness in the fight against corruption and related offences, including school educational programmes and sensitization of the media, and the promotion of an enabling environment for the respect of ethics (AUCPCC 2003).

This provision is a direct reference to human capital capacity capable of building future leaders cultured in the art and acts of ethical leadership in society both in the private and public sector.

In addition to this, Article 6 of the Convention prescribed legislative measures against the scourge of money laundering and illicit capital flow. The Convention criminalises

The conversion, transfer or disposal of property, knowing that such property is the proceeds of corruption or related offences for the purpose of concealing or disguising the illicit origin of the property or of helping any person. who is involved in the commission of the offence to evade the legal consequences of his or her action (AUCPCC 2003).

This provision forecloses any act that could amount to concealment of proceeds from corrupt practices as well as "the acquisition, possession or use of property with the knowledge at the time of receipt, that such property is the proceeds of corruption or related offences" (AUCPCC 2003).

An examination of the various Articles of the Convention depicts the redlines of the leadership of the AU to exterminate corrupt practices. One common and recurring phenomenon is the monetization of

political campaigns and party activities through illegal use of public resources by the incumbents. Article 10 forbids the use of public money to fund party activities, a practice that has remained an albatross in the continent's political system (Hummel, C., Gerring, J., & Burt, T. (2021); Paget, 2019; Jancsics, D. (2019).). The Convention mandates political parties to adopt "legislative and other measures" to "Proscribe the use of funds acquired through illegal and corrupt practices to finance political parties; and Incorporate the principle of transparency into funding of political parties" (AUCPCC 2003).

Beyond this, there are other provisions such as extradition and confiscation and seizure of the proceeds and instrumentalities of corruption through the appropriate judicial process to ensure fairness. Article 17 mandate member states to "adopt such measures necessary to empower its courts or other competent authorities to order the confiscation or seizure of banking, financial or commercial documents with a view to implementing this Convention". Given the cumbersome banking regulations and rules, the Convention further declares that member states should "commit themselves to enter into bilateral agreements to waive banking secrecy on doubtful accounts and allow competent authorities the right to obtain from banks and financial institutions, under judicial cover, any evidence in their possession" (Article 17 (4).

As a continental protocol of action, Articles 18 and 19 of the Convention reinforce the need for international cooperation and mutual legal assistance in dealing with the scourge of corruption within and across African states. Article 18 (1) states

In accordance with their domestic laws and applicable treaties, State Parties shall provide each other with the greatest possible technical cooperation and assistance in dealing immediately with requests from authorities that are empowered by virtue of their national laws to prevent, detect, investigate and punish acts of corruption and related offences (AUCPCC 2003).

In a similar vein, Articles 19 (1-3) enjoin progressive cooperation among members states in the continental fight against grafts. In this wise, the Convention enjoin states to

Collaborate with countries of origin of multi-nationals to criminalize and punish the practice of secret commissions and other forms of corrupt practices during international trade transactions.

Foster regional, continental and international cooperation to prevent corrupt practices in international trade transactions. Encourage all countries to take legislative measures to prevent corrupt public officials from enjoying ill-acquired assets by freezing their foreign accounts and facilitating the repatriation of stolen or illegally acquired monies to the countries of origin (AUCPCC 2003).

The Convention generally provides the requisite legislative frameworks that would ensure that African states are relieved of corrupt practices and its consequences.

Nevertheless, a more political approach by the continental body is contained in the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM). At its meeting Lusaka and Durban meetings of the body in 2001 and 2002, respectively, the leaders, in their consideration of the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD), sought for "the setting up of a coordinated mechanism to combat corruption effectively" (AUCPCC 2003). This is what gave birth to the APRM.

APRM

Prior to the establishment of NEPAD, African heads of States had mooted the ideas of a pragmatic response to the challenges of instability and took decisions that would ensure "stability, peace and security, promoting closer economic integration, ending unconstitutional changes of government, supporting human rights and upholding the rule of law and good governance" (NEPAD Secretariat 2003).

Aside from the AUCPCC and the APRM, the leadership of the continental body had instituted a series of mechanisms and strategies to induce growth, development, stability and good governance part of the instruments include the Lagos Plan of Action, and the Final Act of Lagos (1980); the African (Banjul) Charter on Human and Peoples. Rights (1981); the African Charter for Popular Participation in Development (1990); the Declaration on the Political and Socio-Economic Situation in Africa and the Fundamental Changes Taking Place in the World (1990); and the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (1990). Others are the Abuja Treaty establishing the African Economic Community (1991); the 1993 Cairo Declaration Establishing the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution; the Protocol on the Establishment of an African Court on Human and Peoples Rights (1998) and the 1999 Grand Bay (Mauritius) Declaration and Plan of Action for the Promotion and Protection of

Human Rights. The Framework for an OAU Response to Unconstitutional Changes of Government (adopted at the 2000 OAU Summit in Lome, Togo, and based on the earlier decision of the 1999 Algiers OAU Summit); and the Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation (CSSDCA) Solemn Declaration (2000); and the Constitutive Act of the African Union (2000).

The APRM has four thematic areas. The are Democracy and Political Governance (DPG), Economic Governance and Management (EGM), Corporate Governance (CG) and the Broad-based Sustainable Socio-economic Development (SED). These thematic issues are in tandem with the SDGs. In other words, African leaders, in their quest for the realization of the SDGs seeks to fashion a mechanism that would be instrumental to the promotion of good governance through institutional self-assessment.

All these global, continental, and regional mechanism designed to promote sustainable growth and development have identified corruption as a challenge. The World Bank as well as other development agencies have defined corruption as the abuse of public trust and power for personal gains. This presupposes that those in position of power of the state at different level have direct access to state resources. This set of people are the public leaders who control the activities of the state. This means that leadership is a crucial factor in the anti-corruption drives as well as any pragmatic strategies to induce development.

Leadership and Accountability in Africa

In Africa, one of the militating factors against good governance in the lack of good leadership (Fombad 2003; Fagbadebo and Ile 2023; Fagbadebo 2019; Fagbadebo and Dorasamy 2021). Accountability connotes answerability.

Sustainable development and growth require accountable leadership. Indeed, the APRM focal points and objectives requires effective leadership to ensure adherence to the promotion of good governance (Fagbadebo ad Ile 2023). As Fombad (2023:19) has noted, the governance challenge in Africa "would have been mitigated had there been some capable and inspiring leaders who put the interests of their citizens before their own". In other words, African leaders are more concerned about their interest rather than the public goods. Incidentally, they appropriate state power to advance their personal interest through corruption

and other unethical conducts in the management of the public sector. Political power in the African context is the short cut to wealth through corruption. The concepts of state capture and prebendalism, for instance are associated with the developed version of African corruption by the political leadership in concert with heir cronies outside the structure and institutions of the government.

Conclusion

With this sort of leadership, it would be difficult to realize the SDGs as well and the philosophy behind the various anticorruption strategies of the AU and the AUCPCC. Similarly, the APRM objectives will remain a paperwork with no concrete achievements. Leadership in Africa is a challenge to the realization of the SDGs because of their disregard for ethical conduct and behaviors. As such, it would be difficult to follow through the various mechanisms designed to insulate society and citizens form the harsh realities of the consequences of the pervasive crisis of governance. The philosophy behind the APRM and the SDGs are progressive. They are good programmes that are capable of transforming the continent into a society of developed mindset and mentality that cater to the interest of the public. Nevertheless, the lack of effective leadership, committed to upholding ethical conduct and behaviors would continue to be a challenge until the institutionalization of a re-oriented culture of probity and accountability.

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Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) and Their Contribution Towards Sustainable Development of Local Governments in Uganda

<p style="text-align:center">◦ ☙ ◦</p>

Malowa Davis Ndanyi

Abstract

This paper explores the contribution of Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) in the promotion of Local, Economic, and social development, with a clear motive of improving rural livelihoods towards sustainable community development. Through Non-Governmental Organisations a number of projects, programs and initiatives are introduced to assist communities to be empowered and to acquire sustainable development. Some of the programs as will be reviewed by this paper include but not limited to; community skills development, community participation, gender conscious initiatives, civic competence trainings, micro finance provision and wealth creation projects. All these NGO development platforms contribute to the community well-being and their overall empowerment through individual community participation and improved economic generation to the overall community sustainable development. Through such initiatives NGOs contribute towards community self-reliance and empowerment and majorly to the realization of individual community potential hence community motivation to improve their individual livelihood. In a nutshell the paper demonstrates that using the roles/functions of NGOs, communities can achieve the realization of sustainable community development.

Key words: *Community Development, Non-Governmental Organisations, Decentralization and Local Governance and Public Private Partnership. Participation, Gender*

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1.0 Introduction

Local governance requires collective efforts if it must realize its development agenda. The Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) seem to be a quick fix to the economic and social dilemmas of local governments.

The disadvantage is that the infrastructure, human resources and the various sectors in the local governments (LGs) are either non-existent or underdeveloped. The advantage is that LGs can follow a beaten path and be able to avoid the mistakes of its predecessors. The most important challenges of the LGs therefore, is to be innovative and creative in order to realize their development dreams, catch up and surpass those local governments that are slow and non-responsive (Rahmato, 1991).

This article is not prescriptive. It instead makes suggestions on the important contribution the Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) can make to the LG development strategy. We do not underrate the tasks that the political leadership in the LGs face in its mission to deliver development to her people. Neither do we suggest that NGOs are the solution to the development problems facing the LGs. Therefore, NGOs must be seen as complimentary to the development process as development is a multi-dimensional phenomenon.

This paper addresses seven critical areas namely; development tasks of NGOs in all sectors, relations between NGOs and LGs in development efforts, contribution of NGOs in capacity development of LGs, NGOs and poverty alleviation in LGs, NGOs and agricultural development in LGs, NGOs and promotion of gender, education and health in LGs and the contribution of NGOs to sustainable development of LGs in Uganda.

1.1 What are NGOs?

They are basically non-profit voluntary organizations that carry out a broad range of social development functions with and on behalf of the people (Thomas 2013), NGOs are described by four characteristics namely; voluntary, non-partisan, non-profit and non-criminal (Salamon et al 1996). The vast majority exists outside government and their programs originate more from the express needs of the people rather from the government. There are various categories namely; community associations, service providers and cooperatives.

At present, development theorists argue that NGOs can act as

alternatives to government in the process of development. Why? Apart from the fact that they originate from the express needs of the people, the governments in Africa have failed to deliver social services such as free education, free health provision of subsidized agricultural inputs and extension services to the citizens (Omofonmwan et al 2009). They are small in size, less bureaucratic, responsive to specialized needs and are agile in response to local problems. In addition, because they are close to the people, they understand their needs better (Thomas 2013).

Because of their knowledge of local resources and technologies, they are able to identity innovative and inexpensive responses to local problems. However, on the other hand, critics of NGOs argue that their definition as non-profit and voluntary limits their capacities to be self-sustaining. If they do not engage in profit-making projects by investing in possible ventures outside their projects, the alternative is the continuous dependence on the patronage of donors who in any case have their interests to promote NGOs. For local governments to take off they should be able to overcome these shortcomings.

1.1.2 Status of Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) in Uganda

In Uganda, NGOs are regulated through the National Bureau for Non-Governmental Organizations, which is a semi-autonomous body under the Ministry of Internal Affairs. It has the following functions: i) To consider and approve registration of NGOs, ii) To keep a register of registered organizations, iii) To guide and monitor organizations in carrying out their services,

iv) To make recommendations to other authorities with regard to employment of non-citizens, exemption from taxes and any other privileges and v) To advise the Minister of Internal Affairs on the general policy relating to operation of NGOs in Uganda.

Uganda has around 14,027 NGOs, out of which 2,119 have been validated and given permits to operate in Uganda in handling various roles as per their mandates such as health care, food aid, capacity building, education provision, clean water provision and support to the orphans and destitutes (Asingwire et al, 2015). Under the Uganda's current program of Parish Development Model (PDM), NGOs are supporting Local Governments in the area of

awareness creation and capacity building to the population to enable them to utilize the funds in a meaningful manner in trades like brick laying, poultry, fish farming, bee keeping etc.

1.2   Sustainable Development (SD)

Is the development that meets the needs of the present, without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs, SD continuously seeks to achieve social and economic progress in ways which will not exhaust the earth's finite natural resources (World Bank, 2022).

1.3   Local Governments

A Local government is a legal entity that is formed with the aim of delivering local and communal public services with devolved legislative, executive and financial powers from the central government (World Bank 2008). Kenny (2007), defines Local Governments an entity where the administration of the civic affairs of a city, town or district by its inhabitants rather than by the state or country at large. In Uganda, the Ministry of Local Government is responsible for Local Governments which comprises of over 100 district councils sitting at the apex of a five-tier structure; namely; District councils, County/Municipal councils, Sub-county/Town Councils, Parish/Division councils and Village/Ward councils.

2.0   Objective of this Article

The Article is premised on the following research questions;

i)   What is the role of NGOs in supporting Local Governments to perform in order to attain sustainable development?

ii)   What constraints do NGOs face in trying to influence the performance of Local Governments?

3.0   Theoretical review

Various theories have been advanced to explain sustainable development of local governments influenced by Non-Governmental Organizations. This paper is premised on the Principal-Agency theory as reviewed below.

3.1   Principal-Agency theory

The Principal-Agency theory presupposes that the owners of the business are the Principal. The managers, who do the day-to-day management of the business or company, are the Agents. In the Public Service delivery, the citizens are the Principal and the Government is the Agent. The

rationale is that the Principal leaves the Agent to take charge of the business (service provision) on its behalf because most times the Agent has more information and skills about the management of the business (Lane 2019).

There is a clear relationship between the Principal and the Agent. The Principal serves the interests of the Agent. The Principal is expected to put up mechanisms to monitor, supervise and control the actions and inactions of the Agent. It is argued that over time the cost of supervision and monitoring the performance of the Agent can be high and difficult to achieve and hence the Agent is left to work independently.

In this article, it should be noted that the Principal-Agency theory attempts to explain the nexus between Local governments in partnership with NGOs as the Agent and the citizens as the Principal both focusing on service delivery to the community, which development paradigm was designed with the intention of transforming public service delivery, through various approaches. These approaches include but not limited to performance management initiatives, networking with other development partners, delegation, contracting-out, and Public Private Partnership (PPP). In addition, the Principal-Agency theory explains the variation in the behavior or decisions when demonstrated by group members. Specifically, it explains the differences in behavior and action between what the Principal requires vis-a-vis the priorities of the Agent or decisions by noting that the two parties often have different goals hence affecting performance of the organization.

4.0   Development roles of NGOs

There are enormous development tasks for LGs. LGs face very low productivity across its social and economic sectors. There are problems of illiteracy, ill-heath, poor infrastructure, low agricultural productivity resulting in near famine conditions, environmental degradation, abject poverty, and gender oppression among others for development to occur there must, therefore, be a multi-dimensional and integrated development strategy (Adebayo 2018).

Development is a process of economic, social advancement in terms of quality of human life and basic human infrastructure (World Bank 2014). Therefore, the central issues in development are: what is happening to poverty, what is happening to unemployment, what is happening to agricultural

productivity? What is happening to illiteracy, people's health and the environment? What services do they have access to? The measurement of any development has to be based on the above questions as the benchmark. Therefore, any serious development strategy must convey targets for the improvement of human life in the above face. The contribution of NGOs must be seen in this context.

5.0 The nexus between NGOs and local governments

In the process of NGO development activities, they interact with government. It is therefore important that there exist cordial relations with the local authorities. The relationship should be collaborative rather than competitive. Politically, NGOs have the potential of changing the local government structures in favour of greater democratization and institutional accountability. Economically; NGO projects have gained prominence in Uganda partly due, to the inability of government to finance some public service delivery development projects, for instance in areas of health, education, clean water provision and environmental protection. Sometimes governments rely on NGOs to implement certain elements of national rural development policy (Barbara et al 2014).

The importance of good relations between NGOs and local governments is that at both the political and economic level, there is potential for conflict. For instance, the demand by NGOs for political reform in terms of institutional transparency may provoke the wrath of the local governments therefore, it is suggested that NGOs and Local administration must get engaged in discussion and dialogue rather than confrontation. Some of the suggestions by NGOs may be resisted by local governments (World Bank 2014). Moreover, NGOs must know that the State though it may be corrupt, still maintain enormous power of repression. They could just be deregistered hence lose the opportunity to contribute to the sustainable development process in the local governments. NGOs on the other hand, must remain faithful to their mission and offer constructive criticism.

6.0 NGOs and capacity enhancement/building

Another area that NGOs can contribute is in the institutional and capacity building of local government personnel. Increasingly, there is a clear trend among development NGOs in Uganda of a shift away from direct service provision, towards concern for

broader processes of development – a concern for people rather than projects. Hence training, awareness raising, social organization, capacity building and institutional development have taken center stage (Ulleberg, 2009). The NGOs and the political leadership in the local governments must emphasise this synergy in order to sustainably develop the communities.

The performance and contribution of any NGO to the development of local governments must be measured against whether they are engaged in the following (ibid);

1. Whether they are 'catalystic, multiplicative and diffusive' in their strategies whereby they aim at influencing others through working together, sharing ideas and training.

2. Carry out advocacy using experience from the grassroots to influence others at local and national level, reshape resource allocation and promote policy change.

3. Shift away from operational work towards support for local organizational development.

The Capacity of the local people to participate in formulating development strategies of the district through their community organizations is important. This enables them to have a sense of ownership of the programs or projects. Therefore, for NGOs to ensure effective participation of the rural people in decision making and defining their own needs and goals, they have to be empowered so that they reach up to the decision makers and local government officials. To some extent NGOs in Uganda with specific reference to local governments have been engaged in this process.

7.0   NGOs and wealth creation for Local Governments (LGs)

Poverty ranks top as the major obstacle to development in the local governments in Uganda 40% i.e. earning $1.25 a day, World Bank (2022).   Much of the reputation of NGOs is based on claims about their ability to reach the poor. Reaching the poor, is not, however, the same as alleviating/eradicating poverty. To be seen to be addressing the problem of poverty, NGOs in a local government must address a number of issues (Esman et al 1984).

First, how far do they in fact reach the poor and is there a relationship with rural people as good as is claimed" Second, do they address the causes of rural poverty as opposed to simply treating some of its symptoms? Third, in case of this NGO failure, what can the local government do about it?

The leadership of individual local governments must be able to dialogue with the local NGO community to address the issue of poverty at several levels. In Uganda both the local leadership and NGOs have attempted to ascertain whether the following are taking place.

a) **Development Services**: How far NGOs deliver services appropriate to the beneficiaries' needs and whether these services lead to other positive changes, particularly in regard to the poor.

b) **Participation and Empowerment**: How far NGOs are responsive and accountable to beneficiaries and how far NGOs reinforce grassroots capacity. This is the capacity of the group of people to create new systems and mechanisms to accomplish its goals. This is because building such capacity is the heart of participation.

   c) Whether NGOs have produced innovative ways of solving the problem of poverty and such ways having the potential to spread in the area

   d) Whether they have created viable and sustainable income-generating ventures.

   e) Whether NGOs have produced innovative ways of solving the problem of poverty and such ways having the potential to spread in the area.

   f) Whether they have created viable and sustainable income generating ventures.

An understanding of the process underlying poverty is essential if appropriate interventions are to be designed. NGO's ability to alleviate poverty and work with the poor people has been the focus of much uncritical speculation about their potential. Though there is little evidence to support these claims, they also draw attention to the fact that very few NGOs have worked to create new employment opportunities despite the potential poverty alleviating the impact of such a strategy.

8.0 NGOs and agricultural promotion

In Uganda, agriculture is central in the development process, 70% of the Ugandan population being employed in agriculture, especially in local governments, contributing about 24.1% of GDP and 33% of export earnings (UBOS 2021). In general terms agricultural growth provides food, raw materials among others. The suggestion that agricultural strategies would benefit from increased collaboration

between NGOs and Government is common place. The World Bank (2020) has called for NGO involvement in programs/projects that have traditionally been implemented through government organizations. However, for local governments to make a head way, it is suggested that a number of entry points by NGOs into the agricultural sector is deployed on a competitive pace (Barbara et al 2014).

The first entry point should be the raising of productivity through diffusion of technological change, ox ploughs etc. in addition, there must be a move beyond the existing techniques. To enhance production, broader methods are needed: credit, soil conservation, extension services, marketing and promotion of local organizations.

Second, NGOs should contribute to agricultural research and development programmes. The research could concentrate on areas neglected by mainstream research such as collection and promotion of indigenous seeds capable of enduring in the specific local governments' environment.

Third, a food security component must be considered seriously by NGOs. In the face of the food crisis that confronts local governments, indigenous seeds are crucial. This is because of poverty; rural people may

not be able to afford the demands of hybrid seeds since NGOs are supposed to be pro-people, they should not impose their food security programs/projects on the people. By working with the local governments, themselves, they should be able to enhance food security at household and community levels. A more integrated food security programs should involve components of the food cycle: indigenous seeds, nutrition, women and technology in the food cycle, small grain milling, integrated grain storage and processing. These have been done by a number of NGOs in other countries and it should not be beyond the local NGOs. The formation of mission-oriented groups is the best way of sustaining such programs.

Fourth, since women are at the center of agricultural production, NGOs must promote gender awareness in the rural communities in areas of their operation in order to address the unequal gender relations existing prior to their launching of projects. Gender roles must be integrated in the production process. In Uganda for instance government introduced the Parish Development Model (PDM) with seven pillars as follows; i) Production, storage, processing and marketing ii) Infrastructure and economic services iii) Financial

inclusion iv) Social services v) Mindset change vi) Parish based information management system vii) Governance and Administration (PDM – MOLG 2021). The Financial inclusion pillar has a specific component of women and youth deliberate financial inclusion, it is through this pillar that the youth and women are supported, of course by government and other partner NGOs to liberate them from their current economic constraints.

The environment is the basis of survival. The NGOs must make serious contribution in this regard. While the problem of environmental degradation is narrowly defined in terms of soil loss, deforestation, pollution etc. a more holistic approach is the best way of defining the problem (Thomas 2013). NGOs in the local governments must see the environment in broad terms such as physical, ecological, social and political processes. They must focus on the issues of ownership, control and management of natural resources. This is because any meaningful NGO intervention must have these components. It must address the issue of power and conflict of interest. The social interactions with the environment, links with resource conservation and human needs. As such a strategy of environmental conservation is not

likely to succeed if it neglects the social dimension. This is the best way to bring about sustainable development. In Uganda, with the help of NGOs, there have been deliberate efforts to socially organize the population to confront the environmental concerns. Environmental education in this regard is very crucial.

9.0 NGOs: gender, education and civic promotion and local governance

The NGOs can contribute in the above sectors in a number of ways. However, the emphasis should be an understating of the underlying causes of backwardness in these sectors (Korten 1980).

On gender, the issue of women oppression is based on unequal access to resources and education. The NGOs working on gender issues must identify the causes of this inequality.

On education, there are already too many schools offering general education. NGOs should cultivate a niche and offer specialized education particularly practical education but also entrepreneurial education. The issue of discipline and morals, particularly of trust are important in development. There should be a multi- dimensional approach in their educational activities. On health, it is

suggested that the emphasis of NGOs should be on primary health care, emphasizing preventive methods rather than curative.

Finally, NGOs must be in position to teach people their rights. The knowledge or rights is the surest way of establishing democratic governance and social harmony. This would encourage the citizens to participate in political processes to hold their leaders accountable.

10.0 Constraints facing NGOs in Uganda

Asingwire et al (2015), argue that there are a number of constraints that face NGOs in their day today functioning as follows; i) Ineffective Communication, this is occasioned by lack of networking and un coordinated duplication of roles by various NGOs. ii) Political interference, this occurs often as governments normally keep a keen watch on what the NGOs are involved in. At times NGOs are misinterpreted by Government on what they are undertaking and assumed to be working against Government and hence causing untold harassment to NGOs, iii) Lack of funding, NGOs normally commence work with work plans and budgets but along the way their budgets are affected due to reducing or stopped funding by their donors,

this greatly affects their performance and more so their beneficiaries the communities, iv) Ineffective networking, many times NGOs working on similar roles and works fail to agree on how to undertake those assignments in different areas and instead conflict posing challenges to the service delivery consumers the communities, v) Poor governance, in some cases NGOs fail to manage their organizations either due to absence of boards or as a result of compromise between the boards and technical people. The governance challenge affects the performance of NGOs and hence may also contribute to the poor service delivery to the communities.

11.0 Recommendations

a) It is recommended that Governments should support NGOs and their work within the structures of local governments in order to maintain good and harmonious working relationship.

b) For NGOs to cause an impact on local governments it is important for them to build capacity of local citizens in a bid to make them self-sustaining and empowered.

c) It is highly recommended that the local citizens should participate in NGO activities if they are to benefit from their planned set of work plans in a given period of time.

d) NGO activities need to be engendered if local governments are to benefit holistically.

12.0   Conclusion

In sum, the article argues that NGOs have a tremendous potential to contribute to the development of local governments in Uganda. However, the sustainable development path is too enormous and it should not be a one-time event. Various stakeholders should be brought on board to support this sustainable development dream. Secondly, continuous monitoring and supervision on the performance of NGOs must be enhanced by government periodically to mitigate lose ends before, during and after implementation of the projects/programs.

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The Success of the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) Depends on a Fit for Purpose African Public Administration

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Abstract

The successful implementation and sustainability of the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) are inextricably linked to the efficacy, adaptability, and integrity of African public administrations. Drawing on the theoretical frameworks of New Public Management (NPM) and Neo-Functionalism Integration Theory, this paper explores the critical role that a reformed and resilient public administration system plays in facilitating the AfCFTA's objectives. NPM emphasizes the importance of efficiency, effectiveness, service orientation, and innovation in public sector management, advocating for the adoption of private sector management practices to improve public sector performance. Neo-Functionalism Integration Theory provides insight into how cooperation in technical, non-political areas can spill over into positive regional dynamics and gradually cultivate shared interests.

The paper argues that for AfCFTA to thrive, African public administrations must undergo transformative changes to become more meritocratic, transparent, efficient, and responsive to the dynamic needs of intracontinental trade. It examines key reforms necessary for public administrations, including establishing merit-based bureaucracies to combat corruption and enhance efficiency, adopting e-governance to streamline administrative processes, and enhancing the capacity of border and customs organizations through technological advancements. The NPM framework supports these reforms by advocating for a results-oriented approach and the adoption of best practices from the private sector.

Furthermore, the paper discusses the need for fostering inter-state collaboration to harmonize trade policies and regulations, and the importance of incentivizing skilled personnel recruitment and retention, supported by competitive compensation schemes. These elements are reinforced by the Neo-Functionalism perspective, which emphasizes the role

technical agencies focused on trade facilitation can play in inspiring political momentum for deeper integration.

The analysis concludes that the success of AfCFTA is contingent upon building a public administration framework that is not only fit for purpose but also adaptable to the evolving trade landscape. Effectively supporting the continent's ambitious trade integration and economic development goals requires a balance between adopting efficient management practices and responding to the institutional contexts within which these administrations operate.

Introduction

Regional integration initiatives represent a strategic priority for economic growth and development around the globe, formalized through agreements like the AfCFTA that remove barriers for cross-border trade and cooperation. While much analysis focuses on the commercial opportunities of integration frameworks, their effective implementation relies profoundly on the governance capabilities and capacities of participating states' public administrations. From trade policy formulation to customs controls to services interoperability, public institutions enact and facilitate the functional integration at an operational level.

As Quadri and Uche, 2020.outline, bureaucracies possess significant "institutional agency" shaping how regional commitments translate into practical reality. Thus, the success of the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) fundamentally depends on building fit-for-purpose public administrations to actively drive and facilitate cross-border trade and collaboration across Africa. This paper examines the prerequisite public administration reforms, current capability gaps undermining AfCFTA goals, and emerging best practices for an integrated governance architecture that can effectively deliver operational integration and help realize the full potential of AfCFTA. A fit-for-purpose African public administration marks a critical foundation for overcoming technical and political obstacles to regional integration, stimulating economic growth, and leveraging shared

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prosperity through continental free trade.

Overview of the Problem Statement

The African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) agreement was launched in 2018 with the goal of creating a single continental market for goods and services in Africa (UNECA, 2020). Through elimination of barriers to trade such as tariffs and non-tariff barriers, the AfCFTA aims to boost intra-African trade and promote industrial development across the continent (Saygili et al., 2018). With 54 out of 55 African Union member states signed up, the AfCFTA has tremendous potential to transform economies and improve livelihoods through increased trade and investment. However, the operationalization and eventual success of the AfCFTA rests heavily on the efficiency and effectiveness of the various public administration systems tasked with implementing the agreement.

The AfCFTA represents a historic milestone for regional integration and trade liberalization across Africa. AfCFTA has set the ambitious goal of subsequently creating a customs union and common external tariff policy (AU, 2018; UN, 2019). The AfCFTA aims to boost intra-Africa trade by over 50% in the next decade, through elimination of tariffs on 90% of goods and addressing non-tariff barriers, the (World Bank, 2020).

The economic rationale for the AfCFTA is premised on the low levels of existing regional trade. Intra-Africa exports accounted for just 15% of total exports in 2021 compared to 68% in Europe and 61% in Asia, illustrating significant potential for growth (African Export-Import Bank, 2022). Increased trade facilitated by the AfCFTA can generate welfare gains between US$16-22 billion through productivity gains and improved resource allocation (Abrego et al 2019). Further benefits include industrialization, infrastructure development, employment generation and ultimately, meaningful poverty reduction across the continent (Vanheukelom, (2015-2016).

Effective implementation of the AfCFTA however faces multiple hurdles given Africa's diversity and contrasting levels of development. Challenges include high revenue losses from eliminated tariffs, adverse impacts on domestic infant industries, influx of cheap products from advanced economies and loss of policy space (Turpin, 2018). Tackling these complexities require strong institutional coordination between customs authorities,

standards agencies and national AfCFTA strategy centers across multiple jurisdictions (Pigato & Tang, 2015). Hence, the operationalization and eventual success of AfCFTA rests heavily on the efficiency and effectiveness of various public administration systems tasked with implementing the agreement.

Theoretical Framework

The analysis on the role of public administration in enabling the AfCFTA is underpinned by two key theoretical perspectives - new public management theory and neo-functionalism integration theory. This theory emerged in the 1980s and emphasizes public sector performance enhancement through private sector management approaches including decentralization, result-based measurement, and service orientation (Weisbrod et al., 1978, cited in Halpern, 2009). Applying new public management lens to this research highlights the importance of capability building, efficiency incentives and technological upgrades within key bureaucracies steering regional integration.

Neo-functionalism posits that cooperation fostered in technical, non-political areas can spill over into positive regional dynamics and gradually cultivate shared interests (Haas, 1958; Mkandawire, 2016). This drives the analysis of the significant role effective customs, standards agencies and revenue bodies can play in enabling AfCFTA processes to ultimately inspire political momentum for deeper integration. These twin perspectives underscore the potential for public administration reforms focused on intra-regional trade facilitation, policy harmonization and service delivery to stimulate positive integration externalities across political, economic, and social dimensions in Africa.

Public Administration is the Abiding Conundrum in Regional Integration Initiatives

The pursuit of regional integration initiatives in Africa has presented a complex conundrum with mixed results thus far. While economic theories extol the purported benefits of market integration models in inspiring cooperation and collective prosperity (Balchin et al., 2016), the realities unfolding across African regional blocs reveal persistent challenges.

Each regional organization on the continent possesses a distinct configuration of member states with unique economic profiles, political systems, social fabric, security

threats and ecological environments (Mshomba, R.E., 2017). Blindly adhering to integration paradigms without accounting for these differences risks unrealistic expectations and inadequate policies to manage complex transitions (Clark, S.G. & Wallace, R.L., 2015). The Lagos Plan of Action articulated a pan-Africanist vision of economic integration as a driver of development decades ago (AU, 1980). Yet over 20 regional institutions later, intra-African trade remains stagnant as a proportion of total trade (Brookings, 2019).

The lacklustre outcomes suggest prevailing integration approaches have struggled to reconcile contrasts across countries and overcome constraints posed by colonial legacies, infrastructure bottlenecks, governance deficits and structural economic weaknesses (Taylor, 2016; Kufour, 2017). There exists a sizable volume of academic literature analysing the trade, fiscal, infrastructure and regulatory requisites for market integration (Njoku et al., 2019; Biakuyambo et al., 2021). However, the socio-political and historical realities permeating African regions infuse the integration agenda with challenges that cannot be resolved through technical fixes alone (Grant & Domat, 2020). Issues of trust deficits, weak national institutions, low policy harmonization, knowledge gaps and inadequate stakeholder engagement continue to undermine regional initiatives.

Deep-seated challenges continue to plague public administration effectiveness across Africa, hampering service delivery and economic progress. These include lack of skilled manpower, weak systems and processes, limited adoption of technology, transparency and corruption concerns, inadequate infrastructure, and low fiscal capacity (Hope, K.R. (2000). Such limitations within the bureaucracy reduce states' readiness to meet AfCFTA regulations, uphold quality standards, facilitate border administration, and mobilize domestic firms to tap into the continental market. Addressing these bottlenecks through public administration reforms is therefore instrumental for the AfCFTA to stimulate intra-African trade and enable economic transformation.

Despite having among the world's youngest populations, African states face acute shortages of specialized skills within key bureaucracies. This emanates from limited investments in civil service training programs, poor retention strategies and capacity imbalances between central agencies and local bodies

(Adamolekun and Olowu, 2015). The proportion of university graduates employed in national institutions also remains below other developing regions (Butt & Shalley, 2022). Such gaps in qualified personnel diminish the ability to manage complex policy reforms and regional commitments like the AfCFTA.

Additionally, pervasive infrastructure bottlenecks regarding unreliable power access, internet connectivity and transportation networks obstruct efficient administration (Tshishonga & Mafema, 2010). Many government offices lack the requisite digital, statistical, and analytical tools to enrich decision-making while poor record keeping practices persist due to outdated platforms (DFID, 2010). These challenges severely restrain bureaucratic productivity and responsiveness to citizens and businesses.

Corruption and transparency concern further erode public trust and efficiency gains from service improvements (Hope, 2000). Partial reforms occasionally incentivize informal payments through red tape while limited transparency cultivates misappropriation risks (Jama, 2021). Lack of meritocratic principles in appointments also foster incompetence over intrinsic motivation (Ayee, 2008). Therefore,

system strengthening to uphold ethics, incentivize performance and increase accountability remains necessary. Boosting public administration capacity across workforce, infrastructure and governance dimensions remains indispensable to actualize Africa's economic aspirations through instruments like the AfCFTA (AfDB), 2020).

The imperative of 'Fit for Purpose Public Administration'.

As defined by Hope (2017), 'a fit for purpose public administration' matches the capabilities and capacities of governance institutions to realizing policy objectives and serving public needs. Creating effective, responsive administrations requires strategic alignment between mandates, skill sets, organizational systems, and state expectations (Hope, 2017; Manning & Shepherd, 2020). Achieving fit for purpose public agencies demands grasping pressing capability gaps. This frequently involves reforms to address dimensions like strategic workforce planning, performance management, digitalization, and anti-corruption controls (Manning & Shepherd, 2020; Vallejo & Ong, 2021). Hope (2017) stresses the imperative of institutional analysis and change management, so

administration norms, resources, and personnel fit developmental priorities.

Building fit for purpose governance also necessitates adaptation. As Brynard (2022) outlines, public administrations must continuously evolve their structures, practices and staff competencies as technologies, economic conditions, political priorities, and crises shift. By embracing flexibility and innovation, state agencies can reorient to emerging administrative imperatives and societal needs (Brynard, 2022).

Transitioning to data-driven, digitally powered public management further enables responsiveness and higher performance outcomes aligned to citizen expectations (Vallejo & Ong, 2021). As Menocal (2021) details, fit for purpose trajectories require determining appropriate technologies to enhance capabilities while managing risks of tech-driven reforms excluding marginalized populations. The scientific management movement of Taylor prescribed a set of principles to be followed for an organization to be effective and efficient. These are: (1) systematic scientific methods of measuring and managing individual work elements; (2) scientific selection of personnel; (3) financial incentives

to obtain high performance of workers; and (4) specialization of function, that is establishing logical divisions within work roles and responsibilities between workers and management (Shafritz and Hyde, 1992:3).

In the result, fit for purpose public administration lens emphasizes building state capacity to deliver evolving mandates and public services responsive to contemporary challenges. This forward-looking, capability-driven perspective sees aligning administrative functions and resources to national development goals as vital for progress.

The Nexus between Regional Integration and Public Administration

Public Administration, which encompass government bureaucracy and institutions, plays a pivotal role in facilitating regional trade agreements (Cheong & Tongzon, 2013). Key functions such as policy formulation, regulation, service delivery, monitoring and revenue collection determine the extent to which intended outcomes of trade agreements materialize. According to Meier and Hill (2007), bureaucratic quality marked by meritocracy and internal efficiency is strongly linked to better economic performance. For

the AfCFTA to achieve its objectives, African countries will require robust public administration machinery to formulate regulatory frameworks, implement trade reforms, address non-tariff barriers, and ultimately create an environment conducive for intra-Africa trade and investments to thrive.

Public administration systems, consisting of governmental bureaucracies, institutions, and regulatory frameworks, actively shape the formulation, implementation, and ultimate success of trade agreements (OECD, 2018). As Brun et al. (2005) emphasize, the interface between trade reforms and national policies is facilitated through the machinery of public administration. Its pivotal role spans key functions like policy design, legislation, regulation, revenue mobilization, service delivery and monitoring (Cheong & Tongzon, 2013).

The quality of public administration as characterized by meritocratic bureaucracies, efficient processes and control of corruption strongly correlates with trade-enabling environments and export competitiveness (Dollar & Kraay, 2003). Countries with higher public sector capability tend to face lower trade costs, achieve greater diversification, and attract larger inflows of foreign direct investments (Anukoonwattaka et al., 2020). Hence strengthening public administration effectiveness is imperative for governments to harness the opportunities unlocked by trade agreements.

In the African context, substantial reforms would be necessary to realign public administration systems towards supporting regional integration objectives like the AfCFTA (de Melo, J. and Tsikata, Y., 2014). Policy and institutional coordination between revenue bodies, standards agencies, customs authorities, data providers and other governmental entities involved in trade facilitation would be indispensable to enable continental free flows of goods, services, and investments (Moses, 2023). Developing implementation capacity also warrants investments in human capital, technology adoption, infrastructure and operational financing within key public administration institutions that steer AfCFTA processes (World Bank, 2020).

The United Nations has recognized the vital link between capable public administration and achieving development and economic goals. Considering this nexus, the UN General Assembly passed Resolution 49/136 highlighting the crucial role

of government and public institutions in fostering sustained economic growth and sustainable development, especially in developing countries and transitional economies. The Resolution also underscored the need to strengthen public administrative and financial management capacities to ensure civil services are responsive to citizen needs. This affirmation of the public sector's importance for development provides further justification for investing in public administration reforms as a prerequisite for delivering economic priorities like regional integration. In building effective and accountable bureaucracies, civil services can better facilitate intergovernmental coordination, trade reforms, and various initiatives underlying collective development visions.

It follows, therefore, that public administration is about managing public resources, and involves some processes that are generally grouped into six functions: policymaking, organizing, determining work procedures, financing, staffing, and control (Cloete, 1998). Public administration is also understood to be the key apparatus for the execution of the functions of the state. It is represented by the executive and its bureaucracy at the national, provincial, and local levels together with the various statutory and parastatal bodies that perform several regulatory, monitoring, productive, and service delivery functions (Cloete, 1998:88-97).

The indicators of public administration interventions in regional integration

Public administration encompasses a diverse range of functions and entities that critically enable regional integration pursuits. From policy formulation to economic coordination, from infrastructure development to customs management, African public agencies actively cultivate an environment conducive to deeper cross-border connectivity and collaboration across the following key dimensions:

Policy Formulation and Harmonization: Public institutions play a vital role in formulating policies and regulations that enable regional integration, while ensuring harmonization across member states (Leal-Arcas, 2013). This involves aligning national policies to regional commitments on trade, agriculture, immigration, transport, among others to provide an enabling environment for integration (Hartzenberg, 2011).

The African Union guides harmonization efforts in Africa through model laws, standards, guidelines while public agencies spearhead domestication and implementation guided by national imperatives (Dawar et al 2021).

Regulatory Frameworks: Regional integration requires appropriate regulatory frameworks governing cross-border movement of goods, services, capital, and labour (AfDB), 2018). Public agencies shape various facets like competition regulation to prevent monopolies, intellectual property rights protection, dispute settlement mechanisms and consumer safety protocols to inspire confidence in integrated markets (Chidede, T., 2021). Hence competent institutions and equitable regulations nurture integration.

Infrastructure Development: Seamless multi-country infrastructure networks spanning transport, energy, water, and ICT facilities spur integration by connecting businesses and communities across borders (Ndulu, 2006). As Lee (2013) outlines, public works ministries prioritize regional infrastructure projects while utilities and regulatory agencies enable cross-border infrastructure connectivity. Hence the public sector oversight in planning, financing, and executing infrastructure creates vital arteries for integration.

Capacity Building: Bolstering institutional and human resource capabilities across public agencies involved in trade, revenue, migration, security, and planning enables deeper regional cooperation (Mold et al., 2010). Asmkh (2018) recommends public sector skills enhancement programs on policy harmonization, project management and technology adoption to strengthen national readiness for regional initiatives.

Conflict Resolution: As Meron (1985) notes, legal institutions and public diplomacy are indispensable to resolve inter-state disputes that threaten integration prospects. This entails strengthening the capacity of regional courts coupled with diplomacy and mediation via government agencies to uphold peace, stability, and rule of law.

Economic and Social Policy Coordination: Regional bodies like the African Union Commission provide guidance for harmonizing

member states' economic, employment, education, and health policies to ensure integration efforts achieve inclusive human development rather than just economic growth (Busse et al., 2016; KNotable, 2012). Public services then coordinate implementation aligned to these regional frameworks.

Monitoring and Evaluation: Result-oriented public administration necessitates monitoring frameworks to gauge progress on integration indicators around trade, infrastructure, policy convergence and living standards (Mold et al., 2010; Rampa & Bilal, 2011). Evaluations then guide requisite public sector reforms towards deeper integration.

Customs and Border Management: Customs and immigration agencies are reducing hurdles to intra-regional trade and mobility by modernizing border post infrastructure and streamlining processes through decentralization, automation, and inter-agency coordination (World Economic Forum, 2022). Such public sector driven reforms ease cross-border flows.

Environmental Sustainability: Public environmental regulators and planning authorities assess and mitigate risks from increased economic activities under integration to minimize ecological damage in line with sustainable development principles (Sharma, D., & Gupta, A. K, 2024). Mainstreaming climate resilience and social impact management across infrastructure and energy projects safeguards communities.

Diplomatic Suasion To actualize this potential AfCFTA's full potential will depend on effective diplomacy between member states. As noted by scholars like Sylvanus Kwaku Afesorgbor, (2016), regional integration obligates the alignment of the interests among states through extensive negotiation, compromise, and confidence building. While economic incentives drive integration initiatives like the AfCFTA, the political processes of reconciliation and partnership-building depend greatly on multilateral diplomacy. African heads of state must actively utilize institutions like the Assembly of the African Union to

continuously dialogue through differences and cooperatively

Public Administration Interventions in Regional Integration

construct integrated trade policies

Stakeholder Engagement and Collaboration: Public institutions provide platforms for varied stakeholders to contribute towards integration policymaking (Kohler-Koch and Larat, 2008). Constructive engagement with private sector, civil society, academia and development partners channels technical inputs, local knowledge, and resources to shape equitable integration strategies with broad ownership (Kidane, 2016). The active involvement of stakeholders across the public and private sectors and civil society is indispensable for the AfCFTA process to progress smoothly. Constructive engagement can shape appropriate policies, address contentious issues, and strengthen monitoring mechanisms. Governments need to provide information and guarantees to allay private sector concerns while collaborating closely with businesses and industry associations to unleash their growth potential. Media advocacy also assists in enhancing public awareness and engagement around the far-reaching changes induced by the AfCFTA. Hence participatory decision-making and transparency through multi-stakeholder partnerships can cement

societal buy-in. Businesses and industry play an indispensable role in highlighting implementation hurdles around trade barriers, standards and tariffs while proposing solutions that unlock growth opportunities from integration. Governments must institutionalize platforms for regular public-private dialogue to secure investments in priority sectors.

The core of 'a Fit for Purpose Public Administration'

Strengthening Africa's public sector institutions through targeted capability enhancements is vital amid ambitious development agendas like the AfCFTA. While integration promises widened opportunities, fully leveraging its potential necessitates efficient institutions for trade governance, service delivery and revenue mobilization (Echandi et al, 2022).

Capacity Building and Institutional Strengthening Targeted efforts to bolster human resource capacity, improve systems and procedures and harness technology are imperative to reinforce the performance of Africa's public administration (The Africa Capacity Report: 2019). Public administrators should be professionally trained and equipped with appropriate skills to support trade reforms and implementation while institutions need further strengthening to deliver citizen-centric services efficiently. Digitizing administrative procedures through e-government solutions can also overcome red tape and corruption while enhancing transparency and revenue collection capabilities (Santiso, C., 2021). Such interventions to modernize and empower public administration will cement the foundations for the AfCFTA to function effectively.

Tailored training programs to expand specialist expertise across key bureaucracies can plug human resource gaps constraining policy implementation (Gandhi, N. and Hancock, B., 2015). Rwanda's dedicated colleges (Hughes, 2020). and Ethiopia's prioritization of public sector workforce planning provide replicable models to sustain high calibre talent through attractive civil service careers (Tadesse, W.M., 2019). Embedding technical experts within institutions also fosters peer learning and skills diffusion to junior officials (Gandhi et al, 2015).

Leveraging digital platforms and statistical systems further unlocks administrative productivity, transparent monitoring, and evidence-based reforms (Tadesse, W.M., 2019). Ghana (Abusamhadana, 2021) and South Africa provide noteworthy examples

of e-governance systems streamlining processes while enhancing accountability through citizen engagement and data access (AUDA-NEPAD, 2022). Sustainability concerns, do however, necessitate adequate cybersecurity, user capacity building and impact evaluations before nationwide adoption (Hueca, A., 2022).

Governance frameworks like performance contracts institutionalize efficiency incentives and insulate key bureaucracies from political interference (Mueller, H., 2015). Coupled with increased financing, such instruments can nurture organizational autonomy and credibility fundamental to uphold regional commitments. Hence a multifaceted capability enhancement strategy across tools, technology and governance paradigms is indispensable to cement AfCFTA success.

Best Practices and Lessons Learned

Best Practices and Lessons Learned Examining global best practices around trade cooperation provide crucial insights to guide public administration reforms in Africa. For instance, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) (Ishikawa, K., 2021) has achieved significant regional integration and trading activity through substantial investments in customs management, harmonization of standards and tax reforms (UNCTAD, 2017). As AfCFTA member states develop requisite frameworks and institutions, adapting relevant lessons from ASEAN can spur intra-regional trade. Equally important are best practices around e-government, automation and staff capability building from countries like Mauritius and South Africa that can serve as models to bolster Africa's public administration capacity (Chintamanee, 2018),

The digitization efforts within Estonia's governance systems demonstrates potential efficiency gains and transparency from e-solutions while Uruguay's one-stop digital portal better aligns public services to user needs (Eaves, et al 2019). Replicating such models can significantly enhance Africa's institutional capacity.

Likewise, the extensive customs administration reforms spearheaded by Peru including risk-based inspection protocols, automated processing and anti-corruption controls hold valuable lessons for modernizing Africa's border agencies (Thibedeau, 2019). Within Africa, Rwanda provides a notable example of public sector capability

building through its dedicated training colleges, competitive compensation, and performance-based progression policies (AU, 2020). Mainstreaming such incentives and professionalization principles can boost productivity and retain top talent within the civil service.

The Pacific Alliance between Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and Peru demonstrates the value of facilitating regular input from business associations, labour unions, academia, and NGOs into the regional integration policymaking processes through structured forums and consultations. Formalizing such multi-stakeholder collaboration channels bolsters the equity focus within Africa's integration initiatives (Mia, I, 2021).

The participation agreements within Canada's labour mobility arrangements provide provinces, territories, and other regulatory bodies an operational framework to recognize occupational credentials, licenses and qualifications awarded in other jurisdictions, easing labour movement across provinces. Creating such structured approaches for subnational public agencies to implement regional free movement protocols enables localization of integration policies across Africa's

local governance landscape (GAC, 2019).

The European Union's extensive institutional ecosystem points to the merit of independent authorities like the court of auditors which reviews revenue and spending linked to EU programs and budgets and the anti-fraud watchdog which probes public procurement issues and corruption (Bach, T., & Ruffing, E. (2018). Establishing credible regional oversight mechanisms strengthens transparency in the use of resources for Africa's integration programs and bolsters accountability across associated public agencies (Busuioc, M. (2012)

As Pelkmans (2016) notes, the successes of ASEAN economic integration also carry important lessons around the necessity of regional industrial policy coordination, private sector engagement and impact mitigation mechanisms for vulnerable industries and communities. Adapting these diverse global best practices to localized contexts can accelerate Africa's public administration reforms.

Policy Recommendations

In acknowledging that reforms may progress gradually amid political realities, small early wins can seed further change (Fukuyama, 2013).

And with supportive regional coordination, domestic reforms may stimulate healthy competition through demonstration effects across borders (Armah et al., 2014). To effectively transform public administration into a diligent facilitator for the success of the AfCFTA, several key policy measures and strategic investments are crucial. First, the establishment of a merit-based bureaucracy is essential to drive efficiency gains and combat corruption, ensuring that public service appointments and promotions are based on competence and performance rather than nepotism or patronage. Additionally, there is a pressing need to incentivize the recruitment and retention of skilled trade experts within key government agencies to navigate the complexities of international trade agreements and protocols.

Streamlining cumbersome administrative processes is another vital step, which can be achieved through the wider adoption of e-governance. This digital transformation can significantly reduce bureaucratic hurdles, making public services more accessible and efficient. Moreover, enhancing the capacity of border, customs, and standards organizations is imperative. This can be accomplished by deploying advanced infrastructure and technology, which will facilitate smoother trade flows and compliance with trade standards.

Introducing competitive public sector compensation schemes that are on par with the private sector is crucial to retain top talent within the public service. Such schemes will make public sector positions more attractive to highly skilled professionals, thereby improving the quality of public administration. Lastly, fostering collaboration between revenue bodies across member states is essential to prevent fiscal losses and ensure that the benefits of increased trade are equitably distributed. Implementing these policy recommendations requires a concerted effort from all stakeholders involved in public administration and trade. By focusing on these strategic areas, public administration can become a powerful enabler of AfCFTA's objectives, driving economic growth and integration across the continent.

Conclusion

The AfCFTA ambitions to lift millions out of poverty can only materialize if institutional mechanics across member states evolve to

actively facilitate rather than hamper integration efforts. As the foundational pillars of implementation, public administration systems have the responsibility to carry the AfCFTA through temporary disruptions and obstacles towards delivering shared and sustainable prosperity. The operationalization of the AfCTA holds profound promise to transform economic fortunes across Africa by enabling closer integration, expanded intra-regional trade and strategic industrialization. Yet the complexity of challenges from contrasting governance models to infrastructure deficits across states necessitates efficient public administration machinery to actualize its potential.

In undertaking key capability enhancements across specialized skills, e-governance platforms and performance management while learning from global best practices, African institutions can positively surprise skeptics. With committed leadership, evidence-based reforms and multi-stakeholder collaboration, public agencies shouldered with critical AfCFTA mandates can systematically strengthen operations to facilitate integration processes. Consequently, public administration has the profound responsibility to shepherd AfCFTA processes through present hurdles towards robust integrated markets that tangibly improve livelihoods. With engaged leadership committed to capability building, the public sector can emerge as an indispensable facilitator in connecting Africa's abundant resources and talents to shared prosperity.

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Exploring Governance Capabilities of African leaders in Strengthening Public Institutions for Inclusivity in achieving the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and Africa Agenda 2063 given the COVID-19 experience.

Ukertor Gabriel Moti

Abstract

African leaders appear to be very much aware of the difficulties of change. This acknowledgment is shown in their reception of " Africa We Want the Agenda 2063" at the 50th Anniversary of the African Union (AU) in May 2013. Agenda 2063 sets out Africa's long-term development vision of "an integrated, prosperous, and peaceful Africa, driven by its citizens and representing a dynamic force in the international arena". African states are dedicated to executing public and local advancement programs that are pointed toward accomplishing the SDGs by 2030. Social and economic transformation in Africa requires radical change and strong, resilient, effective, and adaptive public institutions (inclusive institutions that recognize diversity-people living with disabilities and other vulnerable segments of the society). That is why Agenda 2063 perceives that the basic job in Africa's change initiative should be visionary and transformative leadership, which supports ability, makes space for individual articulation, and propels and draws out the most incredible in all individuals. They feature the significance of institutions for progress preparation and attitude change in activating the effective execution of Agenda 2063. Full and equal participation of persons with disabilities in all spheres of society can only be possible by intentionally creating enabling environments for them. Historical evidence shows that effective change has happened for the most part in nations that were governed over extensive stretches by a proficient, trustworthy, and serious government under a solid political initiative that is gifted in contriving and propelling development initiatives, activating and rousing individuals to make the vital sacrifices through functional public institutions. This type of transformative public administration requires creating and influentially imparting a plan for long-haul achievement, cultivating steady foundations, and setting out momentary open doors as

extra motivation. Additionally, transformative leadership should move and activate the populace, send and engage the best specialised capacities to execute and facilitate the change programme, and develop important political partnerships and institutions to guarantee sustainability. Transformative leadership nurtures the institutions and processes that enable the country to take advantage of whatever windows of opportunity are open, building on favourable conditions in the external environment and finding ways to weather and rise above "bad" conditions. However, Africa Capability Index (ACI) 2019 shows that only 10 or 21.7 percent of African countries have High capacity. 31 or 67.4 percent have Medium capacity while 5 or 10.9 percent have Low capacity. This possess a challenge to strengthening institutions inclusive enough to achieve the SDGs and Africa Agenda 2063. The paper explores the governance capabilities of African leaders in strengthening public institutions for achieving the SDGs and Africa Agenda 2063 and suggests strategies to build the leadership capability of African leaders for institutional enhancement and sustainable development. This becomes more pertinent for public sector managers and administrators are given the challenges African countries faced with their institutions in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic and the apparent neglect of the vulnerable in society. The paper will be based on content analysis and quantitative secondary data. High Capacity

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Introduction

African leaders are desirous of and have acknowledged the imperative for a new Africa as shown in their reception of "The Africa We Want: The Agenda 2063" at the 50th Anniversary of the African Union (AU) in May 2013. Agenda 2063 sets out Africa's long-term development vision of "an integrated, prosperous, and peaceful Africa, driven by its citizens and representing a dynamic force in the international arena". Aspiration 3 of the Agenda is on: An Africa of good governance, democracy, respect for human rights, justice, and rule of law (AU, 2013).

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Specifically, goal 2 of the aspiration targets capable institutions and transformed leadership at all levels and emphasizes building strong institutions for a development state African states are equally dedicated to executing public and local advancement programmes that are pointed toward accomplishing the SDGs by 2030. Sustainable Development Goal 16 recognizes the place of institutions in the accomplishment of the Goals.

Studies have established a strong link between the quality of Africa's political institutions and the poor state of governance and socio-economic development on the continent (Osman et al., 2011; Alence, 2004). This is hardly surprising given that, theoretically, institutions understood as systems of established and prevalent rules and norms that structure social interactions are fundamental to the organization of human life in all its dimensions. Institutions, structure behaviour and promote social order and trust, which in turn facilitate cooperation for social and economic progress and inclusion.

Indeed, strong and inclusive institutions are the cornerstone of stable governments. Agenda 2063 seeks to: Harness the continental endowments embodied in its people, history, cultures, and natural resources as, a geo-political position to effect equitable and people-

and facilitating the emergence of development-oriented and visionary leadership in all spheres and at all levels.

centered growth and development; Build on and accelerate the implementation of continental frameworks, and other similar initiatives. This can hardly be plausible without strong institutions that are also inclusive as to 'leave no one behind. This explains why both Agenda 2063 and 2030 emphasize **Capable institutions and transformative leadership.**

African countries have a large vulnerable population consisting of children (children affected by AIDS, orphans, children affected by violence and exploitation, street children, and out-of-school children), women and youths; elderly people (including pensioners and people living with disabilities) whose conditions were exacerbated during the COVID-19 pandemic. These vulnerable groups need to be included in decision-making and thus institutions must recognize and attend to their needs.

The African Development Bank has noted emphatically that no matter the number of financial resources mobilized for Africa's development, such funds would yield only limited or modest results if countries do not have the human, organizational and institutional capacity to absorb and effectively utilize them (AfDB, 2010).

This calls for serious attention to institutional capacity for inclusive development in Africa post-COVID-19. Institutions shape the rules of the game. Until Africa builds and maintains its institutions to shape its development, it will continue to lack the capacity and agency to participate effectively in the global economy.

The COVID-19 pandemic has further sharpened the focus on the need for institutional strengthening capacity building at national and regional scales to complement global capacity and development assistance in Africa. Institutions provide the incentives that are key to economic actors by influencing the organization of production and investments in technology and physical and human capital which can transform society.

However, Africa Capability Index (ACI) 2019 shows that only 10 or 21.7 percent of African countries have High capacity. 31 or 67.4 percent have Medium capacity while 5 or 10.9 percent have Low capacity. This poses a challenge to strengthening institutions inclusive enough to achieve the SDGs and Africa Agenda 2063. The questions that arise are: can African countries strengthen their institutions not only to focus on their developmental objectives but inclusive enough not to leave the vulnerable population behind? What are the militating factors against strengthening institutions in Africa? What strategies can be adopted to overcome such constraints and how can institutions be inclusive so as not to leave out the vulnerable population?

Objectives and Method
The objective of the paper is an attempt to provide answers to the above by exploring the governance capabilities of African leaders in strengthening public institutions for achieving the SDGs and Africa Agenda 2063 and suggest strategies to build the leadership capability of African leaders for institutional enhancement and sustainable development. This becomes more pertinent for public sector managers and administrators are given the challenges African countries faced with their institutions in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic and the apparent neglect of the vulnerable in society. The paper is based on content analysis and qualitative secondary data.

Defining Institutions
To identify the relevant institutions, one must first ask exactly what is meant by "institutions." North (1990) defines institutions as constraints on behaviour imposed by "the rules of the game" in society: "Institutions include any form of constraint that human beings devise to shape human interaction." This definition includes formal and informal

institutions. It is a very broad definition in that it includes particular social norms and all other constraints imposed by a society's system of beliefs and values. In that regard, from North's perspective, it does not make sense to distinguish between "institutions" on the one hand and "culture" on the other as fundamentally different causal mechanisms to explain growth and development; both are institutional causes, simply different ones.

There is a general misrepresentation of what institutions mean in the context of development, however, Ostrom (1990) defines institutions as rules, norms, or strategies that people derive to coordinate or cooperate more successfully in collective endeavours. In some circles, institutions are the "rules of the game", especially related to political structures. With this definition in mind, it is clear that weak strategies, rules, and expectations will lead to weak laws, policies, and interventions.

Institutions can further be understood as "a relatively stable collection of rules and practices, embedded in structures of resources that make action possible" (March and Olsen, 1989). Scott (2014) suggested that institutions comprise regulations, normative, and cultural-cognitive elements that together with associated activities and resources, provide stability and meaning to social life. Regulative refers in this case to rules and sanctioning activities that are formal and explicit; normative elements include values and norms; and cognitive aspects are those elements and conceptualizations through which identities and meanings are constantly interpreted and re-interpreted (Thornton et al., 2012; Scott, 2014).

As systems of established rules and norms that structure social interactions, institutions are central to addressing the sort of collective action problems that are implied in efforts toward economic development and social progress. Institutions structure behaviour and promote social order and trust, which in turn facilitate cooperation for social and economic progress. The exceptionally diverse character of most African states makes the development of viable institutions all the more important. Institutions in this context become very critical for managing and harnessing this rich diversity in the interest of social progress.

Institutions help ensure the equitable distribution of resources, the enforcement of laws, and the growth of the economy. Poor decision-making, lack of strategy, and unwillingness will result in the opposite effect: Economic decline. Institutions are important, and countries with strong and well-set laws are most likely to prosper than those that don't.

It is argued that well-functioning institutions can promote growth and reduce poverty in Africa by providing a conducive environment for implementation and sustainable development programmes (Kumssa and Mbeche, 2004). Therefore, African countries should endeavour to establish effective, responsive, inclusive, and democratic institutions that will promote accountable and transparent governance and sustainable socioeconomic development.

Classifying Institutions

Two approaches are useful for classifying Institutions. These are the functional approach and the macrosystemic approach (Roland, 2000). The functional approach defines institutions by the needs of efficient contracting and investing: we need property rights to write contracts, bankruptcy laws and courts to enforce the contracts, financial market institutions to secure investment, governments to provide public goods and infrastructure, and so forth. Under the functional approach, a specific institution corresponds to each need. This is a straightforward and natural way to think about institutions. The functional approach, however, is not without its problems. First of all, it is not straightforward to derive specific existing institutions from the needs they are called upon to fulfill. This approach does not explain adequately the choice between different institutional arrangements that fulfill the same function, or why some countries end up with inefficient institutions. A second problem is that it is difficult to say something about systems of institutions other than as an average of individual institutions satisfying particular needs. The functional approach does not tell us how institutions interact. In Africa, the approach has been applied with the implication of creating institutions with conflicting and overlapping functions and jurisdictions leading to no performance at times.

A macrosystemic approach for classifying institutions starts from a descriptive list of different institutions, going from general (political, legal, social) to specific categories; political institutions include, for example, regime type, electoral rule, rules affecting legislative bargaining, and the degree of federalism. This approach helps us to understand the effects of particular institutions and to perform a comparative institutional analysis, one of the main goals of the research agenda of institutional economics. Indeed, institutional description allows us to define an extensive-form game that is not arbitrarily given but that follows the description of the institution. Replacing one institution with another can in some cases dangerously disrupt this systemic consistency. Piecemeal institutional change in some directions is made impossible when there are strong

complementarities among institutions. These strong institutional complementarities have figured prominently in debates about the optimal institutional reform strategy.

The existence of complementarities among institutions suggests that analysts should examine systems of institutions and that countries can be classified accordingly. A distinction made by Evans (1989) and picked up by Acemoglu (2002) is that between "predatory" and "developmental" institutions. Predatory institutions allow the minority in power (usually, although not necessarily, under a dictatorship) to use its power to prey upon economic agents, thereby reducing the latter's incentive to invest and produce. Developmental institutions, by contrast, encourage development and growth by providing a "helping hand" to private agents, providing public goods like education, infrastructure, and incentives to invest. This distinction between predatory and developmental institutions is certainly the most important classification.

Identifying the precise mechanisms leading to predatory and developmental institutions is important from a policy perspective. Are predatory institutions essentially the product of multiple regulations put in place by corrupt bureaucrats to extract bribes? Are they the result of the inadequate separation of power within the government and the bureaucracy? Or are they related to differences in the culture, education, and quality of bureaucrats? Different answers to these questions lead to quite different policy conclusions, reinforcing the need for a better understanding of institutional systems.

The state of Institutions in Africa
While the rest of the world is celebrating massive progress toward alleviating poverty, Sub-Saharan Africa remains at the bottom of the list, with some parts experiencing ever-increasing rates of poverty. The World Bank predicts that by 2030, the percentage of poor people living in Sub-Saharan Africa could be as large as 87 percent, should poverty levels continue to rise at the current rate (World Bank Group, 2018).

Why is it that today, when most parts of the world like South Asia are making so much progress and transforming their economies, sub-Saharan Africa continues to lag? One recurring theme has been that of weak institutions. Of course, colonial heritage, climate change impacts, unequal trade, and other factors all contribute to widening inequality in African countries, however, the existence and persistence of weak institutions in Africa are more of design than destiny. That is, weak institutions are created and sustained more by bad political institutions rather than cultural diversity and geographical factors.

Weak institutions have been a curse to the continent, particularly because

it has resulted in the lack of political will by governments to address and provide the fundamentals to its people like potable water, housing, economic opportunities, and healthcare. And also, the lack of accountability by the people who are at the receiving end of bad governance. The lack of regional cohesion or cooperation such as trade restrictions and movements, lack of investment and production within the continent, and the normalization of corruption has led to the downfall of most African Markets.

Additionally, in weakened institutions like those in Sub-Saharan Africa, public officials have been at the forefront of self-interest for several reasons: first, to maintain political power; second, to loot public funds for personal gains; and third, to create monopolies with their close allies. This has resulted in political reforms or policies that have left economies worse off than it was before. The perpetual cycle of poverty thus continues to grow because of this inherent conflict of interest by those in power and aggravating the condition of the vulnerable.

To achieve Agenda 2063 and the SDGs to end poverty, it is imperative that Africa transforms its governance systems, rewires its attitude toward public service, and encourages community participation in governance to promote accountability. A separation of economic decision-making and the

justice system from self-indulgent political powers could do a lot of good. Convicting and shaming corrupt government officials in courts of law and public opinion would remind the stewards of these nations that with every action, there is a repercussion.

There is no doubt that since independence, most African states have struggled to develop effective institutions that are responsive to the governance and development needs of their respective societies. This challenge is reflected not only in the prevalence of social and political strife in many African countries but also in the poor socio-economic performance of the continent as a whole. The same could be said of the slow progress towards greater regional and continental integration, which, to a large extent is symptomatic of a weak institutional culture across the continent.

In many African countries, the basic institutions that are supposed to structure and regulate socio-political and economic activities are generally weak or, in some instances, in a dysfunctional state (Nganje, 2015). However, there is no gainsaying that the wave of political liberalisation that swept across the continent in the 1990s, and the corresponding demand for governance reforms, created conditions for the emergence of relatively functional institutions in several African countries.

As the continent ushered in the new millennium, there was equally a bold effort under the guidance of

visionary African leaders such as the former South African president, Thabo Mbeki, to revitalise and strengthen the institutional framework for regional and continental cooperation. However, while there are indeed pockets of institutional effectiveness across the continent, the quality and performance of most of Africa's domestic, regional and continental institutions today leave much to be desired.

At the heart of this institutional weakness is the enduring tension between formal institutional frameworks on the one hand and pervasive informal rules and norms on the other hand. As a function of its weak capacity and legitimacy, the post-colonial African state resorted to internalizing neo-patrimonialism as its dominant institutional logic (Moti, 2019). Neo-patrimonialism combines rational-legal authority and patrimonial rule to produce a system of governance that is characterized by patronage, clientelism, and a significant blurring of the line between the public and private sectors.

As the governance experiences in countries such as Zimbabwe and Cameroon reveal, neo-patrimonial policies have become the preferred political strategy used by the ruling elite to secure support for the state by entering into informal alliances with dominant social forces, albeit at the expense of formal state institutions, which are turned into resources to maintain extensive clientelistic networks (Nganje, 2015).

According to Nganje (2015), the preoccupation of African leaders with holding onto a state structure that has limited capacity and legitimacy also largely accounts for the weakness of regional and continental institutions. Against this backdrop, the profession of new norms and values, and the design of new pan-African institutions such as the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM), has had to contend with an enduring inter-state politics of elite solidarity, which strives on the logic of preserving and perfecting colonial-era designs in the interest of consolidating the power and privileges of the ruling elite.

Across Africa, the institutional pattern associated with neo-patrimonial politics has in varying degrees been reproduced and reinforced by the deteriorating state capacity in many African countries, which, among other things, works against the effective implementation and enforcement of official rules. What is more, in many African countries where the private sector remains largely underdeveloped and there are few economic opportunities outside of the public sector, state institutions have often been abused and misused for personal wealth accumulation. Such institutional subversion has found fertile ground in African societies with a dearth of ethical political leadership and a disillusioned citizenry that is largely

disengaged from the political process (Nganje, 2015).

Inclusive Institutions and Social Inclusion

Development nowadays has two important features: first is sustainability, measured as durability, and the second is inclusiveness, measured as pro-poor growth. Kakwani and Pernia (2000) define inclusive growth as pro-poor growth, which enables the poor and vulnerable to share the benefits of growth based on the inclusion and sharing of the positive impact of economic and social development. Pro-poor development enables the poor to actively participate in and significantly benefit from economic activity. Inclusive institutions are pillars of sustainable development. Social inclusion is the process of improving the terms on which individuals and groups take part in society-improving the ability, opportunity, and dignity of those disadvantaged based on their identity. Furthermore, inclusive institutions bestow equal rights and entitlements and enable equal opportunities, voice, and access to resources and services for women, youths, and people living with disabilities (Das and Espinoza, 2020). They are typically based on principles of universality, non-discrimination, or targeted action. Targeted action is needed where some people and groups are particularly disadvantaged, and therefore require differential treatment to achieve the equivalent outcomes

On the other hand, exclusive institutions withhold rights and entitlements and undermine equal opportunities, voice, and access to resources and services. They enable or reinforce discriminatory behaviour towards groups or whole sections of society. People and groups commonly discriminated against are women, people with disabilities, religious minorities, certain castes, ethnic minorities, and recent migrants. Some institutions are inclusive in some respects but exclusive in others – for example, political settlements that ensure elites from all groups benefit, but that non-elites are disadvantaged. Other institutions act to disadvantage whole sections of society, such as rules on political transparency, or norms of paying bribes.

Social Inclusion Framework

Social inclusion is multidimensional: it encompasses social, political, cultural, and economic dimensions, and operates at various social levels. The most relevant aspects can be clustered under three interrelated domains: markets, services, and spaces (World Bank, 2013). The three domains represent both barriers to and opportunities for inclusion. It is also relational: it is the product of unequal power

relations in social interactions. Finally, social inclusion is dynamic, it impacts people in various ways and to differing degrees over time and critically depends on and influences people's ability, opportunity, and dignity which are unequally distributed among social groups.

In articulating social inclusion, the Social Inclusion Framework emphasise disadvantage based on social identity. Although such emphasis can be politically sensitive, acknowledging that disadvantage often is based on social identity is important to advance social inclusion. Markers of social identity can be derived from gender, age, disability, ethnicity, religion, or citizenship status, among others. Nevertheless, no single identity describes an individual. The intersection of identities bestows the real advantage or disadvantage. In answer to the question, "Inclusion in what?" the World Bank (2013) answers: in markets, services, and spaces. Markets comprise land, housing, labour, and credit. Services comprise, among others, education, health, transport, water, social protection, electricity, information, communication, and technology.

The notion of space encompasses both physical space and space in a broader sense: social, political, and cultural spaces all solidify exclusion or foster inclusion. Moreover, social inclusion enhances the ability, opportunity, and dignity of individuals and groups to take part in society. The importance of ability and opportunity long has been recognised by development economists. However, the social inclusion perspective draws particular attention to the idea of dignity, which, when compromised, can have severe and unexpected consequences for individuals and groups and society, and the economy as a whole.

Source: World Bank 2013.

In almost every African country, some groups confront barriers that prevent them from fully participating in political, economic, and social life. These groups may be excluded not only through legal systems, land, and labour markets, but also discriminatory or stigmatising attitudes, beliefs, or perceptions. The disadvantage is often based on gender, age, location, occupation, race, ethnicity, religion, citizenship status, and disability, among other factors. This kind of social exclusion robs individuals of dignity, security, and the opportunity to lead a better life.

Unless the root causes of structural exclusion and discrimination are addressed, it will be challenging to support sustainable inclusive growth and rapid poverty reduction.

COVID-19 Pandemic, Institutions, and Inclusion

The COVID-19 pandemic put the spotlight on deep-rooted systemic inequalities. As COVID-19 continues to have wide-reaching impacts across the globe, it is important to understand the differentiated and intensified impact the pandemic has on the most marginalised, including women, persons with

disabilities, unemployed youth, and the elderly. For example, many persons with disabilities have underlying health conditions that made them particularly vulnerable to severe symptoms of COVID-19.

The World Bank (2020) noted that women and children had been affected by increasing rates of domestic violence as a result of lockdowns and increased stress on households, which were difficult to tackle because of weak or non-existent institutional provisions. In some contexts, groups who have historically faced barriers to accessing health systems due to some forms of discrimination had higher mortality rates than other groups and experienced difficulty accessing information about the pandemic, access to equitable care, and access to vaccines.

There had been widespread school closures across Africa in response to the pandemic. This brought to the fore a lack of access to technology considered to be the biggest barrier to learning during the pandemic together with school closures. Many African higher education institutions were not prepared to move to teach online and closing their campuses meant they had to suspend teaching. Fortunately, most institutions have started developing digital or self-study solutions.

The COVID-19 pandemic crisis has to be seen as an opportunity for Africa to focus on the rebuilding and strengthening of more inclusive systems that allow society as a whole

to be more resilient to future shocks, whether health, climate, natural disasters, or social unrest.

Africa's attempt at Growth

Despite challenges, over the past few decades, Africa has seen extraordinary progress. In fact, in some areas, the progress in Africa is faster than it is in any other region, and sometimes faster than we have historically seen anywhere in the world. However, the trends are highly heterogeneous across and within countries. Although they hold the promise of greater heights, they also create new challenges for social inclusion.

Africa has the fastest population growth in the world, but fertility is falling in almost every country. Half of the population is under 25 years of age; by 2050, the continent will have 362 million young people who are between 15 and 24 years of age (World Bank 2014). Simultaneously, many African countries will see an aging population: by 2050, Africa's over-60 population is expected to more than triple, from 69 million in 2017 to 226 million (UN DESA Population Division, 2017a). Although youth inclusion is the immediate challenge facing the continent, the inclusion of older cohorts of Africans will soon be a part of the picture. Nevertheless, today Africa's growing young population has the potential to dramatically drive development and

further reduce poverty if the right social inclusion policies and opportunities are in place.

Approximately 15 percent of the world's population has disabilities (UN DESA Population Division, 2017a). Africans are no exception. Yet, intervening on behalf of persons with disabilities requires a nuanced understanding of disability and of how type and intensity of disability, gender, place in the life cycle, location, ethnicity, gender identity, marital status, socioeconomic status, and other factors intersect to convey disadvantage or advantage. The disability rights movement in Africa arguably is one of the most dynamic contemporary social movements on the continent. Using the axiom, "Nothing for us without us," the movement has influenced budget allocations and research priorities, raised awareness, and helped reduce the widespread stigma against persons with disabilities (Mitra, 2018). The advocacy movement for albinism also is unfolding before our eyes.

The importance of data and analysis has benefited from advocacy and, in turn, strengthens the hand of advocacy movements. The availability of data in some African countries has enabled an empirical focus on the poorer outcomes for persons who have disabilities. Several studies show that persons with disabilities are more likely to be

self-employed in agriculture and less likely to be employees (Hoogeveen, 2005; Mitra, 2018). There also are variations in employment outcomes across different types and intensities of disability. In a study using data from Ethiopia, Malawi, Tanzania, and Uganda, Mitra (2018) found the largest gaps in Tanzania. There, 53 percent of persons with severe functional difficulties are employed, compared to 85 percent of persons with no functional difficulty. Poverty outcomes are similarly nuanced, while persons with functional difficulties are a disproportionately large share of the poor, not all persons with functional difficulties are poor (Mitra 2018).

How Does Social Exclusion Play Out in Africa?

Fundamentally, social exclusion is about power relationships. The world over, societies devise intricate ways to solidify social structures and uphold the status quo. Attitudes, beliefs, perceptions, and practices, including superstitions, stigmas, and rituals, are among the processes through which societies assign some groups to subordinate, and others to dominant, status. Structures and systems comprise, among others, families, communities, legal systems, labour, land, markets, and knowledge systems. It is also important to note that structures and processes reinforce one another and

are solidified by formal and informal institutions. Across the world, belief systems, superstitions, stigmas, and other practices bar the inclusion of specific groups. Intimidation and harassment instill fear that prevents some groups from reaching their full potential and "keeps them in their place."

According to Das and Espinoza (2020), social norms may assign males and females to particular occupations or may render some practices (or bodily functions) "unclean." Other practices such as stigma and shunning may render invisible groups such as persons with disabilities or persons with albinism. Relatedly, some cultures may hide persons with disabilities. This lack of visibility can have several consequences, including not counting these groups in official statistics. Thus, they remain hidden and unattended at both the familial and the national levels. Often, these exclusionary practices are sanctified by religion or by those who interpret religious texts. In many cultures, persons who have a nonconforming sexual identity are excluded to the point of being criminalised. Excluding and criminalising them often is upheld by invoking religious texts.

Taboos surrounding menstruating women are common in many parts of the world; beliefs about purity and pollution exclude certain groups at certain times or at all times. Overall, these practices are mechanisms to enforce social order and control. Why do processes and practices matter for policies and programmes? They matter because they affect the actions and behaviours of dominant and subordinate groups, service providers, and of the state itself. For their part, groups who have historically been excluded may respond in different ways. One possibility is that they "opt out" or reject the terms on which they are included. Excluded groups may drop out of school or the labour market or disengage from political processes (Das and Espinoza, 2020).

A second, related possibility is that grievances may accumulate, creating social tensions and having long-term effects on the economy and society. A third possibility is that groups who feel excluded organise themselves into formidable lobbies and use the political space to demand change. Processes and structures have strong effects on the feelings and perceptions of individuals and groups. In our quest to leave no one behind, attain universal access, and eradicate extreme poverty, we need to be cognizant of behaviour, which is the first step to lasting change. Yet, even as we know that belief systems, feelings, and perceptions affect behaviours, measuring and interpreting such systems and the underlying affective foundations is a

complex undertaking that requires a deep understanding of the context as well as robust data and analytic tools (Das and Espinoza, 2020).

Violence is one of the gravest manifestations of exclusion and a mechanism to show subordinate groups "their place." Physical offensives often are justified by an intricate set of beliefs and taboos that serve to create a "logic of exclusion," which may be sanctified by religion or culture. For example, many religions regard a woman's place as being in the home and may implicitly condone violence against women who dare to transgress this norm. Overall, the acceptance of domestic violence against women remains high in Africa, although acceptance has decreased over time. Beegle et al (2016) find that, between 2000-2006 and 2007-2013, acceptance of domestic violence by women in Africa declined by almost 10 percentage points. Nevertheless, at 30 percent, acceptance of domestic violence in the continent is still exceptionally high.

There is considerable heterogeneity across countries, however. Some practices, such as female genital mutilation (FGM), which hold cultural value for some groups, also are examples of violence and extreme symbols of exclusion and have devastating effects on health, education, and life chances. FGM can have direct effects on reproductive and mental health and cause infectious diseases. Sanctified and upheld by religion and culture, FGM serves to solidify the subordinate status of women and girls (Beegle et al (2016).

Economic empowerment for women, youth, and people living with disabilities is the process of achieving equal access to and control over economic resources and ensuring they can use them to exert increased control over other areas of their lives (Taylor and Pereznieto, 2014), and this can be enabled by inclusive institutions. This is because there are both direct and underlying factors that can enable or constrain the economic empowerment of the vulnerable as shown below in table I

Table 1: Factors that enable or constrain economic empowerment of the vulnerable

Direct factors	Education, skills development, and training
	Access to quality decently paid work
	Address unpaid care and work burdens
	Access to property, assets, and financial services
	Collective action and leadership
	Social protection
Underlying factors	Labour market characteristics
	Fiscal policy
	Legal, regulatory and policy framework
	Gender norms and discriminatory social norms

Source: *Hunt and Samman (2016), Women's Economic Empowerment: Navigating Enablers and Constraints, Overseas Development Institute,*

African leaders, therefore, need to deliberately not only invest in the economic empowerment of the vulnerable but create and strengthen institutions that will in conjunction with civil society and other intervention agencies stand to create a more empowering environment for women, youth, and people living with disabilities. This policy inclusivity has been a challenge.

Case studies of attempts and challenges in developing Inclusive Policies in Africa.

Inclusivity must focus on pro-poor policies and institutions that drive them. An analysis of some selected African policy documents as shown below reveal a lack of serious attention to inclusion.

1. Ethiopia's Growth and Transformation Plan 2 2015/16–2019/20 mentions inclusive development once without defining it but does focus on inclusive growth and how it translates into human development outcomes. Inequality is also underlined, in both its income and non-income dimensions, with an emphasis on gender, religion, and nationality (the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, 2015).

2. Policymakers in Kenya work within the Vision 2030 framework. Neither inclusive development nor inclusive growth is mentioned in this framework, although all

dimensions are covered in the three pillars (economic and macro, social, and political). Inequality in income dimensions is the least prominent. The political goal is to: be a state in which equality is entrenched, irrespective of one's race, ethnicity, religion, gender, or socioeconomic status; a nation that not only respects but also harnesses the diversity of its people's values, traditions, and aspirations for the benefit of all. (the Republic of Kenya, 2006).

3. Ghana developed the National Shared Growth and Development Agenda 2, 2014–2017. Neither inclusive development nor inclusive growth is mentioned in this plan, although the words 'shared growth' signifies a focus on equality. This document follows the main rationale that growth has not created sufficient jobs and decent work; the target is to ensure "that the dividends of growth benefit all Ghanaians, irrespective of gender, location, socio-economic and physical status" (Republic of Ghana, 2014). Human development indicators are also mentioned. Growing inequality in socioeconomic and spatial

development is mentioned as a key national development issue.

4. In 2009, Nigeria developed the Nigeria vision 20:2020. It uses the key concept 'sustainable growth', meaning "optimising human and natural resources to achieve rapid economic growth and translating that growth into equitable social development for all citizens" (the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 2009), in which both income and non-income dimensions are covered. Inequality is limited to income dimensions, which are expected to facilitate the improvement of human development indicators.

5. In Rwanda, Vision 2020 (latest revision 2012) mentions 'inclusive' primarily in the context of identity. The framework does mention equity and equality in opportunity as one of the main missions of the state but does not explicitly focus policies on marginalized groups, except a focus on gender equality. The main targets focus on averages, reducing poverty, increasing life expectancy, and increasing average per capita income to become a middle-income country by 2020 (the Republic of Rwanda, 2012).

6. Similarly, Uganda's Second National Development Plan

2015/16–2019/20, underlines the goal of becoming a middle-income country by 2020. The plan has the theme 'Strengthening Uganda's competitiveness for sustainable wealth creation, employment, and inclusive growth. Economic growth and distribution through employment are underlined, and inequality is mainly related to gender and age (the Republic of Uganda, 2015).

These are attempts at inclusivity at the national level, however, less explicit on women, youth, and people living with disabilities.

Can Social Inclusion Be Achieved in Africa?

If it is a conscious choice for societies, social inclusion can be achieved. It is important because exclusion impedes the ability, opportunity, and dignity of some individuals and groups and is costly to societies and economies. Nevertheless, measuring the costs of social exclusion is no mean undertaking. When assessing the cost of exclusion, some estimates focus on specific groups. These groups include women, persons with disabilities, ethnic or racial groups, and migrants. Costs can be surmised at the level of the individual, the household, the group, or the community. Costs also may be estimated at local, subnational, and national levels.

The costs of social exclusion may be direct or indirect, short-term or long-term. The cumulative long-term costs can be significant and can affect the growth trajectories of entire economies. For example, lower earnings or employment outcomes at the individual level may be driven by lower human capital endowments, which in turn may be caused by a prior disadvantage in education or by discrimination in hiring or in the workplace (Buckup 2009; Lamichhane and Sawada 2013; Morgon and Polack 2015). The experience of exclusion can have physical and mental health costs at the individual, household, group, and, ultimately, national level.

Finally, foregone benefits also can be costly. Hunt et al (2015) and Hunt et al (2018) find that companies in the top quartile for gender, racial, and ethnic diversity are 15 percent to 35 percent more likely to have financial returns above national industry medians. Gains from the inclusion of excluded groups occur not only from adding workers to the labour force; diversity itself may increase productivity (Ostry et al, 2018). Ultimately, social inclusion must be a conscious choice of societies and

governments, made with a clear understanding of the costs and benefits. Investing in an inclusive society is not free and needs concerted action to transform the investment into a win-win. Social programmes, for instance, can be expensive and impact fiscal sustainability. Governments often need to make trade-offs, either by cutting costs on other initiatives or by raising taxes.

There may be political costs as well because initiatives that focus on historically excluded groups can upset power relations. Governments and politicians need to craft clear social contracts with citizens to ensure support for social inclusion. There are examples the world over of citizens willing to pay for a more inclusive society. The most powerful form of support is through the fiscal realm, whereby citizens pay taxes that they know will fund policies and programmes for greater social inclusion. For instance, in Brazil, Mexico, and Nepal, there is strong support for social protection programmes just as in Bangladesh, where poverty reduction is recognised as a national priority, with the elite supporting antipoverty initiatives (Hossain and Moore 2002). Tentative evidence from Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, and Uganda shows that attitudes toward redistribution may be favourable overall (Langer et al, 2016). African countries have made several previous attempts at institutional strengthening and initiated broad-based inclusive transformational programmes that require building-in redistributive mechanisms in the economic system. Cash transfers and social protection are commonly highlighted as effective policy instruments, not only to cushion vulnerability and promote resilience and inclusivity but also to enable productive and social investments by recipient households as well as the pullovers in the local economy. The sustainability of these initiatives has frequently been a challenge.

At the continental level for instance the AU Heads of State and Governments adopted the Solemn Declaration on Gender Equality in Africa (SDGEA) and have set up a Fund for African Women whose five main goals are to:

- Mobilise financial resources to support development programmes and projects for women.
- Support women's initiatives to fight poverty, close the gender gap, and halt the marginalisation of women.
- Share experiences and best practices on economic, political,

and social empowerment of women.

- Facilitate the dissemination of information on activities led by African women.
- Strengthen the capacities of Africans in leadership, management, and entrepreneurship (AU, 2020).

Summary of the main Issues

A summary of the main issues discussed so far indicates the following:

1. Africa has seen significant progress towards social inclusion in the past few decades, in many areas moving at a pace faster than seen globally.

2. Some groups and areas have been left out of the progress in Africa and continue to remain at risk. Social inclusion helps us understand who is left out, from what, in what ways, and why.

3. Social inclusion draws attention to the drivers of poverty in Africa and explains that while we need to focus on poverty, this is only a starting point to end the exclusion.

4. Structures and processes that aid and abet social exclusion often have historical and cultural roots, which institutional strengthening and reforms need to deal with.

5. Areas that are affected by conflict and fragility stand out as having the poorest outcomes related to social inclusion. Conversely, peace and security matter for social inclusion.

6. Societies incur significant costs from social exclusion. Yet, achieving social inclusion also has costs. Therefore, investing in social inclusion has to be a conscious choice for states and societies.

7. With a strong social contract, social inclusion in Africa is eminently within reach, as hundreds of initiatives across the continent demonstrate.

Strategies for strengthening Institutions

Institutional strengthening is a reference for organisations or nations that wish to develop or improve existing institutional strengthening systems and processes. It presents principles, minimum standards, best practices, business processes, references, and tools for effective, efficient, and sustainable organisations. It is the process through which individuals, organisations, and societies obtain, strengthen and maintain the capabilities to set and achieve their

development objectives. Sometimes referred to as institutional development, it is the creation or reinforcement of a network of organisations to generate, allocate, and use human, material, and financial resources effectively to attain specific objectives on a sustainable basis.

It follows a Three-Step Approach: Institutional Performance Review (to improve performance and identify the functions or gaps that require further capacity development); In-Country Strategic Institutional Assessment (require focused, more detailed, and more up-to-date assessments; and design of an Institutional Strengthening Framework (the outputs of Steps 1 and 2 will provide material for the design and subsequent monitoring and evaluation of a results-based institutional strengthening framework or theory of change for a technical assistance programme aimed at strengthening selected government institutions and capacities) (ADB, 2014).

For Africa to accomplish any of its development goals, strong, resilient, and inclusive institutions and good governance must be in place, a task that requires accountability, democracy, and a robust civil society. Institutional development and strengthening in the African context will benefit from a new crop of ethical and visionary leaders who can serve as institutional entrepreneurs to champion the creation and implementation of good institutions. This is particularly the case at the regional and continental level, where even with the prospects of a reformed political culture at the domestic level the pan-African agenda still has to be carefully balanced with specific national interests, given the diversity of African states. There has been a good number of initiatives at institutional strengthening and capacity-building efforts in Africa as indicated in table II below.

Table II: Select a List of Previous Institutional Strengthening and Capacity Building Efforts in Sub-Sahara Africa (SSA)

Name of Initiative	Funder (s)	Years Covered	Total Amount Invested	Description
African Capacity Building Initiative	African country governments, bilateral donor country governments, multilateral donors (WB, African Development Bank, UNDP)	1991-present	> US$700 million ~$26m/year	Improve the capacity of African institutions (including think tanks, government organizations, the private sector, and civil society) through strategic partnerships, research grants, technical support, and improved access to knowledge
Think Tank Initiative	BMGF, DFID, Hewlett, IDRC, NORAD, the Netherlands	2008-2019	> US$200 million ~$16.6m/year	Support selected think tanks around the world through a combination of the core support and technical capacity-building programmes

Partnership for Higher Education in Africa (PHEA)	Carnegie, Ford, MacArthur, Rockefeller, Hewlett, Mellon, Kresge Foundations	2000-2010	US$440 million. ~$40m/year	Provide support to higher education institutions in select African countries through joint grant-making, generating and sharing information on challenges faced by these institutions and possible strategies, encouraging networking and lesson sharing, and advocating for the importance of quality higher education

African Institutions Initiative (AII)	Welcome Trust	2009-2015	GBP28 million = US$37 million. ~$5.3 m/year	Creation of seven capacity-building consortia of both African and non-Africa organizations, each led by an African institution to broaden the resource base for research, support health science research, and support international networks and partnerships for health problems of resource-poor countries
Africa Higher Education Centers of Excellence	World Bank	2014-2020	US$290 million. ~$41.4m/year	A mix of grants and loans to support existing higher education centers of excellence in West and Central Africa and east and southern Africa by promoting regional

				specialization to address common regional challenges, strengthening training capacity, creating linkages with stakeholders, promoting knowledge-sharing opportunities, and increasing qualified workforce
Medical Education Partnership Initiative (MEPI)	NIH	2010-2015	US$130 million. ~$21.7m/year	Fund institutions receiving PEPFAR support to expand and enhance medical education systems to increase the number of healthcare workers, improve in-country medical education systems, and build research capacity to increase

				retention of higher education professionals
Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa (CODESRIA)	SIDA, ACBF, Denmark, the Netherlands, Ford, Senegal, NORAD	1973-present	The annual budget is ~$3m but varies from year to year	A pan-African organization that promotes quality social science research through encouraging collaboration both within the region and internationally, promoting the dissemination of results, and supporting region-relevant research

Source: *Alex Ezeh and Jessie Lu, "Transforming the Institutional Landscape in Sub-Saharan Africa: Considerations for Leveraging Africa's Research Capacity to Achieve Socioeconomic Development" (CGD Policy Paper 147 July 2019):7-8.*

According to Mbaku (2020), countries must entrench mechanisms that promote constitutionalism, accountability, democracy, and good governance if Africa is to achieve its development goals. This is because weak institutions and dysfunctional governance structures continue to prevent many African countries from creating and sustaining the necessary enabling environment for peaceful coexistence, entrepreneurship, and wealth creation.

Firstly, African leaders can leverage this institutional strengthening and capacity-building agencies and partnerships to continue to strengthen institutions. Therefore, notwithstanding the leadership

capabilities of African leaders, it is increasingly apparent that Africa requires capable, reliable, transparent, and inclusive institutions; strong and viable legislature; honest police forces; independent judges; an independent press; a vibrant private sector and a civil society to give life to our democracy.

Secondly, another such strategy is that countries that have progressive and inclusive institutions and constitutions undergirded by the separation of powers, including Ghana, Kenya, Rwanda, Nigeria, and South Africa, should engage in national dialogues to help their citizens understand and better appreciate the importance of the constitution to governance generally and the protection of human rights in particular. Through this process, citizens can determine how to strengthen their national institutions for inclusivity.

Thirdly, African countries, with the aid of civil society, should develop and implement education programmes to help citizens understand and appreciate the constitutional and institutional provisions of governance structures and how to use them as tools to organise their private lives, resolve conflicts and hold their governments accountable in the area of empowering youth and women that could be particularly fruitful. Discriminatory laws which place implicit or explicit barriers on groups that can stymie their ability, opportunity, and dignity should be reformed.

Additionally, goal 16 of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development calls for the promotion of peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, the provision of access to justice for all, and the building of effective, accountable, and inclusive institutions at all levels. Specifically, target 17.7 addresses the need for responsive, inclusive, participatory, and representative decision-making. In this connection, African leaders should focus on supporting national efforts to promote open, transparent, and inclusive participation and decision-making in development initiatives ensuring that all groups are included. Citizens can thus be assisted to be responsive to public needs and engagements through e-participation as well as the promotion and use of open government data, to improve public accountability, combat corruption, and enhance the delivery of public services.

Overall, strengthening institutions would require an Action Plan, and capacity strengthening programme, which should include the following:

- Problem statement: description of the identified organisational weakness.
- Objectives: specific, measurable, achievable, relevant, and timely (SMART); a concise commentary on what the improvement effort

and capacity strengthening aim to achieve and how the organisation intends to implement the improvement.

- Activities: the steps, or specific activities, to be taken to achieve each objective.
- Approach: the process that will be used in capacity strengthening, such as coaching, training restructuring, or software purchases.
- Time frame: the length of time and the deadlines for each action.
- Persons responsible: the individuals or work units responsible for implementing the activities.
- Resources: human, financial, and material resources needed to achieve each objective.
- M&E: the monitoring and evaluation indicators for assessing the achievement of each objective.
- Champion: the leader, or supervisor, who will provide high-level approval and guidance to the improvement effort.

Conclusion

Institutional governance and leadership are essential to achieving organisational efficiency and sustainability. Governance is the process through which institutions and organisations are directed, controlled, and held accountable. It is concerned with effective systems and structures and is a vital ingredient in the maintenance of a dynamic balance between the need for order and equality in society, the efficient production and delivery of goods and services, and accountability in the use of power. To meet the pledge to leave no one behind, the implementation of the Africa Agenda 2063 and 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development requires identifying who has been left behind and in what ways. Changing the social, cultural, and political norms and institutions that underpin or perpetuate unequal power relations, while necessary, is often a long-term process, dependent on national and local circumstances, however, it is achievable. While some African countries have registered high growth in the last decade, a large number of people remain excluded from the benefits of this progress. This calls for the need to continuously make efforts to strengthen institutions in the continent for inclusivity and sustainable development. Two features of governance-**government effectiveness (economic governance) and rule of law (institutional governance)-promote inclusive growth.**

Enough of strong men ruling African countries despotically and engaging in state capture. Our leaders should focus on strong, resilient, and inclusive institutions which are the cornerstone of stable governments and the prosperity that Africa desires. There are no magic bullets. Africa cannot afford to continue in the dilemma of development and change.

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Utilisation of e-Tshwane online platform to enhance service provision in the City of Tshwane.

Valery Louw1, Mpfareleni Mavis Netswera2

Abstract

Municipalities in South Africa are primarily mandated by the Constitution of the Republic of south Africa, 1996 to deliver essential services that have an instant effect on the quality of people's lives. In this era of forth industrial revolution, service delivery is a mammoth task that requires innovation. Through the advancement of ICTs, the City of Tshwane aims to provide municipal services of high quality to its customers through the use of e-Tshwane platform. The main section provides findings, which suggest that e-Tshwane online platform is an innovative way to allow citizens and businesses to electronically interact with the city with the aim of improving service delivery.

Key words: *Forth Industrial Revolution, e-government, e-Tshwane, e-services, municipal service provision, local government.*

Introduction

Klaus Schwab, founder and executive chairman of the World Economic Forum describes the term forth industrial revolution, branded 4IR as a revolution "characterised by a range of new technologies that are fusing the physical, digital and biological worlds, impacting all disciplines, economies and industries, and even challenging ideas about what it means to be human".

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Schwab differentiates 4IR with the first industrial revolution that liberated humankind from animal power, second industrial revolution that made mass production possible The 4IR is not just about technology-driven change, but an opportunity as well to help people, including leaders, policy-makers and people from all walks of life to harness For the purpose of this article, it is essential to frame 4IR within the context of e-government. In the field of public administration as a whole, e-government represents a new paradigm shift in the provision of public services. By definition, e-government, short for electronic government, involves the use of Information and Communications Technologies (ICTs) to provide public services to citizens and businesses. E-government is further defined as government activities that take place by digital processes over a computer network, usually the Internet, between the government and members of the public. These activities generally involve the electronic exchange of information to acquire or provide products or services, to place or receive orders, to provide or obtain information, or to complete financial transactions (Brown, 2005:241-242).

Among many other definitions of e-government, the World Bank (2015)

and third industrial revolution that brought digital capabilities to billions of people (World Economic Forum(a), n.d.).

converging technologies in order to create an inclusive, human-centred future (World Economic Forum(b), n.d.).

defines e-government as: "The use by government agencies of information technologies (such as Wide Area Networks, the Internet, and mobile computing) that have the ability to transform relations with citizens, businesses, and other arms of government. These technologies can serve a variety of different ends: better delivery of government services to citizens, improved interactions with business and industry, citizen empowerment through access to information, or more efficient government management. The resulting benefits can be less corruption, increased transparency, greater convenience, revenue growth, and/or cost reductions". In their recent scientific work, Layton-Matthews and Landsberg (2022:58), further define e-government as a set of multifaceted public sector technological platforms used to create and support government structures that enable service delivery to be delivered in

efficient, effective, and accessible ways. In addition, Brown (2005:241), associates e-government with The aforementioned various definitions locate e-government within the New Public Management critique of the bureaucratic traditional model of public administration. According to Behn (2022:1), NPM gained momentum after public administration scholars came to realise that the authoritarian, top-down decision and policy making practices (traditional method) for organizing the executive branch of government was too inefficient, too unresponsive, too unproductive and was unable to yield the results that citizens were expected from government. Thus, a new paradigm for the management of government was required. In a nutshell, NPM is regarded as a framework through which governments are modernized and re-engineered towards more innovative ways of managing the public service delivery. Proponents of the NPM paradigm trust that public administration should be modelled on standards such as courtesy, timeliness, clarity, performance management, output-based management, competitiveness, adopting typical management styles utilized within the private sector, more effective resource management

electronic public administration encompasses all government roles and activities, shaped by ICTs. (NPM) paradigm. NPM, labelled modern approach to public management, was founded on a and accuracy of information, all this with a remarkable amount of professionalism (Layton-Matthews and Landsberg, 2022:58; Kolachalam, 2002:4,10).

Since the emergence of e-government in the 1980s, governments all over the world have developed e-government strategies and proper ICTs infrastructure to support e-service delivery. In South Africa, the National e-Government Strategy and Roadmap (2017), in particular, defines e-government as a renewed approach and programme of action to radically improve the electronic government (e-Government) situation in South Africa. Based on desktop secondary sources, this paper examines the utilization of e-Tshwane online platform to enhance service delivery in the City of Tshwane. This article reviews the concept of e-government within the context of NPM. It establishes how e-government advanced in South Africa for effective and efficient delivery of e-services through the use of ICTs. Focusing on the City of Tshwane in South Africa, and in line with its

constitutional mandate of service provision, the main discussion centres on the provision of e-services

implementing e-services and a way forward.

E-government within the context of public service provision.

Different e-government concepts in the context of public administration are distinguished. There is Government to Citizen (G2C), which involves making information available online to citizens. Another one is Government to Business (G2B), wherein government interactions with the private sector through ICTs to procure goods and services. While Government to Government (G2G) has to do with activities that take place between different government agencies, Government to Constituents (E-Democracy) refers to online activities of governments, elected representatives, political parties and citizens for democratic processes such as general elections (Palvia and Sharma, 2007:4-7; Local Government Sector Education and Training Authority [LGSETA], 2020:74). According to Kolachalam, 2002:5), the full potential of e-government involves:

through e-Tshwane online platform, e-Tshwane outcomes, challenges that prevent the City from fully

- Making information and services widely available to the citizens.
- Reducing digital divide by providing equal access to information.
- Empowering citizens by interacting with them i.e. two-way communication.
- Creating and linking local and global online communities.
- Encouraging innovative styles of leadership, and
- Business of public sector at reduced transaction costs.

Of all the e-government concepts explained overhead, G2C is the most relevant and forms the theoretical basis in favour of public service delivery enhancement. In its simplicity, G2C is a *citizen/client-centered service delivery*. In this view, public services should be designed from the starting point of meeting citizens' needs. So, the formal organization of government assumes secondary importance. Government agencies are brought together by their common relationship with identifiable communities within the larger population. In the electronic environment, citizen capacity is a factor as well as citizen need and

public administration is pulled to present itself where the public is located, physically and on-line. Here, technology is seen as an enabler (Brown, 2005:247-248). According to Palvia and Sharma (2007:4-7), G2C are those activities in which the government provides one-stop, on-line access to information and services to citizens, for example, filing income taxes, paying taxes, renewing driver's licenses, pay traffic tickets and changing their address. In addition, government may disseminate information on the website, provide downloadable forms online, help citizens find employment, provide tourism and recreation information, provide advice about health and safety issues etc. (Kolachalam, 2002:5).

It appears the evolution of e-Government is classified along five levels. At the most basic level (Emerging, Enhanced), e-government activities focus on publishing basic information on the web. At intermediate level (Interactive and Transactional), governments use websites to support two-way communication, process transactions online, and aggregate content and services through portals. At advanced level (Connected), governments use the web to integrate services across ministries, provide tools for public feedback

and deliberation and customize the web visit for each user through personalization technologies and push technologies (Gant, 2008:19). In Africa, significant progress has been made in e-government development and only 7 of the region's 54 countries remain in the lowest E-Government Development Index (EGDI) group. The EGDI is based on the weighted average of (a) the Telecommunications Infrastructure Index (b) the Human Capital Index and (c) the Online Service Index (Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 2020: xx)

Advancement of e-government in south Africa

The importance of enhancing service delivery through the use of ICTs in the South African public service dated back in 1997 with the promulgation of the State Information Technology Agency (SITA) Act, 88 of 1998. The Act paved the way for the establishment of SITA, a company that provides information technology, information systems and related services to, or on behalf of, participating departments and in regard to these services, act as an agent of the South African Government. Some years later in 2001, the Department of Public Services and Administration (DPSA) released a policy document entitled

'Electronic Government: The Digital Future – A Public Service IT Policy Framework'. The aim was to transform government into electronic age. The framework requires that a range of issues such as the development of IT skills, the establishment of proper channels and functions for communication and liaison, and co-ordination and monitoring be addressed (DPSA, 2001:10). Perhaps one of the integral components of the e-government regime was the promulgation of the Electronic Communications and Transactions Act, 25 of 2002, to render an efficient and value-added ICT service to the public sector in a secure, cost-effective and integrated manner. Thereafter, a web based Batho Pele Getaway that offers general information resource on government activities was launched in 2004 (Nkuna, 2017: Slide 3).

Moving forward to 2011, the National Development Plan (NDP) introduced a single cohesive strategy to ensure diffusion of ICTs in all areas of society and economy, followed by the approval of the National ICT Integrated Policy White Paper in 2016 and the signing into policy a National e-Government Strategy and Roadmap in 2017. The latter aims to guide the digital transformation of public service in South Africa into an inclusive digital society where all citizens can benefit from the opportunities offered by digital technologies to improve their quality of life. The table below illustrates how e-government policy framework and related activities evolved over a period of two decades.

Table 1: Evolution of e-government in South Africa

1995 – 1999	• 1995-Batho Pele White Paper on the transformation of public service. • 1997-White Paper on Transforming Public Services Delivery (Batho Pele White Paper). • 1998-Presidential Review Commission (PRC) report on the operation, transformation and development of the Public Service, and DPSA granted the administrative responsibility for ICT in government. • 1999-Thusong Service Centres initiated to extend services of government to rural and underserviced communities.

2000 – 2003	• 2001-DPSA produced an e-Government Policy. • 2002-Electronic Communications and Transactions Act. • Batho Pele Gateway–Static Website providing Information to citizens about Public Services. • Batho Pele Call Centre launched to support citizens.
2007 - 2014	• 2007-Information Society and Development Plan adopted with emphasis on e-Government. • 2011-NDP introduces a single cohesive strategy to ensure diffusion of ICTs in all areas of society and economy. • 2012-SITA developed an e-Government Framework and started offering e-services. • 2014-Establishment of the new Department of Telecommunications and Postal Services (DTPS) to ensure that ICT infrastructure is accessible, robust, reliable, affordable and secure to meet the needs of the country. In June 2019, DTPS was merged into the Communications and Digital Technologies Department.
2015 - 2017	• 2015-Development of Gauteng Province e-Government Strategy and the establishment of an e-Government department. • 2016-Approval of the National ICT Integrated Policy White Paper, with emphasis on digital transformation of public service and the need to develop a National e-Government Strategy and Roadmap. • 2016/17-Development and approval of the National e-Government Strategy and Roadmap for South Africa.

Nkuna (2017: Slide 3)

As pointed by Ahmed (2020), investing in necessary infrastructure in the ICT sector is the first step towards the implementation of e-Government, including connection networks that form the internet, fixed broadbands, mobile telecommunications,

communication satellites and network infrastructures such as Wi-fi networks. Certainly, investments in ICT infrastructure have been rising progressively in South Africa. To measure e-government status in the country, strides have been made in terms of Telkom, a fixed-line operator (Telkom), mobile operators (Vodacom, MTN, Cell C, Telkom Mobile), and hundreds of internet service providers and value-added network service providers (Gillwald, Moyo and Stork, 2012:1). In fact, the whole ICT sector's contribution to South African GDP is around 10% (LGSETA, 2020:4).

A number of e-Government success initiatives at the national, provincial and local government spheres include South African revenue Services (SARS) e-filling for tax management with good results on tax collection, the Smart Identification Card System for citizens with better security features as well as the Integrated National Transport Information System (NATIS), an online car and license registration. NATIS is operational, though it requires improvement to afford registration and renewal of services not only where users reside, but anywhere in the country (Republic of South Africa, 2017:10). Examples of municipal e-government programmes comprise e-services citizen portals, digital city services and products, broadband fibre rollouts, Closed-Circuit Television (CCTV) networks, data centre facilities, internet access in libraries and smart fines and intelligent traffic management systems (LGSETA, 2020:6).

In comparison to other African countries, South Africa is much-admired for enabling citizens to access public services online and without unnecessary delays. Of concern is the broadband connectivity in certain areas and high mobile data prices and expensive smart devices by both African and global standards (Gillwald, Moyo & Stork, 2012). According to 2021 official statistics, households' internet access at locations such as homes, work, place of study, internet cafés, or at public hot spots in urban areas in South Africa. Larger percentage of households access the Internet at work. Mobile access to the Internet has made it much more accessible to households in rural areas (Statistics South Africa, 2022:46). The existing digital inequalities in South Africa requires regulation that encourages an enabling competitive environment, which facilitates the delivery of equitable and affordable internet access throughout the

country and lower mobile data and smart device prices (Ahmed, 2020).

Methodology

This article is based on secondary sources of data, comprising of literature review on 4IR and e-government, e-government policy documents pertaining to South Africa as well as government and media reports on the City of Tshwane ICT connectivity and the current status of e-Tshwane online platform. The City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality is utilised because it has adopted digital transformation as one of the strategies to improve service delivery and customer service (City of Tshwane, n.d.(a)). The metropole is located in the northern part of Gauteng Province. It is the largest in size when compared to the other two metropolitan municipalities in Gauteng province, namely the City of Johannesburg and the City of Ekurhuleni. (Department of Cooperative Governance (DCoG), 2020:10).

Case Study: E-Tshwane Online Service City of Tshwane ICT connectivity

The constitutional objectives of municipalities in South Africa are to ensure the provision of sustainable services to communities and to encourage their involvement in the matters of local government. The City of Tshwane is a metropole faced with a challenge of delivering household services due to increasing urban sprawl. It is therefore anticipated that the advent of 4IR would accelerate the utilization of e-government platforms to improve the efficiency of service provision. To date, the City of Tshwane has introduced ICT initiatives such as email services, digital city services, emergency toll-free lines, websites and social media platforms (Claassen, 2020). ICT infrastructure is an enabling factor for citizens to utilize e-government services. Tshwane has a world class ICT infrastructure utilizing both fixed and wireless services. It has the largest deployment of municipal Free WI-Fi in Africa. This free WI-FI flagship programme, dubbed TshWi-FI, won the World Wi-Fi Day Award for Most Innovative City or Government Program to bridge the digital divide at the Wireless Global Congress in 2016 (Tshwane Economic Development Agency [TEDA], n.d.). The programme was launched in 2013 to make the country's capital city a global cyber capital. To date, TshWi-FI allows 1GB free per person per day, enough for visiting websites, downloading

and sharing documents (Moatshe, 2021).

Between 2013 and 2017, TshWi-FI network was rolled out at an exorbitance cost of R320 million. There are 54 high sites established across the City that are connected to 1,576 Free Internet hotspots. The hot spots are found in common public areas such as schools, parks, shopping places, community halls, customer care centres and public transport facilities, particularly in less privileged communities in order to bridge the digital divide (Moatshe, 2021). Plans are in place to convert the transmission network TshWi-Fi service to fibre connectivity to improve on the quality of connection as well as the speed and reliability of the network. Major challenges have been theft of solar panels, batteries and power cables, as well vandalism of network (Libera, 2022).

For the 2020/2021 financial year, the City delivered the following:

- Implementation of the Public Wi-Fi Captive Portal which is a central repository system that captures all users that use Tshwane public Wi-Fi. The intention of this system is to capture personal data from all users. Since its inception, 363 149 users have accessed TshWi-Fi and there have been 2 082 613 sessions to date. The portal's capabilities include the detection of users' mobile device branding.

- Installation of an additional free Wi-Fi hotspots at various regions across Tshwane.

- Integration of the Environmental Health Management System with the City's Geographical Information System (GIS) to effectively assist with managing health surveys and inspections, and monitoring environmental health hazard records and other online services on the GIS platform, including cloud computing.

- Finalization of the revision of the City's ICT systems downtime maintenance plan to further maximize the availability of all connectivity operations in all major centres of Tshwane (City of Tshwane. 2022:123).

Moreover, Acumen Software, the South African software solutions company that builds service delivery systems, launched My Smart City, a free collaborative citizen platform allows citizens to engage key stakeholders in their community in a dialogue, sharing ideas and concerns to improve the services on the mobile app or website. It has seen support for its services grow in the cities where it has launched, namely Johannesburg, Cape Town, Ekurhuleni, Tshwane and

eThekwini. The aim of the platform is to assist in the repair of municipal infrastructure, build citizen morale and ease some of the burden on municipalities. Acumen Software's future plan is to connect to all municipal systems to enable the automation of information flow from citizens (Burger, 2022).

What is e-Tshwane?

e-Tshwane is a secure free online portal that was launched in 2013 with the aim of improving service delivery through technology. The portal allows customers to electronically interact with the City via the internet and mobile devices. Once registered, customers are able to upload meter readings, pay traffic fines, lodge queries, apply for services, view statements, and make real time payments for accounts whenever they are. The overall objective is to allow interactions simpler and more efficient as part of a larger strategy of improving customer service in the City (City of Tshwane, n.d.(a)).

e-Tshwane is part of smart city initiatives at the City of Tshwane. The City of Tshwane Vision 2055 envisages a city that is liveable, resilient, inclusive and that is able to provide a high quality of life for its citizens. The implementation of e-Tshwane only demonstrates Tshwane's willingness to deploy ICT for improving knowledge and information in servicing and transforming relations with citizens, businesses, and other arms of government (City of Tshwane, n.d.(a)). The definition of a smart city in this context is a city that is able to interact better with its customers/ citizens at any time of the day via different channels citizens want to access. In other words, it is a city that is prepared for 4IR (Claassen, 2020). The theme for 2022's State of the Capital Address, *Building a Data-Driven City* is chosen because the City believes that the use of technology to drive efficient processes in the City would expand online services. The Mayor in his address declared that delivering citizens priorities requires embracing the full potential and opportunities provided by new technology and data solutions (Williams, 2022:2,6).

e-Tshwane offers benefits to residents, businesses, government, and the City itself by providing convenience whilst reducing the carbon footprint and saving time and money. For customers, the accessibility of e-services means no more waiting in queues, finding parking or worrying about office hours, convenience (24 hours a day, 7 days a week, 365 days a year), completely paperless and almost instantaneous communication with

the City (City of Tshwane, n.d.(b)). It is also an easy method for customers to correct/update their information for better communication. Equally so, quality of service is enhanced through faster turnaround time regarding queries and responses. For the City, e-service platform improved query resolution. The platform also reduces costs related to termination/reconnection of services caused by payment delays and errors in referencing. It reduces turnaround between distribution of bill and payment, it Saves on postage & printing costs (City of Tshwane, n.d.(b)).

E- Tshwane opportunities

In examining the e-government development process, it is notable that e-Tshwane is at an advanced stage that allows customers to conduct transactions online (*refer to e-government within the context of public service provision section*). To assess its status, the following indicators are taken into consideration:

- The number of e-Tshwane online users;
- Online interactions between the City and its customers, and
- Electronic payments of bills.

Before e-Tshwane platform, the City relied on their printing partners to ensure customer statements were delivered on a monthly basis customer, so they did not always receive their bills, and if they did, it would often be late. To date, e-Tshwane counts 350 000 residents as its users, adding 4 000 new users on average per month. Customers receive their statements electronically, track the billing cycles of the City and are able to lodge complain on the system when their statements are not available within the specified time periods (Interfile, n.d.). In addition, the City has almost 30 000 payments that run through the electronic system monthly at a collection rate of about R80 million. Once more, customers are able to upload their own meter readings and a total of 68 000 customers are able to do so. In due course, their willingness to pay their bills is therefore increased as they are billed according to the consumption figures they submitted to the City. The implementation of e-Tshwane includes timeous payment of bills, reduction in traffic to the customer service centres and the reduction in the cost for prints and postage. All payments are made via instructed debit, Visa Checkout and other methods on the platform settles directly into the City of Tshwane's bank account (Interfile, n.d.; Snijders, 2021:51).

New features added during COVID-19 pandemic on e-Tshwane platform such as Zoom and WhatsApp messenger allow customers to interact virtually with the City beyond normal working hours to resolve account and billing queries that they may have (Williams, 2022:16). The expansion of e-Tshwane in the near future includes full automation of the process for applying for building plans and other building control processes. Several land development application forms that have been identified for automation on the e-Tshwane platform include rezoning applications, removal applications, amendment or suspension of title conditions, building applications and township establishment applications (Snijders, 2021:50). Another foreseeable enhancement of e-Tshwane platform is the computerization of the e-health system, which would improve the state of the City's primary healthcare system. E-health would improve services to patients, including access to digitized records, the management of queues in clinics and the overall better management of pharmaceutical stock items (Williams, 2022:17).

The implementation and utilization of e-government services require adequate ICT skills among government employees and citizens. Apart from that, government employees need expertise in developing, operating and maintaining e-government systems. Funding is another factor for the successful development and implementation of e-government projects (Mahlangu & Ruhode, 2021:425). For the success of e-Tshwane platform, several success factors have played a pivotal role (Interfile, n.d.):

- Training of call centre agents and raising awareness of e-Tshwane benefits to customers in ensuring uptake and buy-in through various marketing campaigns and initiatives.

- Funding, rolling out and expansion of free Wi-Fi programme towards residents' access to digital services.

- Proactive engagement between the City and its customers through sharing important information and addressing Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ's) and updating these on a regular basis.

- The integration of e-Tshwane into the core operations of the administrative system, particularly from a billing, payment and consumption perspectives.

E- Tshwane challenges

The delivery of e-services in the African continent faces a variety of challenges. Weak infrastructure is one of the most critical factors which delays e-government progress in Africa. The availability of ICT infrastructure plays a central role in the digital age and in the positioning of the continent for its citizens to enjoy the benefits and simultaneously be incorporated into global digital connectivity (Mosehlana, 2019:571). The City of Tshwane is no exception. Besides challenges of acts of vandalism to the public internet infrastructure alluded to earlier, there exists a gap between those who have access to the internet and digital devices and those who do not. Although the City is urban, there are residents of Tshwane who experience inefficient WIFI networks in remote areas (Maleka & Moeti, 2021:1025). ICT skills are deemed imperative in enabling citizens to utilize digital devices. Thus, those who do not have necessary ICT skills fail to benefit from e-services provided by the municipality (Mahlangu & Ruhode, 2021:425). A study that sought to investigate the application of e-participation in the City of Tshwane demonstrated that the majority of participants did not engage with the City electronically as a results of technology illiteracy (Maleka & Moeti, 2021:1027). What is required from governments all over the world towards transforming conventional service-delivery government into e-government is political will, leadership and institutional capacities, technology diffusion and connectivity, data inclusiveness and digital skills (Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 2020: xxvii).

Conclusion

The City strives towards the goals of providing a high quality of life for its citizens through digital platforms. Of course, Tshwane is urban and the majority of its population are computer literate and has better access to the internet. It has been are found that e-Tshwane has allowed citizens and businesses to electronically interact with the City. The utilization of e-Tshwane improved customer care and reduced service delivery costs. Online users are able to upload meter readings, pay traffic fines, lodge queries, apply for services, view statements, and make accounts payments. As South Africa moves towards the 4IR era and the digitization of government services with the rest of the world, it's vital for the City of Tshwane to maintain its e-Tshwane platform to enhance

the provision of services to its customers. It is suggested that the City should improve its rate of data and technology inclusiveness and connectivity to bridge the digital divide. It is similarly important for the citizens of Tshwane to be guardians of their own ICT infrastructure to ensure constant delivery of e-services.

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The capacity and the organization of the South African government: implications for development outcomes

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Vusi Gumede

Abstract

The paper examines the extent to which South Africa can be viewed as achieving its developmental goals based on its institutional architecture and how the institutional set up has evolved since 1994. The analysis examines the progress, challenges, and prospects of South Africa in achieving its developmental goals. This analysis is undertaken in a comparative context and largely makes use of a developmental state framework. The analysis concludes that many mistakes have been made regarding the development approach pursued so far. Arguably, the country has not had a clear development agenda which would have considered perspectives and insights from research and advise from others. More fundamentally, the manner in which government is organized and capacitated has constrained its effective functioning. The analysis is supported by the quantification of the role of government in pursuing socio-economic development. The results confirm that government's intervention in the economy can yield positive development outcomes. This supports the argument that the capacity and the organisation of the South African government can be reconfigured in order to better pursue socio-economic development.

Keywords*: South Africa, state building, developmental goals, developmental state, capacity, institutions, social policy, human development.*

Introduction

Since the dawn of democracy in 1994, the successive post-apartheid administrations in South Africa have been attempting to facilitate social and economic development among other pressing objectives. The paper examines the extent to which South Africa can be viewed as achieving its developmental goals based on its institutional architecture and how the institutional set up evolved since 1994. As argued in Gumede (2022), it is critical to assess the prospects of South Africa achieving its developmental goals as well as dealing with the challenge of state-building particularly as development outcomes appear to be deteriorating amidst various efforts to capacitate and reorganize the government. The analysis is undertaken in a comparative context. South Africa is compared to Malaysia, Singapore, Taiwan, Brazil, India, Mauritius, Botswana and Nigeria. These countries were carefully selected. Other countries are also considered. The analysis largely makes use of a developmental state framework.

The paper starts with a discussion of public sector reforms that have been pursued in South Africa since 1994. That is followed by analyzing planning and associated critical government functions in a comparative context. I then examine critically why have development outcomes not improved in South Africa and or why development outcomes have been deteriorating. Before concluding, I quantify the role of government in socio-economic development particularly highlighting the role of social policy in socio-economic development. Overall, the central argument of the paper is that government can be reorganized differently with a view of ensuring that it functions better and ensures that correct policies are in place for the advancement of wellbeing in South Africa.

Public sector reforms

The start of reforms in post-apartheid South Africa, besides the reorganization of the government nationally and provincially, was with the White Paper on the Transformation of the Public Service (1996). There have been many legislative and policy interventions since 1994. The Public Service Act has continually been amended. Institutions pursuing public sector reforms have evolved since 1994.

To start with, the South African Management Development Institute (SAMDI) was the first institution that was established after the end of apartheid, to provide necessary training for the public sector. Later,

SAMDI was transformed into Public Administration Leadership and Management Academy (PALAMA) whose main aim was to provide or coordinate the provision of training and management development interventions that lead to improved performance and service delivery in the public sector. PALAMA, which was established in 2006, reported to the Minister for Public Service and Administration. In 2013, the National School of Government (NSG) replaced PALAMA. The training provided has not received positive feedback in some instances.

For instance, Dastile (2018) finds that 34% who attend the training provided felt that the training was not linked to their performance development plans, but they attended the training because they were selected by their superiors to attend the training as it was deemed to be aligned to the departmental objectives. In some instances, respondents said they attended training due to late cancellation by their colleagues. Much earlier, the Public Service Commission (2008) had also found that employees either were not sufficiently trained and or monitored by senior managers on whether they complied with some of the Batho Pele principles. These are principles that govern the behaviour of government officials and the functioning of the public sector in South Africa

It was during the Nelson Mandela administration (1994-1999) that government undertook first steps in public sector reforms. The primary focus, arguably, of the Mandela administration was reconciliation. The administration was constrained by coalition that had to be formed resulting to the Government of National Unity. Many of the Presidential Review Commission's recommendations were implemented during the first term of the Thabo Mbeki administration. Among these are the Batho Pele principles (i.e. consultation, service standards, access, courtesy, information, openness and transparency, redress and value for money). It can be argued that the Mbeki administration implemented the public sector and public management reforms that had been initiated in the Mandela administration. The cluster system, for instance, was firmly put in place during the Mbeki administration. Further improvements in the functioning of the government were pursued earnestly during the Mbeki administration.

The Kgalema Motlanthe administration continued with that. The Jacob Zuma administration made some modifications. The Cyril

Ramaphosa administration largely continued with what the Zuma administration was pursuing but it also resuscitated what the Mbeki administration had put in place. For instance, the Ramaphosa administration resuscitated the Policy Unit but in a different form. It is called the Policy and Research Services. It mainly focuses on influencing policy making whereas the Mbeki's Policy Unit dealt with coordination, monitoring and evaluation, planning and policy thinking/advise.

As indicated earlier, the public sector reforms have been geared to making South Africa a developmental state. The terminology or phraseology has changed over time, but the focus is essentially on a democratic developmental state. Gumede (2022) concludes that there is still a long way for South Africa to become a democratic developmental state because of factors such as policy paralysis, weak leadership and absence of a sound development agenda. Although the Ramaphosa administration has been trying to steer the government and social partners back to the developmental state, the efforts have not yielded any positive results so far.

Among recent initiatives in relation to public sector reforms is the Public Service Charter. As a measure to ensure that public service officials conduct themselves in a manner that is professional, a social contract was entered into and it involved the employer and the employees, through the Public Service Charter (2013). Included in the Charter are the values that govern public administration, as they are set out in Chapter 10 of the Constitution, which also include professional ethics, transparency, accountability and good management of human resources (PSCBC 2013). The Charter has a context legislatively that includes the 1997 Batho Pele White Paper on Transforming Public Service delivery. Within the Public Service Charter is a Code of Conduct for Public Servants. This includes prohibitions on abusing positions of authority and a commitment to the optimal development of public servants.

In 2009, President Zuma appointed 34 ministers responsible for various portfolios, a shift from President Mbeki's Cabinet which had a composition of 26 ministers – President Cyril Ramaphosa has 28 Ministers. When the second term of office of President Zuma commenced after the general election of 2014, he reconfigured his Cabinet again on 24 May 2014 and introduced new ministries namely, the Small Business Development; Water and

Sanitation; Environmental Affairs; Telecommunications and Postal Services; and Communications ministries and combined a few existing ministries namely, the Justice and Correctional Services; Planning and Performance Monitoring and Evaluation bringing the number of his Cabinet members to 35 (Koma & Tshiyoyo, 2015).

Over and above resuscitating public sector reforms started under Mbeki, the Ramaphosa administration has pursued a number of additional public sector reforms. Among the initiatives in the Ramaphosa administration is the National Implementation Framework towards the professionalization of the Public Service. In December 2020, the then Minister for the Public Service and Administration, Senzo Mchunu, approved the publication of the draft National Implementation Framework towards the Professionalization of the Public Service for public comments. The purpose of the Framework was to develop a national implementation framework towards the professionalization of the public service as part of creating a capable and ethical developmental state.

A high-level task team on the professionalization framework was established in 2021. The members of the task team represent a wide array of institutions and sectors, including representation from Auditor-General South Africa (AGSA), think tanks, state-owned training academies, academia, and the legal fraternity. At the time of finalizing the paper, Cabinet was scheduled to consider and approve the Framework for the professionalization of the public sector

The Department of Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation (DPME) recently came up with a National Policy Development Framework which has been developed with the aim of regulating policy management processes in South Africa. It also seeks to develop a code of practice for policymaking and entrench evidence-based policymaking. It will also guide officials, on analyzing policy, developing policy, policy authorization, implement policy and on policy reviews. The framework further gives clarity on how to approach intra/inter departmental consultation (policy coordination) and external stakeholder consultations during the process of policy management.

The District Development Model (DDM) is an operational model for improving Cooperative Governance aimed at building a capable and ethical Developmental State. It embodies an approach by which the

three spheres of government and state entities work in unison in an impact-oriented way, and where there is higher performance and accountability for coherent service delivery and development outcomes. Essentially, it is a method of government operating in unison focusing on the municipal district and metropolitan spaces as the impact areas of joint planning, budgeting and implementation.

All the initiatives discussed above confirm that institutional capacity of the South African government has been increasing overtime. The number of public sector employees has increased faster since 2009/10. It is therefore not surprising that the compensation of public servants as a share of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) has increased from about 12% in 2009/10 to about 16% in 2019/20. This is higher than USA, Japan, UK, China, Malaysia, Singapore, Brazil, Mauritius and Botswana. In addition, public servants per 100 economically active people or public servants per 100 people in South Africa compare well with other countries. For latest data available (2019 or 2020), public servants per 100 economically active people in South Africa is 7.43. In Malaysia it is 7.47, it is 7.76 in Brazil and 9.81 in USA (see Gumede 2022).

Planning, in a comparative context

Development plans presuppose that there are clear developmental goals, or a clear developmental agenda driven by the developmental elite that is guided by a developmental ideology. In other words, the outlook of those leading society and government has to be developmental – at the core, the desire to advance the wellbeing and welfare of society or a particular group or groups in a society. Development is largely understood as the improvements in wellbeing and welfare. In the context of this paper, the focus is on social and economic development: higher levels of human development and economic performance.

In a comparative context, per capita incomes (signifying standard of living) measured in US dollars are much higher in Singapore (followed by Malaysia). India has the lowest per capita incomes among the countries that South Africa is compared with in this paper. This is to be expected – that Singapore leads – because, as will be illustrated, Singapore has venerated bureaucratic planning capacity and a robust development plan. This, however, does not take away that the East Asian Tigers developed quicker because of geo-political and geography-related factors as well as under authoritarian regimes. The proximity to markets and the agenda

of the West to 'defeat' communism played important roles in the speedy industrialization of some Southeast Asian countries.

Per capita incomes for Botswana and South Africa have been similar from 2000 to 2012. In fact, during the same period, there were years when South Africa's GDP per capita was higher than that of Botswana. From 2013, South Africa's GDP per capita has remained stagnant; in fact, it has actually been declining for some years before the Covid-19 pandemic (see Gumede 2020). South Africa's GDP started declining from around 2007/8. It seems to be an anomaly that South Africa is the only country in the selected countries (i.e. Singapore, Malaysia, Mauritius, Brazil, Botswana, India and Nigeria) with a declining GDP per capita over the period under study (2000-2019). Although GDP per capita for India and for Nigeria are low, the numbers have been increasing throughout the same period. It is also insightful that South Africa's GDP per capita was approximately equal to that of Brazil

until about 2005. With all its challenges, Brazil's GDP per capita has continued to grow over the years leaving South Africa far behind.

Regarding human development – a comprehensive measure of wellbeing considering access to healthcare, education and income – Singapore has the highest level of human development followed by Malaysia. The Human Development Index (HDI) – a composite indicator consisting of life expectancy, literacy, and per capita income – for all the countries being compared to South Africa has been improving as shown by an upward trend. Nigeria has the lowest index in the selected countries and it has not improved much: the HDI for Nigeria has been standing still since 2015. The same can be said about South Africa's HDI: it has not improved much since 2000 and it has remained constant since 2015. Compared to Botswana, South Africa's HDI was higher during 2000-2010; however, Botswana has since overtaken South Africa's HDI (see Table 1).

Table 1: Human Development Index, 2000- 2019

	2000	2010	2013	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
Singapore	0.818	0.909	0.923	0.929	0.933	0.934	0.935	0.938
Malaysia	0.724	0.773	0.787	0.797	0.801	0.802	0.804	0.810
Mauritius	0.674	0.748	0.775	0.786	0.790	0.793	0.796	0.804
Brazil	0.684	0.726	0.752	0.755	0.757	0.760	0.761	0.765
Botswana	0.578	0.660	0.699	0.714	0.719	0.724	0.728	0.735
India	0.497	0.581	0.607	0.627	0.637	0.643	0.647	0.645
Nigeria	-------	0.484	0.520	0.527	0.528	0.533	0.534	0.539
South Africa	0.629	0.662	0.683	0.699	0.702	0.704	0.705	0.709

Source: *United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), various sources*

There appears to be a relationship between per capita incomes of the selected countries and their indices of human development. This is unsurprising since HDI is calculated using per capita incomes. It would also seem that the two Asian Tigers perform far better than the rest of the selected countries. Looking at South Africa more closely, the 2019 Human Development Report suggests that South Africa's Human Development Index (HDI) has

effectively been stagnant, though it has been marginally increasing in the past few years. As Table 2 shows, the 2010 HDI for South Africa was 0.662 and 0.629 in 2012 – an insignificant change. Table 2 also illustrates that both per capita incomes and life expectancy have been stagnant, especially in the recent period. Other useful numbers in the 2019 Human Development Report relate to schooling: data implies that South Africans, on average, school five years less than expected

Table 2: Human Development in South Africa (1990-2019)

	Life Expectancy at birth	Expected years of Schooling	Mean years of Schooling	GNI per capita (2017 PPP$)	HDI value
1990	63.3	11.4	6.5	9,588	0.625
1995	61.6	13.0	8.2	9,023	0.652
2000	56.0	13.0	8.8	9,498	0.629
2005	53.4	12.9	8.9	10,798	0.620
2010	57.7	12.8	10.2	11,723	0.662
2015	62.6	13.8	10.1	12,052	0.699
2016	63.2	13.7	10.2	11,908	0.702
2017	63.5	13.7	10.2	11,864	0.704
2018	63.9	13.7	10.2	11,756	0.705
2019	63.87	13.8	10.2	12.129	0.709

Source: *United Nations Development Program (2021/22)*

As a result, there have been insignificant improvements in the HDI and associated factors. In fact, from 2016 it seems all indicators given in Table 2 are dormant. Of concern is that the average number of years for school remains unchanged while the expected years of schooling have increased. The gap/shortfall has increased to 4 years. By implication, the level of human development would decline further as a result of Covid-19. In fact, development outcomes and the performance of the South African economy have worsened ever since Covid-19 came to South Africa in March 2020. At the time of finalizing this paper there were no signs of improvements in the economy and in development outcomes.

As indicated earlier, the HDI is a composite index consisting of three main dimensions: a long and healthy life, the ability to acquire knowledge and the ability to achieve a decent standard of living (see Gumede 2016). Using the NIDS data to calculate the HDI, the level of human development in post-apartheid South Africa has not improved much: 0.649 in 2010; 0.685 in 2014 and 0.69 in 2017 as shown in Table 3. The 2018 Human Development Report was used because the 2019 Human Development Report did not have certain figures, particularly those corresponding with the waves

of the NIDS for analysing similar years and similar periods; hence, no data for some years for the IHDI and the GII. It is important to indicate that the HDI is determined based on two calculations, as undertaken for this paper. First, before computing the overall HDI, each dimension is transformed into indices of between 0 and 1 by setting their minimum and maximum values, which is followed by aggregating the dimensional indices to produce the HDI.

Table 3. Human Development (2008-2017)

	2008	2010	2012	2014	2017
HDI	0.633	0.649	0.664	0.685	0.699
IHDI	---------	0.411	--------	0.428	0.467
GII	---------	0.635	0.462	0.407	0.389

Source*: Gumede (2021)*

Table 3 also shows the Inequality-adjusted Human Development Index (IHDI) which combines a country's average achievements in health, education and income with how those achievements are distributed among the country's population by discounting each dimension's average value according to its level of inequality (UNDP 2019). The IHDI seems to have been increasing relatively faster than the normal HDI in South Africa: 0.411 in 2010 and 0.467 in 2017. Although this is commendable, the IHDI is generally low. It is not unreasonable to expect that the IHDI should have been at least 0.50 if government was vigorously pursuing interventions aimed at improving wellbeing. It is, however, worth highlighting that the Gender Inequality Index (GII), a measure of gender disparity, has been declining with relative significance since 2010: 0.635 in 2010 and 0.389 in 2017. This means that the country is doing relatively well in addressing the gender gap.

It appears that countries with clear development plans perform better than those with inarticulate development plans. Indeed, countries with effective capacities in place for implementing development plans appear to perform better in terms of social and economic development. How governments are organized in the selected countries also plays a role for socio-economic development. Planning commissions for countries such as Malaysia and Singapore have necessary technical

capacities and work closely with government departments or ministries and various agencies of the government.

Table 4: Country by country vision statements or objectives

Country	Vision or Overarching National Objective
Malaysia	To become a high-income country by 2024
Nigeria	To become one of the world's 20 largest economies by 2020
Brazil	To reduce poverty and grow the middle class
India	Aspiring for developed country status
Mauritius	To become a high-income country
Botswana	To raise the standard of living for its population
South Africa	To eliminate poverty and reduce inequality by 2030
Singapore	To become a developed country in the first league
Taiwan	To become a Green Silicon Island

Source: *Summary from plans of selected countries*

In addition, or more importantly, as Table 4 shows, Malaysia and Singapore have crisp (and ambitious) plans. An examination of their plans over the decades suggests that these countries have had very clear intentions about goals and objectives. Also, their plans come across as realistic although quite ambitious – ambition in planning works if the track record supports it and if requisite capacities are in place to accomplish the plan. Lastly, most of the plans under study are relatively brief.

With some exceptions, all the countries compared with South Africa have relatively short long-term/development plans and relatively clear focus. The South African NDP is by far the longest in terms of the number of pages. In addition, for countries compared with South Africa that have higher development outcomes, there are requisite capacities to plan, monitor and evaluate as well as implementation. The planning commissions are relatively independent and influential. All these countries have either tweaked existing long-term plans or came up with comprehensive interventions to deal with the negative impact of Covid-19. Taiwan, for instance, developed a plan aimed at increasing Taiwan's global visibility and

influence taking into account Covid-19[1].

Social and economic transformation
Much has been achieved regarding the implementation of the government's priority on addressing the lack of access to basic social services. However, as the discussion will show, there is still a long way to go in ensuring a 'Better Life for All'. Statistics South Africa (StatsSA) data and government records indicate impressive progress has been achieved in ensuring that people have access to basic services such as clean water sources despite numerous more people still being piped (tap) water[2]. The service delivery challenges remain unabated. Progress has varied: some areas show improvements while others are deteriorating. For instance, as Table 5 illustrates, there has been an increase in access to formal dwelling and a decline in informal and traditional dwelling although these improvements are not that significant particularly from 2011.

Table 5: Access to services and type of dwelling South Africa (1996-2019)

Type of main dwelling	1996	2001	2011	2018	2019
Formal	65.1	68.5	77.6	81.1	81.9
Informal	16.2	16.4	13.6	13.1	12.7
Traditional	18.3	14.8	7.9	5.0	4.1
Other	0.4	0.3	0.9	0.8	0.3
Household basic services					
Piped water (tap)	80.3	84.5	91.2	89.0	88.2
Electricity (lighting)	58.2	51.4	84.6	84.7	85
Toilet facilities					
Access to a flush toilet	82.9	82.3	90.6	83.0	82.1
Bucket toilet	4.7	4.1	2.1	2.8	2.4
No toilet	12,4	13,6	7.3	14.2	---

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[1] *Taiwan National Development Council, 2021, National Development Plan (2021-2024), Taipei.*
[2] *According to the 2011 Census there were about 1 265 907 people without access to piped water,* *of which 1 234 087 were Africans – this supports the point that most of the socio-economic challenges confronting South African society remain predominantly problems of Africans.*

Source: *Compiled from various Stats SA surveys*

There remain significant backlogs. For instance, approximately 18 percent of households do not have access to a flush toilet and about 14 percent of the households do not have a toilet at all as is shown in Table 5. Table 5 provides apt reasoning for the increased public protests that have increased significantly post 2007. It is also worth highlighting South Africa's social assistance programme – the cash transfer system. Table 6 indicates that South Africa has an extensive social assistance programme that has helped cushion households from extreme hardship.

In 2012/13 approximately 16 million people received social grants which constituted 3.1 percent of GDP. By 2018/19, grant recipients were 17,8 million in total. The 12,5 million child support grant recipients constituted 70.2 percent of the total grant recipients in 2018/19. This grant is provided to children in need until the age of 15 years. It is expected that children under 18 years will, over time, also receive the child support grant as per the means test. The age requirement for the old age pension for men was also reduced to 60 years.

Table 6: Number of social grants per grant type, 2012/13-2019/20

Grant Type	2013/14	2014/15	2015/16	2016/17	2017/18	2018/19	2019/20
Old Age	2 969 933	3 086 851	3 194 087	3 302 202	3 423 337	3 553 317	3 676 791
War Veterans	429	326	245	176	134	92	62
Disability	1 120 419	1 112 663	1 085 541	1 067 176	1 061 866	1 048 255	1 042 025
Grant in Aid	83 059	113 087	137 806	164 349	192 091	221 989	273 922
Care Dependency	120 632	126 777	131 040	144 952	147 467	150 001	154 735
Foster Child	512 055	499 774	470 015	440 295	416 016	386 019	355 609
Child Support	11 125 946	11 703 165	11 972 900	12 081 375	12 269 084	12 452 072	12 787 448
Total	**15 932 473**	**16 642 643**	**16 991 634**	**17 200 525**	**17 509 995**	**17 811 745**	**18 290 592**
Annual Growth	-1.08%	4.46%	2.10%	1.23%	1.80%	1.72%	2.69%

Source: *Compiled from South African Social Security Agency's Annual Reports*

The challenge with the social assistance programme is its financial sustainability and possible unintended consequences. Although it was stabilizing as a share of the GDP, it is still remarkably high (over 3 percent). As for the unintended consequences, the fundamental issue relates to the kind of the society

South Africa aspires towards. Ideally, as in Brazil and India, more people should be gainfully employed than on social assistance. The grants however, especially in the context of a small informal sector, play an important role in mitigating severe hardship endured by those in need. As some findings on poverty suggest, the grants may have cushioned the poor against the global economic recession.

With regards to economic performance, South Africa's economic growth has not been commensurate to the size of its economy. Looking at comparable countries such as Botswana, India, Brazil and Malaysia, South Africa's economic performance has been low. The low GDP growth rate, compared to similar countries, supports the point that it is not only the global economic recession that has lowered SA's economic performance, but that GDP appears to have begun to decline after its highest point in the post-apartheid dispensation, in 2006. There were no significant economic policy reforms undertaken for effectively ten years (1996-2006). Macroeconomic stabilization was achieved, through GEAR, around the year 2000. The obvious next policy or strategy would have been the one focusing on accelerating GDP growth, which have happened around 2002. There was, arguably, a significant policy reform lag because AsgiSA began in 2005. And because it takes a while for any policy to gain traction, AsgiSA would have started to deliver optimally around 2008. However, there was state of flux and relative instability in the public sector due to the recall of former President Mbeki in 2008, the immediate resignation of former vice president, Phumzile Mlambo-Ngcuka, and others who championed AsgiSA.

There was an exodus of critical technocrats and policy gurus such as Joel Netshitenzhe who left government in 2009. The researcher left the presidency in 2009 but returned for a year as a special advisor in the state-owned enterprises portfolio of the Department of Public Enterprises. The caretaker administration of Kgalema Motlanthe during mid-2008 to mid-2009 maintained relative stability and continuity, but the politics of that specific period made governing a challenge. It was always understood in the ANC that Kgalema Motlanthe was temporarily holding the reigns for Jacob Zuma (who became president of the ANC, replacing Thabo Mbeki, in December 2007 in Polokwane).

Why have development outcomes not improved?

The fundamental issue requiring addressing is what could be causing a deterioration in development outcomes when capacity seems to have been increasing since 1994, hence the analysis in this paper. This should be instructive for the further public sector reforms that are being pursued. It might very well be that public sector reforms implemented since 1994 have not addressed the correct problem. Part of the challenge might have been that the reforms pursued were aligned to the neoliberal agenda. The New Public Management approach for instance that was followed in the 1990s in South Africa had been critiqued by those who felt that it was akin to neoliberal reforms that had not worked well in other countries. Similarly, GEAR was criticized as it was seen as akin to the Washington Consensus.

The analysis in this paper suggests that what matters most is the kind of capacity that the government has and how the government is organized. Countries with which South Africa is compared placed significant technical capacities at the centre of the government. There were attempts to do this in the late 1990s to the late 2000s. That capacity, largely centralized in the Mbeki's policy unit, was not sufficient and it was destroyed during the Zuma administration. Zuma created fully-fledged long-term planning as well as monitoring and evaluation, but development outcomes started deteriorating. He also inaugurated a national planning commission.

Given the experience of countries that South Africa is compared with, the organization of the government seems to matter greatly. Requisite capacities should be at the highest level in the government. The planning commission should not only have necessary technical capacity, but it must also be part of the government. In South Africa, the national planning commission was constituted more as a political structure made up of different social partners. This might not be a major problem, but the capacity of the national planning commission and its secretariat should be sound. There have been various attempts at this, but it might be that the capacity building has not been appropriate. Arguably, there are specific skills set that are needed at local government level that might differ from the expertise required at the provincial and national levels. This point has implications for the professionalization of the public service that is being pursued. It would be important that the

professionalization addresses the correct problem.

As Mkandawire (2001) explained, a country's 'circumstances' shape the kind of a developmental state a country can be or can become. It is largely in this context that I argue that the notion of a developmental state should be viewed as a framework instead of attempting to copy the developmental state 'model' of another country. In fact, developmental state as a framework guides the work of a government that is serious about development – if a government can achieve the various attributes of what is perceived to be a developmental state that government would have achieved what any society hopes for and thereby ensure inclusive development. As Mkandawire put it, deciding on universalism versus targeting is about "the choice of instruments for redistributing resources in society and for determining levels of social expenditure" (Mkandawire, 2005: 12). Linked to this is what Mkandawire called a shift from development to poverty reduction (Mkandawire, 2005: 7). Overall, Mkandawire provides evidence that social policy has been universalistic while targeting was used to make universalism more effective in the countries that have been able to reduce poverty – Theda Skocpol's "targeting within universalism" notion.

Government's role in socio-economic development

Although there are those who argue that governments must not intervene in economy, evidence confirms that governments can play important roles in socio-economic development (see Gumede 2023). Among the important policies that can advance inclusive development is social policy. As explained in Gumede (2019), social policy has to do with policy interventions in the public sector aimed at directly improving wellbeing in a society – it can be thought of as a series of public policies that ensure that the quality of life in a society improves. It is also worth highlighting that social policy has various roles/functions (i.e. production, distribution, reproduction, protection and social cohesion/nation building). Leading scholars of social policy emphasise social policy's transformative role; that social policy must transform society, societal relations, the economy etc. For estimations, several input variables (i.e. expenditures on education, health, social development, art and culture as well as water and sanitation) were used to

come up with policy scores for the social policy variable.

Because of many advantages associated with the autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) econometric method, the ARDL model is used to assess the role of the government in society (based on 1996-2020 time period). For instance, there is no need to worry about the order of integration and ARDL can be used even with a limited number of samples (Pesaran et al., 2001). The equations estimated are:

$$HDI_t = \beta_0 + \beta_1 lnGDP_t + \beta_2 lnGSP_t + e_t$$

(1)

and

$$HDI_t = \beta_3 + \beta_4 Social\ Policy_t + \beta_5 Institutions_t + u_t$$

(2)

HDI in both equations refer to Human Development Index which is a composite index consisting of three main dimensions: long and healthy life, the ability to acquire knowledge and the ability to achieve a decent standard of living (as explained earlier). In equation 1, *GDP* is gross domestic product (measured in constant price) and *GSP* is government spending (measured as a percentage of GDP). In equation 2, *social policy* denotes the scores of the PCA (principal component analysis) index and the *institutions* variable is measured by regulatory quality. Like social policy, institutions are critical for socio-economic development but are often not sufficiently accounted for. For this paper, analyzing the institutional architecture, it is necessary to include institutions in the equation that estimates socio-economic development.

The subscript t indicates a certain variable at time t while e and u in equations 1 and 2 denote the error terms, respectively. Equations 1 and 2 are extended in order to depict the ARDL approach and include lag operators for dependent variable p and the regressors $(q1, q2, q3\ and\ q4)$. The ARDL models are then shown as:

$$\Delta HDI_t = \beta_6 + \beta_7 \sum_{i=1}^{p} \Delta HDI_{t-1} + \beta_8 \sum_{i=0}^{q1} \Delta lnGDP_{t-i} + \beta_9 \sum_{i=0}^{q2} \Delta lnGSP_{t-i} + \alpha_1 lnGDP_{t-i} + \alpha_2 lnGSP_{t-i} + e_t$$

(3)

and

$$\Delta HDI_t = \beta_{10} + \beta_{11} \sum_{i=1}^{p} \Delta HDI_{t-1} + \beta_{12} \sum_{i=0}^{q1} \Delta Social\ Policy_{t-i} + \beta_{13} \sum_{i=0}^{q2} \Delta Institions_{t-i} + \alpha_3 Social\ policy_{t-i} + \alpha_4 Institutions_{t-i} u_t$$

(4)

Δ depicts the first difference and $\beta_6, \beta_7, \beta_8, \beta_9, \beta_{10}, \beta_{11}, \beta_{12}, \beta_{13}$ indicate the short run elasticity given a 1% increase in the control variables while $\alpha_1, \alpha_2, \alpha_3$ and α_4 denote the long run elasticity.

Table 7 gives the summary statistics of the variables

Table 7: Summary Statistics

Variable	Mean	Std. Dev	Min	Max	Variable
HDI	0.6665	.0384781	0.611	0.727	Human
GDP	3.10189982371	4.28758563	2.276776	3.5871244	Development
GSP	18.09188	1.4130	15.8607	20.6502	index
Social	0.0000000206	2.1865	-3.1689	3.5738	Gross
Policy	0.3887817	0.2881	-0.0731	0.8196	Domestic
Institutions					Product
					Government
					Spending
					Social Policy
					Scores
					Institutions

Gumede (2023) estimated the relationship between government spending, economic growth and socio-economic development, and found that economic growth does not necessarily translate to socio-economic development although government spending does. Essentially, the findings supported the view that governments should be active in facilitating social and economic development. As Table 8 shows, estimates for this paper suggest that, apart from the initial conditions, both social policy and institutions have a positive impact on socio-economic development.

Table 8: The impact of social policy and institutions on human development.

	ARDL		ECM		Long run estimates	
	Coef.	SE	Coef.	SE	Coef.	SE

D.HDI (-1)	0.9161**	0.2187	-0.3129	0.1136		
D.HDI(-2)	0.3129	0.2317		0.0440		
D.Social Policy	0.0100**	0.0030	0.0100**	0.0013	0.0652**	0.0436
D.Social Policy(-1)	-0.0045	0.0027	-0.0094**	0.0014		
	0.0094	0.0094				
D.Social Policy(-2)	0.0591	0.0236	0.0591**	0.0516	0.9405**	0.5257
Institutions	0.0713**	0.0181	-0.0849**	0.0515		
Institutions(-1)	0.849**	0.0169				
Institutions(-2)	-0.2180	0.0913			0.9519**	0.1539
Con			-0.2290**	0.0232		
CointEq(-1)*						
R-squared	0.9985		0.9595			
Adj R-squared	0.9924		0.9190			

F-Bounds Test		Null Hypothesis		No levels relationship	
Test Statistic	Value	Signf.	I(0)	I(1)	
F-statistic	9.7581	10%	2.63	3.35	
K	2	5%	3.1	3.87	
		2.5%	3.55	3.38	
		1%	4.13	5	

Standard errors in parentheses, *** denotes significance at 1 %, ** at 5 % and * at 10%

As shown in Table 8, in addition to the fact that a 1% increase in the previous values of the HDI leads an increase of the current HDI for about 0.92%, results also show that estimation also seems to have a long-run relationship as demonstrated by bound test result. The vector error correction (VEC) model and its long run results indicate that social policy as well as institutions both have a long-run impact. With regards to social policy for instance, a 1% increase in social policy leads to 0.07% increase in HDI in the long run as shown in Table 8.

Conclusion

Examining the post-apartheid development experience implies that many mistakes have been made regarding the development approach pursued so far. Arguably, the country has not had a clear development agenda which would have taken into account perspectives and insights from research and advise from other. For instance, the role of social policy would have been

a 1% increase in social policy and institutions is significantly responsible for an increase of HDI (0.01% and 0.07% respectively). In addition, the social policy more pronounced in such a development agenda as well as an important issue of the link between social and economic policies. The research presented in this paper confirms the critical role of social policy for inclusive development. Fundamentally, the manner in which the South African government is organised and capacitated has affected socio-economic development. This does not mean that other factors (e.g. corruption) have not had a negative impact on development outcomes. Lastly, the assessment of the role of the government in the economy confirm that the South African government can play an important role in socio-economic development. Among the critical policies that should be in place and should be properly implemented is social policy.

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Development of a dynamic National Identity Management (NIM) system in South Africa: A prerequisite for strong national institution

Meron Okbandrias (PhD)

The Department of Home Affairs (DHA) is designing a National Identity Management system for South Africa. The NIS, which will replace National Population Register (NPR), will essentially act as a single source of information on the identity and status of South Africans backed up with biographic and biometric information. The department tabled a draft of the Identity Management policy at the end of 2020. The plan for a single integrated source of data for all citizens, residents, and anyone who crosses South African borders is expected to secure a national identity database, foster economic transformation, and facilitate efficient and seamless digital service delivery. The effort to strengthen the national identity database is necessary to properly manage citizens and their status and respond to the Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 17 of strong institutions. The impact of having effective NIS will not only make the national government efficient and secure, but its benefits cascade down to providing services in municipalities and businesses. This article looks at the challenges and opportunities in developing such a system as the development of NIS is an ongoing process that started with issuing Smart ID cards in 2013. The data sources for the articles are literature on the topic, government policies, and publications from DHI. The department has been attempting to secure the national identity database for the last decade, and it has encountered challenges implementing it. The article will explore the challenges and make recommendations in building scalable and dynamic NIS that will be responsive to the future operational needs of DHS, the country, and the economy in line with the NDG goal 17 of strong institutions.

Key words: *Identity Management, Home Affairs, Digital Services, National Identity, Sustainable Development Goal.*

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Introduction

There is a consensus that poor identity management remains one of the greatest obstacles to development in many nations, particularly the developing ones (Pang & Lips, 2008; Adjei, 2013; Ayamba, 2016). Across the globe, governments are strengthening their identity management strategies. One reason is a growing interest in using the online environment to deliver and improve services, and another is the increasingly sophisticated efforts by criminal elements in forging and stealing identities (McKenzie, Crompton, and Wallis, 2008:51). Many countries today are currently investing in their identity management infrastructure, migrating from old paper-based systems to digitally based implementations, e.g. in China, Mongolia, Pakistan, the Philippines, Indonesia, and across Africa with countries like South Africa, Nigeria and more recently Algeria and Cameroun (Thales Group 2022).

This paper explores the development of National Identity System (NIS) in South Africa that will replace the National Population Register (NPR). There are multiple reasons for the upgrade. Primarily, it has to do with having a secure system. There has been a lot of criticism of the security of the South African identity

management systems. Many foreign nationals have managed to get identity cards and passports fraudulently. In addition, the Department of Home Affairs (DHA) is attempting to make the system more secure by adding some biometric features. More importantly, there is a need to design a system to seamlessly to integrate different functionalities to ensure that the system add value to online services that are essential to the knowledge economy. Therefore, the article critically explores the development of the NIS and the inherent challenges that DHA has been grappling with.

National Identity Management

An identity management system, as described by Bhargav-Spantzel et al. (2007), is the synthesis of technology, rules, and operations that results in a user authentication system integrated with an information management system. National Identity Management (NIM) have been referred differently in different countries. National Identity Management (NIM) is a central database that contains the personal data of citizens and residents of the country (Osuolale, Adewale, and Abimbola, 2017; Venkatraman and Parvin, 2022). This includes the following

personal data: names, sex, date of birth, place of birth, citizenship, residence permit, place of residence and marital status, personal identification code, a photo, a signature, the date of issue and date of expiry. Governments approach identity management in considerably different ways.

Nigeria's experience exemplifies why governments choose new national identity management systems. Nigeria, in particular, has incurred significant losses as a result of a variety of economic and financial crimes, human trafficking, and insecurity, including insurgency, militancy, and terrorism, because it is now difficult to pinpoint the perpetrators of such security breaches. Interpol, an international law enforcement organization, came to an agreement to connect the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC), the National Drug Law Enforcement Agency (NDLEA), the Nigeria Immigration Service (NIS), the Nigeria Customs Service (NCS), the National Agency for the Prohibition of Trafficking in Persons (NAPTIP), and the National Agency for Food, Drug Administration and Control (NAFDAC) to its database tool known as I-24/7 on November 14, 2016 (Ayamba, 2018).

In Nigeria, the National Identification Management Commission was founded in 2007 to not only give all Nigerians with a General Multi-Purpose Card, widely known as a national identity card, but also to offer a centralized national identity database that will enable law enforcement to have an easier time identifying lawbreakers, criminal offenders, and those who violate the state's peace and security (Eke et al., 2022; LawPàdí, 2021). However, the majority of Nigerians and permanent residents who have enlisted in the national identity management system still lack valid identification that they still carry many types of identities, such as a voter's card, a driver's licence, an international passport, a school identity card, a work identity card, etcetera, indicating a disjointed database and an unstructured identity landscape (Ayamba, 2018).

Even recently, the National Identity Management Commission challenged the Bank Verification Number (BVN) programme in Nigeria's legal right to register people using biometric information, claiming a major role in identifying affairs (Idoniboye-Obu, 2019; Ogah, 2021; Ogochukwu, 2019). Finally, an agreement was achieved in November 2016 to reconcile the databases and in order for Interpol's

attempt to link Nigeria's security and law enforcement agencies to its database to have the most impact, Nigeria had to first address her own identity management problem, which is the lack of a central identity (data) repository (ICPC Nigeria, 2022; Nwezeh, 2022; Royal, 2022).

Kenya has just completed registration for the country's new digital database, resulting in Africa's first population-wide identity programme (Gebre, 2022). President Uhuru Kenyatta stated during the project's commencement in January 2019 that his government will construct a central master population database that will be the accurate single source of truth (Munyua, 2019). According to a new report by the Ministry of Information Communications and Technology (MICT), the National Integrated Identity Management System, or NIIMS, is anticipated to assist government quickly identify its citizens, provide services efficiently and effectively, combat corruption, and come up with solutions to policy problems, and when departments can correctly identify individuals, overcoming differences in the way they retain information, and minimizing the opportunities for fraud or errors (Gebre, 2022). The national identity card is required to obtain a job, get married, acquire or sell land, or register to vote, in Spain, employees on contractual arrangement must use the national identity card issued to them to demonstrate work eligibility, and it also is used for the health care system in Kenya.

According to Heichlinger and Gallego (2010), the eID card (Documento Nacional de Identidad electr'onico - DNIe) was introduced in Spain in 2006, superseding offline identification papers. Three sets of digital certificates are saved on the card's microchip and are used to authenticate the ID card via a consensual authentication procedure, establishing an encrypted communication channel between the card and the operator. The second component is the digital signature certificate, which was designed to establish confidential communication channels between citizens and service providers, while the third component is the content commitment certificate, which is used to sign documents and has the same significance as a manual signature (Heichlinger and Gallego, 2010).

In Belgium, citizens and legal residents of fifteen years and above are required to carry their national identity card at all times. The card is used for banking, billing, rental agreements, proof of age when

buying alcohol and cigarettes, or entering an adult only business. National identity card is required for SIM-card registration in Peru, Ghana, Bangladesh, Kenya and Pakistan. In Uganda, Pakistan, Tanzania and Kenya, national identity cards double as passports (Obi, 2006).

In South Africa, the Department of Home Affairs (DHA) is the established legal institution within the South African government mandated to carry out the responsibility for identity management. Accurate and reliable data and information on all South Africans such as birth, marriage, death records and other vital statistics is a necessity for planning and formulating appropriate policy and programme responses to cater for the needs of South Africans. All these are essential services offered by the DHA. The policy on identity management is anchored in the DHA's crucial role as part of this critical function, as demonstrated when the State provides socio-economic goods and services such as non-contributory social assistance, housing, education and healthcare services to its citizens and other legally. In addition, for the economy to function to its full potential, identity management is used in various forms through multiple

channels, technologies and innovations by the private sector and its markets in financial services and transactions (DHA, 2020).

The DHA started replacing the previous green barcoded identity documents (IDs) with Smart ID cards within the national digital identity programme for years now, with efforts dating as far back as 2013, when the government introduced its SmartID cards as a replacement for the more vulnerable green ID book it was using until that point (Magoma, 2020). The SmartID cards came equipped with security features that were considered modern at the time, such as holograms and laser engravings, and were intended as a tool in the fight against rampant identity theft in the country.

The evolution of the country's ID system continued when in June of 2019 when it was announced by International Relations and Cooperation minister Naledi Pandor that the government was in the process of working on a new ID system that would employ biometric technologies (Bitzionis, 2020). "The new national identity system South Africa seeks to build will serve as a master source for civics and immigration management," said Naledi. "The modernization of South Africa's Home Affairs, when fully

and successfully implemented, will re-engineer and automate most of the key processes of the department and yield a significantly enhanced national identification system, and a credible national population register." Some of the main elements of the new system that Pandor highlighted are the ability to keep records of individuals throughout their lifetimes, the consolidation of birth, marriage, and death records into one system, and the capture of the biometric data of individuals during the visa application process (Bitzionis, 2020).

The article uses document analysis as a methodology. The author has formally requested interview with the DHA officials. Access has not been granted. Therefore, the article uses public documents like reports, media statements, policy documents and as well as published work on the topic.

The Evaluation of Identity Management in South Africa

The evolution and landscape of identity in South Africa are complex. The South African ID system has evolved over the years. Changes were initially made as a result of the shift from the apartheid regime to a democratic nation that sought to uphold the dignity of its people by providing them with comprehensive

ID documents (Magoma, 2020:9). In South Africa, the Pass Laws of 1952 compelled black South Africans to carry a pass book (ID), this internal passport system was designed to segregate and control the population (Kamble, 2018). Pass Laws severely limited the movements of black South African citizens by requiring them to carry a pass book, also known as a 'dompas', when outside their homelands or designated areas (Lele, 2017). Forgetting to carry a dompas resulted in arrest. Each year, over 125,000 blacks were arrested for technicalities regarding a dompas. In 1956, twenty thousand women marched to the Union Buildings in Pretoria to protest against the detested passbooks (Lele, 2017). The pass book became one of the most hated symbols of the country's apartheid system until the requirement was effectively lifted in 1986 (Magoma, 2020:10).

When South Africans lined up in their millions to vote during their first democratic elections in 1994, they all carried with them an ID to verify who they were. The green identity book was introduced, post-1994, as a compulsory ID document for all South African citizens above 16 years of age. This ID document was designed like a book, with a line barcode and a unique 13-digit ID number at the top, and featured a

photographic image. After many years of using a green ID book with limited security features, South Africa finally upgraded to what it is called a 'Smart ID card', which is on a par with identity systems used in Europe, Asia and America. The new card was launched on the 18th of July 2013 (Magoma, 2022:11).

In the post-apartheid period since 1994, the DHA has undergone several phases in terms of its strategic goals, focus of functions and operations. The historical legacy of the apartheid systems with the then Republic of South Africa, the TBVC states and self-governing territories meant that the attention was on building a unitary state with one single central authority. Consequently, the years 1994 - 2007 saw the DHA driven by the imperative to bring all South Africans into a single NIS by registering all citizens of the new Republic South Africa into one National Population Register (DHA, 2020). This critical initiative was accompanied by extending and expanding DHA services to areas that were historically underserved in terms of both infrastructure and services. Under these circumstances, the DHA needed to respond to broader national and international issues and global developments on identity management. This

translated into the DHA adapting, and implementing a number of policies and legislation that which have an impact on official identity management, and serves South Africa's national interests (DHA, 2020). The DHA, in realising its mandate, uses the following core legislation.

Current policy and legal framework
According to best international practice, ensuring data privacy and security requires a holistic approach to system design that incorporates a combination of legal, administrative and technical safeguards. South Africa has adopted general data protection and privacy laws that apply not only to the identity system, but to other government or private sector activities that involve processing personal data: The Constitution of South Africa 1996 provides for the right to privacy in terms of the common law and section 14. The White Paper on Home Affairs 2019, the DHA is positioning itself to deliver effectively against its mandate as a critical enabler of citizen empowerment, economic development, national security and an efficient State. The White Paper on Science, Technology and Innovation 2018 focuses on using Science, Technology and Innovation to assist in solving problems that, among

others, are associated with rapid technological advancement, geopolitical and demographic shifts, and fourth industrial revolution (DHA, 2020).

DHA legal and regulatory framework

The Department has multiple legislative and regulatory frameworks to manage identity and status of citizens and foreigners visiting or residing in South Africa (DHA, 2020). These are key legislation that regulate how personal data that is hosted in the DHA identity management systems is handled.

The Identification Act and Alteration of Sex Description and Sex Status Act 49 of 2003	This Act provides for altering the sex description of certain individuals under certain circumstances, amends the Birth and Deaths Registration Act 51 of 1992 as a consequence, and provides for matters incidental to this.
The Births and Deaths Registration Act 51 of 1992	This provides for the compulsory registration of births and deaths for both South Africans and non-South Africans.
The Citizenship Act 88 of 1995	This provides for the acquisition, loss and resumption of South African citizenship
The Identification Act 68 of 1997	This regulates compiling and maintaining a population register of the population of the Republic, for issuing identity cards and certain certificates to persons whose details are included in the population register.
The Immigration Act 13 of 2002	provides for regulating the admission of persons to, their residence in, and their departure from the Republic
The refugee act 130 of 1998	This Provides for the reception of asylum seekers and regulates application for and recognition of refugee status. It also provides for the rights and obligations of such status.

The Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act 4 of 2000	This provides for the prohibition of unfair discrimination based on race, gender, sex, pregnancy, family responsibility or status, marital status, ethnic or social origin, HIV and AIDS status, colour, sexual orientation, age, disability, religion, conscience, belief, culture, language and birth.
The Cybercrimes Bill 2019	This was created to regulate jurisdiction for cybercrimes, regulate the powers to investigate cybercrimes and impose obligations to report cybercrimes.
The Electronic Communications and Transactions Act 25 of 2002	This provides for facilitating and regulating electronic communications and transactions. It provides for the development of a national e-strategy for the Republic. It also promotes universal access to electronic communications and transactions and the use of electronic transactions by small, medium and microsized enterprises
The Promotion of Access to Information Act 2 of 2000	It gives effect to the constitutional right of access to any information held by the state and any information that is held by another person and that is required for to exercise or protect any rights. The Act also gives effect to the constitutional right of access to any information held by the State, and any information that is held by another person and that is required to exercise or protect any rights

(DHA, 2020: 28-30)

1. **Strong identity management's impact on development**

The importance of identification for people's rights and for development was recognized through adoption of the Sustainable Development Goal

(SDG) Target 16.9: "by 2030, provide legal identity for all, including birth registration." The right to an identity starting from birth as guaranteed in Articles 7 and 8 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) and to be recognised as a person before the law are critical first steps in ensuring lifelong protection and are a prerequisite for exercising other rights (World Bank, 2018:5). Furthermore, having an official way to prove one's identity may be required for many formal interactions, transactions, and services across the public and private sector. For example, verifying a person's identity against an official credential or registry is often required to open a bank account, vote in an election, obtain formal employment, and acquire a nationality. Register for school, enrol in health insurance, receive a social transfer, buy a SIM card, register property, cross borders, or seek legal redress (World Bank, 2018).

The contribution of NIM to sustainable development goals 17, for governments, private sector actors, and other stakeholders, being able to reliably identify people or verify certain attributes is critical for delivering programmes and services efficiently, effectively, and accountably. The ability to know who people are is essential for a number of government responsibilities, including targeting social programmes and ensuring that the correct people receive benefits; responding to emergencies, disasters, and epidemics that require rapid direct assistance; collecting taxes; reducing fraud in public wages; facilitating safe and orderly migration; and, in the case of civil registration, producing vital statistics for planning and monitoring development progress (World Bank, 2018:5). Essentially, a strong identity management is a precursor and a must to have strong institution in any modern nation state as it referees to SDG 17. A secure identification of citizens and foreign visitors and residents is a corner stone of credible government and private institutions and their processes. Countries who lack such a system lack credibility, as state and non-state actors use them for nefarious activities. As a result, it impacts their security and their ability provide services.

In certain private entities, verifying customers' identities to a particular level of assurance for certain services such as opening or allowing access to an account is necessary to mitigate risk, and protect clients against identity fraud and theft. When identification systems provide digital mechanisms for individuals

to authenticate themselves remotely in online contexts, they are also important enablers of an inclusive digital economy and underpin digital platforms across sectors, including for online services and digital payment systems (World Bank, 2018:7).

In comparison to paper-based registries, the adoption of digital technologies has the potential to increase the accuracy and reliability of identity data and credentials, automate processes to save money and increase convenience, and provide new platforms for innovations in service delivery. This includes improving governance and service delivery, increasing financial inclusion, reducing gender inequalities by empowering women and girls, and increasing access to health services and social safety nets for the poor (World Bank, 2018:6).

Despite the opportunities that come with improving identification, identification systems that are poorly implemented or inappropriately used can create a number of risks; these risks disproportionately affect already disadvantaged groups and can be amplified by digital technology.

Key risks include those related to exclusion or discrimination, data protection and privacy, and poorly designed and implemented identification systems that waste resources while offering few benefits. Vulnerable and marginalised groups are often the least likely to have proof of their identity, but also the most in need of the protection and services linked to identification (World Bank, 2018:10). Shockingly, during the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020, identity fraud cost South Africa over R1 billion (Cape Business News, 2020). This was largely due to money claimed from the TERS (Temporary Employee/Employer Relief Scheme) through fraudulent applications that could have been prevented with the correct ID authentication. The amount of R30 million of the TERS fund was paid to persons with invalid identification numbers, R696 million to refugees who had not made UIF contributions in the past year, and an astonishing amount of R440 000 was paid out to people who were dead (Magoma, 2022:15).

The overarching importance of identity management is evident and clear (DHA, 2020). In 1982, the South African government Department of Home Affairs, established the national population register (NPR) to enable it to store biometric data (fingerprints and face image) and other data specified in the Act. This register can be used to determine a person's identity, linked to the

biographical information and personal information for civil registrations, and compile and store particulars as stipulated in the Identification Act. However, as the NPR is outdated and only data stores are limited to citizens and permanent residents, it will be replaced by an inclusive and secure National Identity System (NIS). The NIS will become the backbone for systems, networks and platforms to facilitate providing goods and services to citizens and other legal persons, in the government-wide consolidation of processes and systems to enhance national security and in the contribution to economic development and growth (DHA, 2020).

2. The role out of the National Identity Management (NIM) in South Africa

The current DHA systems are not integrated and many processes are largely paper-based. Changes to identity and status that are made in immigration systems are only partially reflected in the National Population Register (NPR), using lengthy manual processes that are not reliable. The NPR was designed in the 1980s and data is often inconsistent or missing. Biometric and biographical data are stored on a mixture of paper and digital records that are neither reliable nor sufficiently secure. The existing operating model is based on one used before 1994 by white Home Affairs, characterised by clients queuing before a front office clerk to complete forms (DHA, 2020).

The DHA initiated a modernisation programme in 2012 with the aim of integrating and digitising its systems, and transforming its delivery systems to achieve the strategic objectives of inclusivity, national security, service delivery and meaningfully contributing to the government-wide agenda of a growing, inclusive economy (DHA, 2020). The new DHA systems and operating model will be built around the new NIS and linked to the systems for the civil registration of birth, nationality, citizenship, marriage and death. It will also be linked to the MCS and other immigration systems. The NIS will enable the DHA to manage all its functions efficiently and responsively, as the NIS will link the identity of all citizens and other persons in a country to their civil and immigration statuses. Interfaces between systems will mean that data is accurate and continually updated in real time (DHA, 2020). The NIS will support identification searches to establish the identity of a person with a given biometric, and

verification searches to confirm whether the identity document belongs to the person whose biometric is presented. It will be scalable and expandable to include additional biometrics such as iris scans, palm prints and footprint and facial recognition (DHA, 2020).

The modernisation programme consists of multiple projects: short-, medium and longterm. Elements that are being rolled out include the smart ID card, fully digital ID and passport processes, online capture of biometrics at ports of entry and upgrades to the movement control and biometric systems (DHA, 2020). The NIS will also be able to interface with other government and private sector identity systems (Bitzionis, 2020). The NIS will be developed in phases based on open standards to ensure seamless integration of all government IT systems. All modules will be developed as required and will be based on the functional and technical specifications that are based on reengineered business processes. Developing the NIS modules will be fully implemented once the information from the legacy systems (National Population Register (NPR), Home Affairs National Identity System (Hanis), Enhanced Movement Control System (EMCS), Movement Control System (MCS), Visa Adjudication System (VAS), and National Immigration Information System (NIIS), have been cleaned up. Every case requiring data clean-up should be tracked through a case management system to investigate and report on the nature of challenges encountered and progress made towards resolution of the cases detected (DHA, 2020). The NIS is the envisaged single source of all DHA client data. It will consolidate the data stored on the NPR, NIIS, MCS, EMCS, VAS and the visa system into one database (DHA, 2020).

The NIS has the following objectives:

- The main function of the NIS will be to ensure the storage and integrity of client data. All data that is concerned with the identity of a DHA client, citizen and non-citizen, will reside in the NIS. The DHA's business processes will be executed in front-end systems, such as Live Capture, and the NIS will only store the data generated from those front end systems. The NIS will provide access to its data via a catalogue of services, which in turn will be used by the interfacing systems to perform their functions (DHA, 2020).

The services that the NIS will provide can be broadly grouped as follows:

- Query: all interactions where data residing in the NIS is only being retrieved; i.e., the data from the NIS is merely used to accomplish some desired function, but remains unchanged after the interaction. This is inclusive of verification and identification, which entail more than the simple retrieval of data.

- **Modify:** all interactions where data residing in the NIS is only being updated or changed from its current value.

- **Create:** all interactions resulting in the genesis of a new record. Once a record is created, all subsequent interactions with it will be modify interactions.

- Insert: this is not a fundamental interaction type of the NIS but it is used to represent all interactions involving new information being entered into the NIS. This consists of both modify and create interactions.

- Retrieve: this is not a fundamental interaction type of the NIS, but it is used represent all interactions involving existing information being requested from the NIS.

- Push: this involves the automatic propagation of data from the NIS to any of its interfacing systems. Push services provide the capability to send data to external systems without necessarily being initiated by an external system to the NIS. These services are typically initiated when specific trigger events occur within the NIS, where it has been determined that an external system should be updated automatically upon occurrence. An example of this is when the NIS receives information about a v-listed individual. The NIS in turn will automatically push this information to relevant systems such as the risk engine, so that it too has the latest and most accurate version of the v-list.

- Deactivate: this is an interaction whereby the data of a record or the record itself is removed from the active set of the NIS and placed in an inactive set, which is only accessible with the requisite authorisation (DHA, 2020:55-56).

Given the pivotal nature of the NIS to the operations of the State and society, and the sensitive nature of the personal information contained in it, proper privacy and security measures will have to be put in place to protect it from unauthorised modification and external tampering or hacking. Key security measures will include biometric access control

including non-repudiation measures for officials and audit logging of any transaction processed on the NIS. The NIS will also ensure the secure issuance of enabling documents to eligible applicants. Important enabling documents will be secured by including security features. The introduction of the smart ID card and the new secure passport (an ICA compliant machine-readable travel document) are part of the security improvements that form part of the NIS rollout (DHA, 2020).

The successful implementation of the NIS will apparently lead to a substantial reduction in fraudulent transactions across the State and society. If the system is successful, the reduction in social grant fraud alone will more than enough to pay for its development over the medium term; new revenue streams could be generated; and many forms of partnerships developed.

The identity management system will be planned according to the following horizons:

Three-year horizon (April 2019 – March 2022): The focus is on putting in place the policy and legal framework for the population pegister and NIS. Five-year horizon (by March 2024): All core elements of the new population register and NIS are fully functional, including basic administrative and core business systems, and required security standards are maintained. That is, integration of DHA systems completed, the NIS interfaces with critical government systems, a single database for government and e-government platform is operational, the NIS interfaces with private sector systems, the NIS interfaces with systems of neighbouring countries piloted through the one-stop border post initiative. The population register is generating substantial revenue through large-scale verification of identity. Ten-year horizon (by March 2029) the envisioned end-state is achieved with the legacy model fully replaced, world-class standards maintained and funding assured (DHA, 2020).

Additionally, the HANIS which stores and processes the biometric data of citizens and non-citizens will reportedly be substituted in the near future by the Automated Biometric Identification System (ABIS), which will process and store biometric data of all persons, citizens and noncitizens (DHA, 2020).

Challenges for the implementation of NIS

The primary challenge of NIS lies in its design. Such systems are not unique. However, they are complex. DHA doesn't have a good track record in designing and maintaining systems. The frequent downtime of

the existing system should not be repeated. The challenges are both in the departmental shortcomings of not having skilled ICT experts and the general lack of ICT skills within government and country. In addition, the procurement process is prone to corruption like so many departments in South Africa. Therefore, the service provider has to be reputable and there has to be consequences if the service provider delivers sub-standard system. It is essential that all of the above challenges need to be addressed if DHA will have a reliable, responsive and scalable system.

The other challenge is that the roll out of this system. As indicated above, the department plans to roll out this system over the period of ten years. However, if the messy roll out Smart ID card is an indication, the roll out might take a lot more time. The challenges were of skilled man power, hardware being available at all the offices and other administrative challenges. Given the general challenges of DHA in providing services, it might be a tall order to expect the roll out to be smooth.

More importantly has to do with the perennial challenge in the South African public service. The country can boast one of the best systems in terms of the design of structures and systems. However, the implementation always falls short of the standard. The main reason is the corruption that plagues the public services and DHA in particular. The weakest link in any ICT system is the people who operate it. Therefore, the has to be a serious investment in insuring there is a tight control to insure controlled access, accountability and audit.

South Africa implemented an integrated national identity management system as a policy response to the country's objective of implementing a fully automated biometric ID system in order to eradicate and prevent social service corruption and fraudulent activities which are hard to track using decentralised identity management system (King, 2016). The current proposed Official Identity Management Policy (2020) demonstrates an intention to revolutionise government identity management and act in accordance with national development strategies, but there are clear signs that such policies may be inadequate to manage the circumstances of personal data risks associated with digitisation efforts in South Africa without the comprehensive and constructive application of the Protection of Personal Information Act across stakeholder groups

(Razzano, 2021). This is alarming, considering the implications for universal digital identification, and in light of the everyday experience of South African residents and noncitizens alike of inadequate service delivery in the field of identity management (Razzano, 2021).

Based on the history of other nations, there is little question that South Africa will confront several risks of exclusion, data security, and privacy concerns throughout the deployment of the integrated identity management system. It is worthy to note that similar implementation challenges have been raised in the context of Kenya. For example, a judgement by the Kenyan High Court raised concerns regarding the deployment of their integrated identity management system, notably around privacy and security, noting ongoing violations of data protection legislation (Bueermann and Fanti, 2022). This has great implication for the successful implementation of the identity management system in Kenya.

Similarly, public opposition stemming from a lack of sufficient consultations is a major obstacle in the deployment of an integrated national identity management system. India's Aadhaar system, for example, is frequently mentioned as a paradigm for centralised identifying systems that offer a "unique number from cradle to tomb." The South African authorities must learn about India's Aadhaar system which was implemented through a "Money Bill" without public consultation or enlightenment. The Supreme Court of India has heard a number of legal cases contesting the procedure by which it was approved, privacy issues, and the increasing emphasis it places on citizens to provide private information in exchange for access to public services, amongst many other things (Open Society Foundations, 2020).

Personal data breaches are mostly caused by the purposeful or unintentional release of information by persons with authorisation to process personal data, rather than by external hackers. In India, for example, as of June 2019, an estimated 210 government websites with legal access to data have exposed individuals' personal information, including one leak involving an estimated 135 million beneficiaries (Open Society Foundations, 2020). The Indian Attorney General stated in his submissions before the Supreme Court that the system was safe since it was protected by walls 13 feet long

and 5 feet high. In 2019, a study observed 5.8 million records released by a legitimate firm, Indane, a state-owned energy company, after Google crawled the company's website, compromising personal data of consumers (Moneylife, 2019) The adoption of an integrated national identity management system in South Africa will probably pose a significant risk of inaccuracy and marginalization of rural inhabitants (Sarfraz, 2019) the department takes deliberate steps to access rural inhabitants and faraway places on regular bases and respond to their challenges. In India, for example, the error frequency in basic demographic statistics can reach 8.8%, and biometrics, especially fingerprints, are infamously skewed against the poor, women, and manual workers, who may not have readable fingerprints (Jones, 2022; Open Society Foundations, 2020). Due to unreadable fingerprints, lack of energy, or connectivity concerns, some impoverished community It is clear that the major issues that the South African authorities will confront in implementing the integrated national identity management system include data privacy, resistance stemming from lack of public consultation, poor design framework and exclusion of certain individuals who are at

members (14% India's Andhra Pradesh and Telangana areas) were unable to confirm their identities (Open Society Foundations, 2020). DHA should learn from previous experience and the experience of other countries.

Conclusion

NIS can hopefully address the shortcomings of the current system. Despite the promises of the government and DHA, there is a serious concern to what degree this system will be a game changer. The country has lost credibility as a result of its insecure identity system where foreign citizens have used to enter the Western countries. It has directly impacted South African citizens to get easier access to other countries. In addition, the current system is not optimal to facilitate online services as it doesn't integrate different government functions. Despite the challenges, NIS has the potential to secure the system and add value to the knowledge economy.

disadvantaged position such as those living in the rural slum. According to Wagner and Ferro (2020), data protection principles define the circumstances under which personally identifiable information handling is legitimate, restricting the capacity of both government authorities and private actors to

accumulate, publicly release, publicise, and use individual personally identifiable information without the permission of the person (Wagner, and Ferro, 2020). These standards also outline data subjects' rights, such as the right to know who has information about them and how that information has been used (Wagner, and Ferro, 2020). Furthermore, data privacy standards put many duties on individuals who handle personal information including the data controller and processor in both the public and private sectors, requiring them to treat this data in accordance with local data protection laws (Bu-Pasha, 2017; Cordeiro, 2019; Lindqvist, 2018; Tikkinen-Piri, Rohunen and Markkula, 2018; Wolters, 2017). As a result, Privacy International (2018, p. 10) states that "a robust data protection framework can empower individuals, restrain harmful data activities, and minimise data exploitation."

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